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ABSTRACT 
 
 
TURKEY AND THE BALKANS IN THE POST –COLD WAR ERA: 
DIPLOMATIC/ POLITICAL, ECONOMIC AND MILITARY RELATIONS 
 
 
Ekinci, Didem 
 
Ph.D., Department of International Relations 
 
Supervisor: Asst. Prof. Nur Bilge Criss 
 
 
April 2009 
 
 
This dissertation argues that as a region in which Turkey has been no stranger since 
the end of the 14th century, the Balkans poses political, military, and economic 
significance for Turkey. Turkey has strong historical ties with the Balkans; the region 
is a strategic link between Turkey and Europe; Ankara is concerned that the Turkish 
minority in the region remain integrated in their host countries; and there is also a 
remarkable amount of Balkan immigrants in Turkey who are influential on Ankara’s 
Balkan policies. Therefore, Turkey’s engagement in the regional developments 
intensified after 1990. However, the intensity of relations lost momentum after 1995 
due to more pressing domestic and foreign policy issues, causing a lack of strong 
cooperation network between political, military and economic fields. In this 
framework, the main research questions in this dissertation will be based on finding 
under what circumstances Turkey’s political, diplomatic, economic and military 
relations towards the region have been formulated after 1990 and whether (and how) 
these policies displayed continuity or disruptions became possible throughout. It 
argues that well-worked policies towards the region can be achieved if political, 
diplomatic, economic and military relations are treated evenly.  
 
 
 
Keywords: Balkans, Turkey, post-Cold War era, politics, diplomacy, economy, 
military, UN, NATO. 
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ÖZET 
 
 
SOĞUK SAVAŞ SONRASINDA TÜRKĐYE VE BALKANLAR: 
DĐPLOMATĐK/SĐYASĐ, EKONOMĐK VE ASKERĐ ĐLĐŞKĐLER 
 
 
Ekinci, Didem 
 
Doktora, Uluslararası Đlişkiler Bölümü 
 
Tez Yöneticisi: Yrd. Doç. Dr. Nur Bilge Criss 
 
 
Nisan 2009 
 
 
Bu tez, 14. yüzyıldan bu yana Türkiye’nin yabancısı olmadığı bir bölge olarak 
Balkanlar’ın, Türkiye açısından siyasi, askeri ve ekonomik önem arz ettiğini 
savunmaktadır. Türkiye’nin Balkanlar’la güçlü tarihi bağları bulunmaktadır; bölge, 
Türkiye ve Avrupa arasında stratejik bir bağ teşkil etmektedir; Ankara için bölgedeki 
Türk azınlığının bulundukları ülkelerde entegre bir biçimde yaşamaları önem 
taşımaktadır; ayrıca Türkiye’de, Ankara’nın Balkan politikaları üzerinde etkili, 
önemli sayıda Balkan kökenli nüfus bulunmaktadır. Bu sebeplerden ötürü, 1990 
sonrasında Türkiye bölge olaylarına daha fazla dahil olmaya başladı. Ancak, 
ilişkilerdeki yoğunluk, daha acil cevap bekleyen iç ve dış politika konuları nedeniyle 
1995 itibarıyla ivme kaybetmiş, bu da siyasi, askeri ve ekonomik alanlar arasında 
güçlü bir işbirliği ağı eksikliğini beraberinde getirmiştir. Bu çerçevede, bu tezdeki 
temel araştırma soruları, Türkiye’nin 1990 sonrasında bölgeye yönelik siyasi, 
diplomatik, ekonomik ve askeri politikalarının hangi koşullarda formüle edildiğini ve 
bu politikaların bir süreklilik mi sergilediği yoksa duraksamaların meydana gelip 
gelmediğini (ve bunların nasıl oluştuğunu) bulmak temelinde olacaktır. Bölgeye 
yönelik iyi hazırlanmış politikaların; siyasi, diplomatik, ekonomik ve askeri 
ilişkilerin eşit derecede ele alınıp değerlendirilmesiyle elde edilebileceği 
belirtilmektedir. 
 
 
 
 
Anahtar Kelimeler: Balkanlar, Türkiye, Soğuk Savaş Sonrası dönem, siyaset, 
diplomasi, ekonomi, ordu, BM, NATO. 
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CHAPTER I 
 
INTRODUCTION 
 
 
The coverage of Balkan issues and Turkey’s post-Cold War relations with the 
Balkans to date gives the impression of the approach that the issue should be devoted 
more scrutiny, and yet this is not reflected into practice. Relevant research on the 
issue is observed to be redundant concerning the pre-1990 period, however there are 
not as many comprehensive researches on the post-1990 period. Furthermore, 
particularly after the wars in former Yugoslavia, one feels compelled to argue that 
from Turkey, the Balkans have even come to be perceived as a region composed of 
two states only, and their meaning for and relations with Turkey. In the relevant 
Turkish literature, the majority of the scholarly pieces seem to focus on the war in 
Bosnia and Turkey’s relations with Bosnia – Herzegovina and Kosovo. Given this, 
the dissertation aims to examine diplomatic/political, economic, and military 
relations of Turkey with the Balkan states namely, Bosnia – Herzegovina, Serbia 
(and Montenegro), Croatia, Macedonia, Albania, Kosovo, Romania, Bulgaria, and 
Greece with special emphasis on the post-Cold War era, and by doing so it attempts 
to contribute to filling in the relevant void in the Turkish literature.  
The subject matter is obviously comprehensive and interrelated, and at this 
point, it must be stated that the actors and the subjects presented are with no 
exception rapidly changing, complex, and still unfolding. The main argument in the 
 2 
dissertation is framed around the assumption that the Balkans have been underrated 
in Turkey’s relations and the diplomatic/political field has been treated with a higher 
concern, downplaying the impact of economic and military relations. Indeed, these 
venues are, interrelated and have the potential to consolidate one another if explored 
and exploited duly. The primary concern of this dissertation is therefore to examine 
how Balkans were placed in Turkish foreign policy making after the Cold War in the 
three fields, with a multidimensional approach.  
Just as it is fundamental to develop individual policies towards each of the 
regional countries, it is equally fundamental to devise a revised and well-worked 
common policy towards the entire region, covering all venues, presenting a holistic 
approach, and without prioritizing a particular one. It goes without saying that just as 
events and issues faced by the countries examined in this study in the aftermath of 
the Cold War were of considerable importance, those which will face the countries 
concerned in the upcoming years are no less significant. For instance, the Bosnian 
war did not remain limited within the boundaries of Yugoslavia. Although it was 
labeled as a civil war by the European states in the initial phases of the war itself, it 
later boiled down to regional and international developments. It gave way to the 
subsequent engagement of the Western states and Turkey was no less engaged. As 
things stand now, the recent independence of Kosovo and contending approaches to 
the issue remain unsolved, and are likely to come to the surface once again in the 
region.  
Apart from the objective to contribute to filling the void of a 
multidimensional approach in current Turkish literature, another significant objective 
of this study is to develop insight for future relations and to make policy 
recommendations. The changes in the region are likely to pose challenges for 
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decision makers, and that implies Turkish decision makers, too. The degree of 
intensity of the changes remains to be seen as these changes unfold in the ensuing 
years. Yet, it can safely be presumed that increased and rapid confrontation in the 
region, such as possible problems Bosnia and Kosovo, could bring about novel and 
substantial policy discords. That, unquestioningly, necessitates an informed and well-
worked policy towards the region.  
If we are to present a concise summary of Turkey’s policies in view of the 
region in the post-Cold war era, the status of Turkish and Muslim minorities in the 
Balkans stands out as a considerable priority for Turkey, which stemmed from the 
assimilation policies implemented by the Bulgarian government from 1985 to 1989. 
As every crisis in the Balkans caused the displacement of the Turks and erosion of 
their acquired rights, Turkish policy makers tried to pursue a line which would 
ensure preservation of these acquired rights. After the break-up of war in Bosnia, 
Turkey tried to establish a bilateral and multilateral network of relations with all 
Balkan states. While Turkish foreign policy makers assumed a leadership role as 
mush as Turkey’s power, capacity and skills allowed, it also tried to prevent a 
regional actor from becoming a regional hegemon. When the irreversible wave of 
change in the international system, regional systems, and dissolution of Yugoslavia 
came about almost simultaneously, Ankara both tried to understand this new 
conjuncture and determine Turkey’s attitude. The expected role from Turkey in this 
new conjuncture was to contribute to security, which would increase its geopolitical 
importance in due course. Furthermore, Ankara tried to bring the regional states into 
Euro – Atlantic structures as much as it could after the war ended. Nevertheless, 
although bilateral and multilateral relations were promoted by Turkey, they did not 
amount to the presentation of Turkey as a preponderant state in the region since the 
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contours of the relations were determined by the U.S.A.. Apart from its diplomatic 
and political efforts, Turkey tried to revive economic ties with the country by signing 
free trade agreements for instance. It also embarked into a new cooperation era in 
military terms with regional states. The essence of Ankara’s diplomatic/political, 
economic and military relations with Balkan states was aimed at good neighborliness 
and establishing permanent peace, however, this did not go beyond minimum 
stability in the region.1 
A few words are in order regarding the terminology and the chapter sequence 
of the dissertation. The term “Balkans” shall refer to the countries mentioned above. 
Bosnia and Bosnia – Herzegovina shall be used interchangeably. The dissertation 
neither employs an approach which clusters formerly Communist and non-
Communist countries nor takes one to examine their diplomatic/political, economic, 
and military relations individually. Instead, it deals with all of them in individual 
chapters regarding diplomatic/political, economic, and military venues, upon the 
preliminary background provided in the first two chapters, taking into account the 
existing state of affairs. Although Serbia and Montenegro separated in 2006, the 
dissertation examines relations with the two states under one subheading in the 
subsequent chapters due to the recent nature of the separation. Finally, all relations 
are handled in a chronological order, however there are no internal time frames in 
this chronological sequence due to the complex nature of relations and abundant 
number of states. 
Upon such background, the first chapter is devoted to the overview of the 
historical backdrop as to how Turkey fits in the Balkans and the examination of how 
the region came to be labeled as a synonym for instability over the centuries. The 
                                                 
1
 For more information, see Mustafa Türkeş, “Türkiye’nin Balkan Politikası’nda Devamlılık ve 
Değişim”, Avrasya Dosyası, Balkanlar Özel, 14(1), 2008, pp. 253 - 280 
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change in Turkish foreign policy making in the early 1990s towards an active stance 
and its relation to foreign policy making in the Balkans is also addressed. The second 
chapter is a preparatory section to better comprehend the existing state of affairs 
between Turkey and the regional states. It concentrates on the history of Turkey’s 
relations with the Balkans from the end of the Great War to the end of the Cold War, 
examining the contours of Turkey’s Balkan policy during the interwar period, the 
Balkan Entente (1934), World War II, Communism and Balkans, the Balkan Pact 
and the Alliance (1953), the Stoica Plan, and the succeeding decades up to the 1990s. 
The third chapter investigates bilateral diplomatic/political relations of the post-Cold 
War period in length. The fourth chapter explores Turkey’s bilateral economic 
relations with the regional states in post-Cold War era. Finally, the fifth chapter 
investigates Turkey’s military relations with the regional states in the post-Cold War 
era. 
As for the literature on the Balkans and particularly the war in Bosnia, Noel 
Malcolm’s Bosnia – A Short History provides a full history of Bosnia, yet more 
importantly, it negates the Western European claims that the war in Bosnia was 
inevitable due to deep rooted ethnic hatreds, and argues that the destruction came 
from outside Bosnia, that is, from Serbia proper, based on the misinformation and 
disinformation of Western political figures throughout the war. As such, Malcolm’s 
book has high relevance to what this study maintains in the relevant section. The 
exact opposite approach to the war in Bosnia is seen in Robert Kaplan’s Balkan 
Ghosts where the journalist – author has brought together, what may be called, 
literary travel writing with reporting. In his travel itinerary, Kaplan’s formulation of 
the issue that internal hatred was a driving force in Yugoslavia falls out of the scope 
of this dissertation, as well as his writings on Romania, Bulgaria, Greece, and 
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Albania predicting the capacity of the region for large scale bloodshed due to old 
ethnic hatred, again missing out the point that the war in Bosnia was devised from 
outside Bosnia, and thus seeing no role on the part of the Western political figures. 
The book constitutes a good example of the relevant opposite approach which was 
reportedly blamed for former U.S. President Bill Clinton’s hesitant stance concerning 
intervention, and his use of Kaplan’s portrayal of the Balkans to provide justification 
for U.S. intervention. Concerning the war in Bosnia in general and the Srebrenica 
massacre through the end of the war in July 1995, David Rohde’s A Safe Area is the 
most comprehensive work consisting of definitive account of events, narrative, and 
analysis. As it is the product of an on-site research at the time of the event, it 
provides a detailed and thoroughly factual account of Europe’s worst massacre since 
World War II. The strength of the book lies in the reconstruction of the ten-day 
period from 6 July – 16 July 1995 which changed the course of the war in Bosnia 
around the personal experiences of three Bosnian Muslims, two peacekeeping 
soldiers, and two Serb soldiers. In other words, it combines all actors. Rohde’s book 
relates to this dissertation in understanding the peak of the war as well as the modus 
operandi of ethnic cleansing which happened under the noses of the UN 
peacekeeping units. Apart from putting in detail what was going on, it can be said 
that the book also has an ability to tell in advance what happened soon in Kosovo. 
Last but not least, the book is important to see that the West missed several 
opportunities to end the war. The most powerful aspect of the book is to demonstrate 
that in reality the Dutch peacekeepers proved to be witnesses to the massacre, who 
were even awarded for their success afterwards. A general historical account of the 
region is also found in Mark Mazower’s The Balkans whose strength lies in its 
concision. In line with the argumentation in this study, the book takes the view that 
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the Balkans does not necessarily entail ethnic and religious conflict as opposed to the 
commonplace Western arguments concerning the region. For one thing, The Balkans 
successfully argues that it was the West that has come to define violence in the 
Balkans as inherent, despite being an outsider. Europe’s Backyard War: The War in 
the Balkans by Mark Almond portrays West’s fallacious attitude towards the war 
when the politicians balked at recognizing the newly independent Yugoslav republics 
and therefore rather than supporting the integrity and independence of the newly-
born states, they wanted to see Serbia establish the order. Almond makes the point 
that this was why the West opted for describing the developments as a civil war. 
Branka Magas’ The Destruction of Yugoslavia – Tracking the Break–Up 1980 – 92, 
documents who destroyed Yugoslavia and how, and puts the blame on Slobodan 
Milosevic as well as his state-sponsored nationalism treating non-Serbs as a group of 
people to be cleansed. The response of the West had been that of a failure to 
distinguish between the aggressor and the victim, and as such, strengthened 
Milosevic’s hand. Magas’ book successfully argues that while the West had rallied 
around the “never again” principle after the holocaust, this proved to be left in words 
only.  
Oral Sander’s, Balkan Gelişmeleri ve Türkiye starts from the premise that 
although Turkey is a gateway between the Balkans and the Middle East, there is no 
significant and illuminating regional research in the period up until the date of its 
publication (1968). As such, it constitutes the ever all-inclusive study on Balkan 
issues in Turkish and Turkey’s relations with the Balkans spanning from the end of 
Word War II to 1965. Itself being a Ph.D. dissertation, it explores the region 
thoroughly dating back to the 19th century and Turkey’s relations with the region as 
of the end of World War I in a chronological account. The book brings into light 
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various moments and developments which put their imprint on their respective times, 
such as World War I, the interwar period, World War II, and Communist era, etc. 
One of the strongest aspects of the book is its immediate observation of the necessity 
for Turkey that it should rearrange its relations with the regional states beyond the 
understanding of minimum goodneighborliness, back in 1968. Moreover, its ability 
to foretell the future rocky relations with Greece is evident in its reminder that 
Turkey should not forget that Greece was a Balkan state and therefore relations with 
the country was of utmost importance concerning both bilateral and regional 
relations. Regarding the alliance between Greece and Serbia during the Balkan wars 
in the last decade, Takis Michas’ Unholy Alliance summarizes the book with his 
remark that “[w]hat seemed incomprehensible during the Bosnia and Kosovo wars 
was not so much that Greece sided with Serbia, but that it sided with Serbia’s darkest 
side (p. 4).” Michas explores Greece’s attitude towards Macedonia and Kosovo and 
links that to Greece’s response to the Balkan wars to argue that the westernizing 
experience of Greece which began in the 19th century was now over. The book 
strongly characterizes the nature of the alliance between Greece and Serbia as being 
not holy as opposed to commonplace arguments by of maintaining that the Orthodox 
Church in Greece is not a religious but a political institution. Therefore, it was an 
“unholy” alliance one which stemmed from the ideology of nationalism. Unholy 
Alliance constitutes an exemplary book of its kind as one which dispels relevant 
official Greek arguments concerning the Bosnian and Kosovo wars. In addition, an 
edited volume on bilateral economic relations between Turkey and Greece, Greece 
and Turkey in the 21st Century: Conflict or Cooperation, provides both overall Greek 
– Turkish bilateral relations in the Balkan context and economic relations, the EU 
dimension in the two states’ relations, and their respective defense economies. Apart 
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from being recent, the book also fills a niche concerning these issues which had not 
been available in the relevant international literature, written by Turkish and Greek 
scholars. This is yet another book that makes clear that complex bilateral relations 
should be examined in a multidisciplinary way, in line with the main approach of this 
dissertation.  
Other scholarly pieces on the issue include Christopher Cviic’s Remaking the 
Balkans, Chuck Sudetic’s Blood and Vengeance, Sabrina Petra Ramet’s Balkan 
Babel, Misha Glenny’s Fall of Yugoslavia, and Norman Cigar’s Genocide in Bosnia. 
Regarding Turkey’s relations with other regional states, mostly national scholarly 
pieces have been used, which include Balkan Diplomasisi (Ömer E. Lütem and 
Birgül Demirtaş – Coşkun eds.), Makedonya Sorunu Dünden Bugüne by Murat 
Hatipoğlu, Türkiye – Yunanistan – Eski Sorunlar, Yeni Arayışlar (Birgül Demirtaş – 
Coşkun, ed.), Bulgaristan’la Yeni Dönem by Birgül Demirtaş – Coşkun, White 
Papers 1987, 1990, 1992, 1995, 1998, and 2000 by the Ministry of Defense, 
Balkans: A Mirror of the New International Order (Günay Göksu Özdoğan – Kemali 
Saybaşılı eds.), and Turkish Grand National Assembly Journal of Minutes from 1989 
to 2006, among many others. The list is not exhaustive and presents a variety in 
related sections. Within this framework, the dissertation is arranged in a way to build 
upon both scholarly pieces as well as empirical data from newspapers and news 
agencies due to the contemporary nature of the subject matter. The absence of a 
similar study in Turkish literature makes the exploration Turkish - Balkan relations 
in such a framework worthwhile and I sought to handle the issue with such an 
approach which permits the inclusion of diplomatic/political, economic, and military 
fields. I hope this study may help explore a region which has been explored to date 
 10 
with insufficient attention with respect to Turkey’s relations. Certainly, involuntary 
mistakes belong to me. 
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CHAPTER II 
 
TURKEY AND THE BALKANS: AN OVERVIEW  
 
  
2.1. THE HISTORICAL BACKDROP: HOW DOES TURKEY FIT IN THE 
BALKANS? 
 
Relevant literature is replete with introductory remarks which usually depict the 
Balkans as noted for its significance for Turkey. This dissertation shall be no 
exception to this depiction. Historical evidence suggests that Turkey has been no 
stranger to the region since the end of the 14th century, when the Ottoman 
domination of the region began. The Ottoman Empire dominated the Balkan 
peninsula until the beginning of the 18th century, which would in the course of the 
next two centuries be pushed back territorially until the end of World War I.1 
 With the proclamation of the Republic in 1923, Turkey sought to establish 
peaceful relations with a view to consolidating its new frontiers. Indeed, the Balkan 
states ranked among the first with which Ankara established friendly relations. 
During the Cold War, Turkey’s foreign policy focused on the well-being and the 
protection of the Turkish minority in the Balkans and on acting as the protagonist of 
                                                 
1
 J.F. Brown, “Turkey: Back to the Balkans?” in Turkey’s New Geopolitics: From the Balkans to 
Western China, Graham Fuller and Ian O. Lesser with Paul Henze and J.F. Brown, eds. (Boulder: 
Westview Press, 1993), p. 141. 
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the Pax Americana after 1952, when it became a NATO member.2 The self-
accommodation of most of the regional states within the Warsaw Pact was observed 
as having worked to the detriment of Turkey when these states joined the Communist 
bloc in the Cold War period, thereby constituting a barrier before cooperation 
opportunities in the region.3 Due to the polarization, Turkey never really had a 
chance to develop its relations in its “normal” course with the integration of Balkan 
states (Romania, Bulgaria and Yugoslavia) into the Soviet sphere of influence.4 The 
Balkans ended up a region where American and Turkish interests coincided; a sphere 
of ideological confrontation and power struggle between the U.S.A. and the 
U.S.S.R., whereas Turkey, beyond playing a role in the containment of the Soviets, 
also had concerns with respect to regional security and economic considerations.5 
Indeed, Turkey has always been in favor of good bilateral relations with the Balkan 
                                                 
2
 Dilek Barlas, “Turkey and the Balkans: Cooperation in the Interwar and Post-Cold War Eras” 
Turkish Review of Balkan Studies 4 (1998/1999), p. 72. Barlas states that like the other Balkan states, 
after 1952, Turkey’s role was relegated to regional politics and that the regional states partook in 
international affairs in broader schemes through integration with international organizations as NATO 
and the Warsaw Pact thereafter. In the wider historical context, the Balkans has always occupied a 
significant place in Turkish foreign policy. After signing the Treaty of Lausanne, Turkey tried to 
restore its relations with the Balkan states, which was one of the important tasks in its foreign policy. 
The idea of Balkan Entente, which was masterminded by Mustafa Kemal Atatürk, was materialized in 
1934 and was signed in Athens by Turkey, Greece, Romania and Yugoslavia. Bulgaria was not a 
signatory as it had territorial demands from Greece. The Entente did not prove long-lived partly 
because it coincided with the rise of fascism and Nazism in Europe and it withered away with the 
outbreak of World War II. The second important progress with regard to cooperation in the Balkans 
was recorded during the Democrat Party period. In the period concerned, Washington wanted a 
cooperation agreement to be concluded between Turkey and Greece, as two NATO members with 
Yugoslavia. Thus, it would be possible to pull Yugoslavia – which did not have friendly relations with 
the U.S.S.R. – to the Western camp. Due mostly to such a framework, Turkey, Greece and Yugoslavia 
signed a Treaty of Friendship and Cooperation in Ankara on 28 February 1953. Known as the Balkan 
Pact, this treaty did not prove long-lived either, because the close cooperation atmosphere which the 
treaty envisaged did not exist in the region at the material time. There were various disputes between 
Turkey, Greece and Yugoslavia. When Soviet foreign policy took on a milder form and thus 
decreased the threat vis-à-vis Yugoslavia in 1954, Belgrade, as a supporter of non-aligned movement, 
began to depart from the Balkan Pact framework. On the side of Turkey and Greece, the Cyprus issue 
began to take on a rocky nature and caused even further deterioration of this trilateral pattern. See also 
Ergun Balcı, “Cem’in Balkan Gezisi”, 30 October 1997, Cumhuriyet.  
3
 Esin Yurdusev, “1945-1989 Döneminde Türkiye ve Balkanlar,” in Đsmail Soysal ed., Çağdaş Türk 
Diplomasisi: 200 Yıllık Süreç, (Ankara: Türk Tarih Kurumu, 1999), p. 376. 
4
 Graham Fuller, “Turkey in the New International Environment” in F. Stephen Larrabee ed., The 
Volatile Powder Keg: Balkan Security after the Cold War, (Washington D. C.: The American 
University Press, 1994), p. 142. 
5
 Đlhan Uzgel, “Doksanlarda Türkiye Đçin Bir Đşbirliği ve Rekabet Alanı Olarak Balkanlar” in Gencer 
Özcan and Şule Kut eds., En Uzun Onyıl, (Đstanbul: Boyut, 1998), p. 406. 
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states and supported limited efforts to establish a regional political cooperation that 
started in the late 1980s.6 By the mid-1990s, the new structure in international 
politics prompted Turkey to preoccupy itself more with the Middle East than the 
Balkans, while Greece focused on the Cyprus issue and Tito’s Yugoslavia paid 
attention to the non-aligned movement. Put differently, the Balkans did not display a 
cooperative picture in this period. The Communist Balkan states – perhaps with the 
exclusion of Bulgaria – remained marginal for Turkey7 and the primary objective 
shaping foreign policy came out as preventing Greece from acquiring a superior 
position in the region whilst preserving the status quo with the remainder of the 
Communist regional states. However, during 1989 – 1991, when Communism was in 
retreat, Soviet control began to disappear. Thereafter, “[the] Balkans history not only 
returned, but also seemed to be making up for lost time.”8 As the post-Communist 
U.S.S.R., the post-Communist era in the Balkans opened up new questions about the 
future relations of Turkey with the Balkan states as they regained their independence 
after the “communist night”.9 The post-Communist era did not seem to bring a 
positive fresh start to the region. It appeared that “Balkanization”, once again, was 
well under way. 
 
 
 
                                                 
6
 Heinz Kramer, A Changing Turkey: The Challenge to Europe and the United States, 2000, on 
http://brookings.nap/edu/books/08157500234/html/162.html#pagetop. p. 146. 
7
 Baskın Oran, “Türkiye’nin Balkan ve Kafkas Politikası” Ankara Üniversitesi Siyasal Bilgiler 
Fakültesi Dergisi, 50 (1-2) (January – June 1995), p. 271. For a similar argument, see Unfinished 
Peace: Report of International Commission on The Balkans, Foreword by Leo Tindemans 
(Washington D.C.: The Brookings Institute Press, 1996), p. 134. The Report writes that the Caucasus, 
Central Asia and the Middle East also pose equally pressing interest and for Turkey, these regions 
have strategic priority over the Balkans, yet in emotional terms, the Balkans loom larger.  
8
 Brown, “Turkey: Back to the Balkans?” in idem, Eastern Europe and Communist Rule, (Durham: 
Duke University Press, 1989), pp. 263-293, 317-383, 415-444; and idem, Surge to Freedom: The End 
of Communism Rule in Eastern Europe, (Durham: Duke University Press, 1991), pp. 181-245. 
9
 Fuller, “Turkey in the New International Environment,” p. 142. 
  14 
2.2. “(RE)BALKANIZATION”:  A SYNONYM FOR INSTABILITY? 
 
Could Paul Scott Mowrer as a journalist have foreseen that the negative geopolitical 
impact of the Balkans expressed through the term “Balkanization”, launched by him 
back in 1921, would prove so persistent in the course of time? The answer to the 
question lies in the age old and recent history of the Balkans and our concern for the 
subject relates to the latter. In literal terms, “Balkanization” referred to:  
 
the creation in a region of hopelessly mixed races, of a medley of 
small states with more or less backward populations, economically 
and financially weak, covetous, intriguing, afraid, a continual prey to 
the machinations of the great powers and to the violent promptings of 
their own passion.10 
 
 
 One may argue that not every use of the term endorses all the components in 
this definition as most scholarly works seem to refer to fragmentation primarily, in 
their use of the term. Be that as it may, the breakdown of Communism brought back 
the concept as a synonym for instability, even before the war in Yugoslavia placed 
the region at the core of the international policy agenda.11 
 Notwithstanding, since the disintegration of Yugoslavia and the retreat of 
Soviet power from Europe, the process of Balkanization had come visible once again 
back in 1990s, after seventy years.12 The signs after 1990 of clashes in Croatia and 
talk of independence in Slovenia brought warnings from different circles such as the 
diplomats, scholars, and intelligence agencies regarding the danger of Balkanization 
                                                 
10
 Lene Hansen, “Past as Preface: Civilizational Politics and the ‘Third’ Balkan War” Journal of 
Peace Research, 37(3) (May, 2000), p. 350. Hansen cites Maria Todorova, Imagining the Balkans 
(Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1997), p. 34.  
11
 ibid., pp. 350-51. Hansen cites James Der Derian, Antidiplomacy, Spies, Terror, Speed and War 
(Oxford: Basil Blackwell, 1992), pp. 141-169; and Ole Wæver, “Securatization and Desecuritization” 
in Ronnie D. Lipschutz, ed., On Security, (New York: Columbia University Press, 1995), pp. 72-75. 
12
 Murat Yetkin, Ateş Hattında Aktif Politika – Balkanlar, Kafkaslar ve Orta Doğu Üçgeninde Türkiye 
(Đstanbul: Alan, 1992), p. 192. 
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and Yugoslavia’s disintegration.13 It has been argued that the agencies of concern 
such as the CIA and also the desk officers of Western departments of state and 
foreign affairs were well informed of the events and they tried to draw public 
attention to the dangers during 1990.14 However, they were mostly dismissed out of 
hand:  
 
... not because they were unconvincing but because the prospect did 
not seem to present any threat to the interest of major powers. No 
longer needed to contain the Soviet Union, not considered capable of 
sparking a wider war since great power competition was a thing of the 
past or capable of disrupting Western economies, Yugoslavia and its 
fate were not significant.15 
 
Perhaps “the Balkans” still inspired disparaging descriptions, attributions of 
backwardness, corruption, or even in the popular way of thinking, Dracula and the 
Orient Express at best,16 and the general euphoria and self-confidence in the West 
based on the idea that threats to security were declining with the retreat of 
Communism and that economic interests and opportunities would shape the new 
world order.17 
 As Nelson had estimated back in 1991, it proved certain that a smooth 
transition from Communism towards democracy was made far more difficult by the 
resurgent Balkan issues and that the larger European integration and security was 
troubled by (re)Balkanization.18 When diplomatic maneuvers proved futile and a 
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 Susan L. Woodward, Balkan Tragedy – Chaos and Dissolution after the Cold War (Washington D. 
C.: The Brookings Institute, 1995), p. 148. 
14
 ibid., p. 454, see footnote 4 of Chapter 6 titled “Western Intervention”. Woodward writes that there 
is one leaked report of the CIA, dated November 1990, regarding the issue. 
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 ibid., p. 148. 
16
 Daniel N. Nelson, Balkan Imbroglio – Politics and Security in Southeastern Europe (San Francisco: 
Westview Press, 1991), p. 1. 
17
 Woodward, Balkan Tragedy – Chaos and Dissolution After the Cold War, p. 148; and Murat Yetkin, 
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preponderance of power was necessary to bring peace to the region,19 it was seen that 
the famous film title Im Balkan nichts Neues (‘All Quiet in Balkans’) which the 
writers on the Balkans had been articulating in their own way during the Cold War 
years would not match with the new Balkan developments. Indeed, by 1990, there 
was a lot of news from the Balkans20 which would coincide with active foreign 
policy making in Turkey. 
 
 
2.3. NEW DIRECTION IN TURKISH FOREIGN POLICY IN THE EARLY 
1990s: ACTIVISM  
 
The term “active foreign policy” was a concept introduced by former President 
Turgut Özal with reference to explaining the policy pursued during the Gulf War. It 
was articulated more concretely in former Prime Minister Mesut Yılmaz’s 
Government’s program in July 1991 read in the Turkish Grand National Assembly, 
which stated that Turkish foreign policy would take on an active path thereafter.21 A 
brief descriptive account of foreign policy restructuring in the first half of the1990s is 
in order here, because, in the face of developments in the Balkans and elsewhere, 
Turkey had already begun to restructure its foreign policy from being “the tail end of 
Europe into the center of its own newly emerging world” in Fuller’s description of 
the state of affairs.22 Observations of the matter endorsed the self-evident view that 
                                                 
19
 Raymond Tanter and John Psarouthakis, Balancing in the Balkans, (New York: St. Martin’s Press, 
1999),  pp. 132-133. 
20
 Christopher Cviic, Remaking the Balkans, (London: Pinter Publishers, 1991), p. 1. 
21
 Murat Yetkin, Ateş Hattında Aktif Politika – Balkanlar, Kafkaslar ve Orta Doğu Üçgeninde Türkiye, 
p. 240. 
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Union, (Santa Monica, CA: Rand , 1997), p. 66 cited in Muhittin Ataman, “Leadership Change: Özal 
Leadership and Restructuring in Turkish Foreign Policy” in Alternatives: Turkish Journal of 
International Relations 1(1) (Spring 2002), p. 147. 
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this was an abandonment of Turkey’s traditional policy of non-involvement in 
regional conflicts in the new post-Cold War openings.23 This entailed that the main 
thrust of Turkey’s response to the new post-Cold War situation was to pursue a more 
active role in the regions surrounding its borders – the Balkans, the Caucasus, 
Central Asia and the Middle East.24 
 As the mastermind of this strategy, Turgut Özal, prime minister from 1983 to 
1991 and then president until his death on 17 April 1993, played a central role both 
in the formulation and the execution of this strategy. At the core of this strategy was 
the belief that Turkey could continue to be a valued ally of the West only by 
expanding its regional role and influence.25 
 It has been argued that both during his prime ministry and his presidency, 
within the scope of active foreign policy making, Özal acted upon a grandiose 
mission to make Turkey one of the ten or fifteen most developed countries in the 
world and accordingly took the initiative and chose to act individually regarding 
foreign policy issues.26 He also expressed his views on sensitive foreign policy issues 
and critical problems with other countries without even consulting the Ministry of 
Foreign Affairs at times and he justified this attitude by emphasizing that he was 
responsible for the security of the country as President and Head of the National 
Security Council.27 
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 I.P. Khosla, “Turkey: The Search for a Role” in Strategic Analysis, XXV(3) (June 2001) on  
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(Spring 1997), p. 45. 
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 ibid. 
26
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 In the wider context, Turkey began to follow a diversified, active, daring and 
outward-oriented foreign policy which seemed to be a clear contrast to the Western 
oriented, élite-formulated and pro-status quo foreign policy making. Within the new 
framework, it was not surprising to see that Özal administration signed more 
international agreements than any other administration until then Turkish history.28 
Özal’s conduct of foreign policy was an overt departure from Turkey’s non-
involvement in the regional affairs and that included the Balkans as well. While 
many in Turkey and the West assumed a much reduced role for Turkey as a regional 
actor and an ally of the West, these calculations proved devoid of any ground as the 
new active foreign policy contrasted remarkably with the passive approach that 
characterized Turkish foreign policy before the Gulf War.29 In Paul Kennedy’s (et 
al.) use of the term, Turkey qualified as a “pivotal” state par excellence30 due to its 
location at the nexus of the Balkans, the Middle East and the Caspian region.31  
 After most of the postwar period during which Turkey largely neglected the 
Balkans and regarded the region in secondary importance,32 Turkish policy was now 
in flux with renewed interest in the Balkans.33 Turkey established closer relations 
with countries which had a high percentage of Muslim population. Some circles 
argued that Özal’s official visits to Bulgaria, Macedonia, Albania and Croatia in 
1993 were a “[h]istorical step toward overtly expressing friendship with Muslims 
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 Anavatan Partisi Genel Başkanı ve Başbakan Turgut Özal’ın Konuşmaları, 16-31 October 1989, 
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while containing aspirations of Yugoslavia and Greece.”34 It has also been 
maintained that the alleged Ottomanist – Islamist approach towards the region was 
seen as a policy of balancing against the “Orthodox Christian – Slavic” bloc in the 
Balkans.35 The project that materialized within the framework of active foreign 
policy towards the region was the Black Sea Economic Cooperation (BSEC) 
launched by Özal in 1992. The positive response of the states invited to join the 
BSEC was to be coupled with the acknowledgment by the former Soviet Republics 
that Turkey was their gateway to the West. It seemed that “the Balkans, the Caucasus 
and the Middle East” framework that Özal had in mind was well under way.36  
 The dramatic shift from the traditional status quo foreign policy making to 
Özalist proactive and diversified alliance patterns and regional foreign policy led the 
supporters of the former attitude to consider Özal’s active foreign policy as 
adventurism.37 From afar however, Turkey, under the leadership of Özal, was seen 
far ahead of the material time. According to an American diplomat, “Turkey [was] 
living ten years ahead of its time.”38 
 Although the concept of active foreign policy was not welcome by the 
Ministry of Foreign Affairs, so much as to cause one superior diplomat to say that 
the term should be rid, and not well-received by the military alike, the ensuing years 
until mid-1990s proved that it was to be adopted. As mentioned above, the term 
“active foreign policy” had found expression in Mesut Yılmaz’s government 
program and remained in Demirel – Đnönü government program as a more contoured 
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policy – though not with the same intensity - defined as “integration into the new 
world order.”39 Afterwards, Turkey had to balance this activism with self-restraint in 
face of foreign reactions and fears that Turkey might be tempted to “play the Muslim 
card” at some point.40  
Although Turkish foreign policy pursued its traditional path in the early 
1990s, this did not last long with regard to the Balkans. The last section of the 
chapter shall proceed with exploring Ankara’s policies toward the region. However, 
before that, an account of the road to Balkan developments in the early 1990s is in 
order for the sake of laying out the causes of resurgent turmoil in the region. 
 
 
2.4. PRELUDE TO BALKAN TURMOIL  
 
A short travel in finding out the commonalities that laid the ground for future conflict 
in the Balkans reveals at least six factors.41 First, nationalism gained new 
acceleration which had a profound spill-over effect in terms of both domestic and 
foreign policy making in the region. Indeed, this momentum assumed such a pace 
that both regional states and Western states tried to develop and use the term 
“Southeast Europe” in their description of the region with a view to averting the age-
old reputation of the Balkans as a “powder keg”. Second, the ex-Communist party 
members and activists pursued nationalist policies within the newly established 
socialist parties while the liberal-oriented parties came to power but were replaced 
soon due to lack of liberal experience and opposition background in, particularly, 
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Bulgaria, Romania and Albania. Third, the struggle for influence in the Balkans in 
the 1990s took on a new shape as the Soviet factor had now diminished. While 
Russia tried to maintain influence on the new Yugoslavia and Greece, the role of 
Germany, Turkey, the U.S.A., and Italy increased in the region. Fourth, a number of 
new states emerged after the disintegration of Yugoslavia leading to the 
establishment of new bilateral relations. Fifth, although the new structure was 
expected to bring political and ideological variety, it brought a one-dimensional 
structure in domestic and foreign policy making. For all regional states, with the 
exception of Yugoslavia, liberalization, privatization, and integration with Western 
organizations became a top priority. Sixth, and related with the fifth, the regional 
states went through the burden of the transitional period. The hope and the will to 
liberalize remained, yet they were built on fragile state structures and non-existing 
liberal experience.42 
 This “slow-motion”43 but irreversible disintegration in Yugoslavia would 
pose new challenges to both regional states and outsiders as ensuing years proved. 
Although this disintegration prima facie might have sounded as good news for some 
circles, the tuning in the region brought hot war, replacing the Cold War. It was seen 
that the aftermath of Communism was not a clear break with the past because 
Communism had taken deeper roots than assumed. The new Balkans seemed hard to 
lend itself to a quick compromise. Unlike the European countries that had undergone 
transitions from authoritarian to democratic systems such as Spain, Greece and 
Portugal, the Balkan states had to go through a dual transition which suggested that 
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they would have to change their political and economic systems simultaneously.44 
The main actors on the new Balkan stage were the regional states, Russia, Western 
Europe, Austria, Hungary, Italy and Greece and they were to have their share from 
the developments and their repercussions after Croatia and Slovenia declared 
independence which confirmed the conclusion that Yugoslavia had broken down 
irreversibly. Amidst this Balkan turmoil was Turkey, having to face the daunting task 
of handling the issue which was to take its place among other pressing foreign policy 
issues such as the PKK terrorism, the war between Azerbaijan and Armenia, and the 
middle-East in the 1990s with new activism in foreign policy. 
 
 
2.5. A SHORT TRAVEL IN THE RELATIONS BETWEEN TURKEY AND 
THE BALKANS IN THE POST-COLD WAR ERA 
 
As stated in the previous sections, a remarkable activism was observed in the Balkan 
connection of Turkish foreign policy in the early 1990s which gave rise to neo-
Ottomanist arguments by the regional states.45 The evaluation of these arguments 
shall be elaborated in the following sections, however it can briefly be stated at the 
outset that Turkey sought to improve the previously existing links and to establish 
itself more prominently in the region.46 A considerable portion of Turkey’s 
population, approximately 10 percent, has ties with the Balkans. Similarly, there are 
people of Turkish origin living in the Balkans. As Kramer notes, this led to a revival 
of the concept of Dış Türkler (Turks abroad) as a significant factor shaping Turkish 
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regional foreign policy in the early 1990s.47 Turkey’s Balkan policy was regarded as 
a natural expression of existing geographical, historical, and cultural links from the 
viewpoint of decision makers in Ankara.48  
 In the wake of the events in the Balkans, Turkish concern and fears grew by 
1991, however the sequence of developments in the following year was not quite 
expected in Ankara, and beyond that, the Balkans were not a top priority issue in the 
first half of the same year since the pressing policy agenda included issues such as 
the war between Azerbaijan and Armenia, the Gulf War, and PKK terrorism. Turkey 
also had to include in its agenda the need to lay the basis for improving the relations 
with the former Soviet Union.49 Yet, upon growing number of reports and news on 
ethnic cleansing and detention camps, Turkey inevitably became more involved 
Balkan issues in its active foreign policy framework. The upheaval in the Balkans 
caused a feverish debate in the Turkish media and public opinion that could not be 
overlooked by policymakers.50 Indeed, “it was becoming increasingly involved in a 
situation it would like to have avoided but now it could not.”51 The involvement was 
shaped by the strong Turkish public opinion that something must be done in Bosnia, 
the aloof stance of Western states who initially were inclined to suggest that the 
situation in Yugoslavia was a civil war and should be handled by those states 
themselves; and finally the pressure from the Muslim states.52 In face of such a 
conjuncture,  
 
Ankara’s policy of defining and pursuing Turkish national interests in 
the Balkans has had to maintain a balance between often exaggerated 
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and interventionist public expectations, limited national means of 
action for creating stability in Turkish terms, constraints on the design 
and implementation of multinational regional architectures emanating 
from the conflict-ridden regional political pattern, and the necessity to 
keep Turkish policy in line with the policies of its western allies.53  
 
 Kramer’s assessment above captures Turkey’s concerns at the material time. 
In this connection, it is also worthy to note that not only such domestic concerns but 
external factors have been among factors that determined Turkey’s Balkan policy: 1) 
the Balkans were regarded as a strategic link between Turkish and Western Europe 
2) almost three million Turkish citizens live in Western Europe, 3) the Balkans are 
seen as a gateway for Turkish trade route, and 4) the Balkans would continue to 
attract Ankara’s attention as long as Turkey’s foreign policy is shaped by a lasting 
interest in integrating with the European institutions.54 Although these factors will be 
handled in the following sections, suffice it to say that they indicate that Turkey 
would be one of the players that would shape the Balkans’ future.55  
 Several analyses concluded that in Turkey’s overall post-Cold War foreign 
policy within the paradigm of “daring versus caution,” as one scholar has done in a 
1998 study;56 caution has dominated over daring with regard to Balkans - except for 
the active foreign policy of the first half of the 1990s. Yet some arguments asserted 
that Turkey acted aggressively in the Balkans.57 It was suggested that Turkey tried to 
play the card of Islam in the Balkans; Greece also maintained that Turkey’s activities 
in the Balkans were a set of efforts to create a Muslim axis. Taking the view even to 
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further geographical locations, this view also asserted that Turkey tried to do the 
same with regard to the Middle East, the Caucasus and Central Asia. 58 What 
followed from this argument was that “the unsuccessful attempt to play a major role 
in the Caucasus and Central Asia turned Turkey’s attention to more traditional 
directions, having to do with its Ottoman past: the Middle East and the Balkans.”59 
From such a point of view, the use of Muslim ties and the Ottoman past constituted 
the cement of creating the supposed Muslim – Ottoman axis in Europe, the so-called 
green corridor. 
However, it should be noted that Ankara shaped its Balkan diplomacy in 
conformity with the principles and policies of the international community and 
refused to unilaterally participate in any possible military intervention. As Gangloff 
writes, for instance, when NATO issued an ultimatum to Serbia in February 1994, 
Turkey backed the initiative but offered its participation in air strikes only for logistic 
purposes.60 Close cooperation with the international community implied that Turkey 
had acted in concert with Washington. There was a similarity between Turkish and 
American policies regarding the region. It has been correctly argued that Turkey 
helped the U.S.A. in the region since the latter did not have any pre-cognizance of 
the region.61 Ankara worked hand in hand with Washington particularly on sensitive 
issues such as the ethnic tensions in Bosnia, Macedonia and Kosovo,62 and it signed 
military agreements with Macedonia and Bosnia-Herzegovina in August 1995 and 
January 1996, respectively, only after the U.S.A. got involved in the settlement of the 
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conflict in Bosnia-Herzegovina in 1994-1995, and recognized the Former Yugoslav 
Republic of Macedonia (FYROM) and signed military agreement with it.63 
 It has been argued that Turkey’s role, to a certain extent, in the Balkans could 
be compared to the geostrategic equivalent of Germany’s attraction for most of the 
old Soviet Empire in Eastern Europe.64 Although not in similar vein as the neo-
Ottomanist charges, it has been argued that Turkey mattered so much in the region as 
Germany did in Europe. This argument was depicted most clearly in The Times 
editorial under the title “The Sick Man Recovers” with the following words:  
 
No sooner has Germany begun to stretch its muscles across Central 
Europe than another historical ghost is emerging to the south. Turkey 
not only boasts a vigorous growing rate; it is now actively intervening 
in the economies of its sickly neighbors.65 
 
Noting Turkey as the already largest single source of foreign investment in 
Romania and Bulgaria, it has been maintained that from Brussels, it was still a 
developing country, however, from Bucharest (or Tashkent), it was a dynamic 
regional power. From the latter two, Turkey’s well-stocked shops, thriving 
agriculture and developing infrastructure, a new Germany could pull them out of 
their stagnation and Turkey’s contribution to regional influence could be 
invaluable.66 In this connection, taking into account Mark Eyskens’67 remark that the 
European Community (EC) was back then an economic giant, a political dwarf, and a 
military worm, it would not be erroneous to claim that this was confirmed by the 
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EC’s failure to handle the crisis in former Yugoslavia situated in a region which was 
a test ground for the EC.68 
 It can be argued that both the neo-Ottomanist assumptions and others, as laid 
out above, charging Turkey with the said allegations seem to have missed out the 
point that Turkish decision makers were conscious that they had to act prudently in 
their relations with the Balkan states and avoid any impression that might be 
patronizing the newly emerged states as the “big brother” in the most colloquial 
sense of the term.69 In the course of time, this self-restraint received so much 
criticism from senior academics and various circles.70 Indeed, Turkey went to great 
lengths to avoid giving the image that it followed a neo-Ottomanist strategy and that 
it would become “a future protagonist in the Balkans” as one Greek scholar 
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commented.71 In this regard, it has been argued that Turkey’s cautious foreign policy 
in the Balkans enjoyed support in some circles particularly in the very early phases 
of the Yugoslav conflict. To give one example, although the Turkish press showed its 
reaction to the ethnic cleansing in Knin and Vucovar in 1991, it was also recorded 
that although there were high casualties and destruction in Croatia, the Serbs were 
taking revenge upon the Croats who had “butchered” the Serbs during World War II 
in collaboration with the Axis powers.72 However, later on, this attitude did not prove 
to outweigh in relation to the one which accused Serbian policies and practices. 
 The activism in the first half of the 1990s lost previous momentum in the 
second half of the same decade to the extent that it found articulation in the agenda 
of the Turkish Grand National Assembly (TGNA) as a separate topic. In spite of the 
fact that Turkey existed in the Balkans in diplomatic/political, economic, and 
military terms, it lacked the organization between these venues to attain targeted 
levels in relations with the regional states, as one analyst had observed in 1999.73 
Almost a year later, the heads of TGNA Balkan States Interparliamentary Friendship 
Group requested in a written letter to former President Süleyman Demirel, former 
Prime Minister Bülent Ecevit and former Foreign Minister Đsmail Cem that Turkey’s 
Balkan policy be reformulated. This platform included Hayati Korkmaz from Bursa 
(Democratic Leftist Party/Bulgaria), Kemal Vatan from Đzmir (Democratic Leftist 
Party/Macedonia), Turhan Tayan from Bursa (True Path Party/Greece), Fahrettin 
Gülener (Democratic Leftist Party/Albania), Hüseyin Kansu from Đstanbul (Virtue 
Party/Bosnia-Herzegovina) and Turhan Đmamoğlu from Kocaeli (Democratic Leftist 
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Party) and laid out the parameters to be taken as basis.74 Following the letter, and 
after negotiation with the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, it was decided that a briefing 
be held to be attended by the deputies who were members of the commission. It was 
further envisaged that the Ministry of Foreign Affairs would revise its Balkan policy 
taking into consideration the arguments raised by the said deputies.75 One 
noteworthy remark in the said letter at the turn of 2000 was: 
 
it should be known that Greece’s influence on the regional states is likely to 
increase due to the membership demands of these states. In the Balkans, as a 
gateway to Europe, Turkey has to maintain its friendly relations with states in 
face of Greece. It has to play a more active role and closely follow the 
developments in the Balkans…76 
 
Furthermore, stating that economic relations with the region were weak and 
fragile, the letter listed certain initiatives which Turkey could take at the time. Some 
among these were listed as 1) Macedonia should be accepted to the BSEC; 2) Balkan 
population studies should be carried out; 3) organized inventories of the Đstanbul – 
Durres Highway be established; 4) Eximbank credits should be increased; 5) private 
sector should be encouraged to invest more in the region; 6) political contacts and 
consultations should be made more frequently.77  
It can be argued that this request for revising the regional policy echoed a 
frequently used phrase “Turkey has no Balkan policy” in the words of one deputy.78 
Such a judgment may be too straightforward and rough, or even banal, to be accepted 
in scholarly terms. However, it may well be accepted that, as mentioned, Turkey can 
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have a contoured Balkan policy if organization between diplomatic/political, 
economic and military venues is provided. 
Most recently, from the European Union (EU), Turkey and the Balkans 
perspective, impacts of Turkey’s possible EU membership on the Balkans have been 
on the agenda of relevant debates. It has been maintained that if Turkey becomes a 
full member of the EU, regional integration will be reinforced or it will be hastened; 
the solution of bilateral problems will be easier; Turco-Greek cooperation will serve 
as a locomotive in solving the conflicts in the region; democratization and respect for 
human and minority rights will gain new momentum and; irredentist and 
ultranationalist tendencies will be enervated.79 One feels compelled to argue that 
these assumptions largely depend on an assumed given and are by no means 
exhaustive or all-inclusive. To give one example, Turkey’s relations with Serbia and 
Bosnia-Herzegovina, for instance, may not follow the same expected course in a 
scenario that posits Turkey as a member of the EU, or a prospective membership 
may further increase the rivalry between Turkey and Greece in the Balkan context as 
the Balkan states might want to have closer relations with Greece and Turkey as two 
members that can pave the way for the regional states for future membership.  
Given the historical background of relations between Turkey and the Balkans, 
the assumptions regarding Balkanization, the outlook of the Balkans in the early 
1990s, and activism and caution in Turkish foreign policy, it is for the following 
sections to proceed with exploring the evolution of Turkey’s diplomatic/political 
relations with the regional states upon such background in a comprehensive time 
frame from the early days of the Republic to date. 
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CHAPTER III 
 
TURKEY AND THE BALKANS: FROM THE END OF THE 
GREAT WAR TO THE END OF THE COLD WAR 
 
 
3.1. CONTOURS OF TURKEY’S BALKAN POLICY DURING THE 
INTERWAR PERIOD 
 
Even though Turkey’s policies towards the Balkans had the imprint of common 
history, geopolitical location, and cultural values, it was first and foremost shaped 
by Atatürk during the interwar period. Therefore, it has been rightly argued that 
the Balkan policies of the interwar years were those formulated by Atatürk.1 The 
components of Atatürk’s Balkan policy may be examined with different 
approaches depending on the method and nature of analysis. Ten components were 
substantial in shaping Atatürk’s Balkan policy, which are of course tentative but of 
equal significance: 
 1. Realism: Realism was observed as the main pillar in the Balkan policies 
and it was based on the objectives defined in Misak-ı Milli (National Oath). 
Turkey achieved success in the Lausanne Peace Treaty negotiations with the 
realist stance it assumed and drew the boundaries of the new Turkish Republic 
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with this realist framework. For instance, it renounced part of the claims in Thrace 
as well as the actions filed for compensation. Likewise, it did not put forward an 
assertive attitude concerning the Dodecanese islands and the Aegean islands, all 
constituting thorny issues.2 
 2. Tactical Expertise: Tactical success was seen as important as strategy 
towards the Balkans. For instance, Turkey did not allow the regional states to form 
a hostile front against Turkey and followed closely the Little Entente supported by 
Italy. 
 3. Openness for Dialogue: The policies towards the Balkans were also 
based on keeping dialogue channels open. Personal contact between high level 
officials was seen beneficial as a tool in conducting successful diplomacy. In this 
context, many high level Balkan politicians were invited to Turkey.3  
 4. Knowledge of History, Understanding the Present, and Interpretation of 
the Future: A well-known fact, Atatürk’s deep knowledge of history and use of 
experience proved useful in many future prospects. For instance, he estimated 
future developments in Germany after 1933, the approximate outbreak date of 
World War II, the failure of Italy, the defeat of Germany by the U.S.A., and the 
final victory of the U.S.S.R. during his conversation with General Macarthur in 
November 1932.4 
 5. Reliability: Turkey acted in accordance with the National Oath in law 
and practice, which in turn gained the approval of the regional states. 
 6. Being Self-Reliant and Entering Alliances: Atatürk’s foreign policy 
making also rested on the premise that states which were not self-reliant were not 
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likely to govern themselves independently. It was also based on entering into 
alliances if and when Turkey’s interests so demanded. For instance, when Italy 
attacked Ethiopia in 1935, this was also perceived as a threat for Turkey which led 
Turkey to ally with Britain. However, before that, one of Turkey’s main opponents 
in Lausanne was Britain. 
 7. Active Foreign Policy: Turkey followed an active foreign policy for its 
national cause during the National War of Liberation and the Montreux 
Convention. It assumed a pioneering role in the 1934 Balkan Entente as well. 
 8. Nationalism – Humanitarianism: Atatürk’s foreign policy was in line 
with nationalism yet it was not on extreme lines. Although the defeated powers of 
the Great War - Italy and Germany - were swayed into extreme forms of 
nationalism in the 1920s and 1930s, this was not what happened in Turkey. In this 
context, Atatürk told the participants of the Balkan Conference in Ankara in 1931 
that the only way to make human beings content would be a movement which 
would bring them together.5  
 9. Western-Oriented Foreign Policy: The basic pillar of Turkish Foreign 
Policy after independence was its western-oriented nature. In the interwar period 
when states signed countless nonaggression and friendliness pacts, Turkey tried to 
be part of the European family of nations in political and economic terms, which 
continued during World War II.  
 10.”Peace at Home, Peace in the World”: Turkey observed this principle 
after 1923 which helped produce a friendly atmosphere towards Turkey on the part 
of other states and that applied to the Balkans as well.6 Upon such backdrop, 
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Turkey’s foreign policy towards Yugoslavia, Romania, Albania, Bulgaria, and 
Greece can be summarized briefly as follows. 
 a. Yugoslavia: Following the formation of Yugoslavia in 1918, the 
Yugoslavian officials began to pursue a friendly foreign policy towards the 
regional states. During the Turkish War of National Liberation, Britain asked for 
Yugoslavia’s support against Turkey. However, this was turned down by 
Yugoslavia and a copy of the relevant letter explaining the refusal was also sent to 
Atatürk. This was returned by Atatürk by allotting a land for the Yugoslav 
Embassy to open in Ankara. In the course of the War of National Liberation, 
Atatürk also stated that Turkey would in no way enter a secret or an open alliance 
against Yugoslavia. Later on, the relations between Turkey and Yugoslavia were 
based on such a cooperative framework.7 
 b. Romania: Relations with Romania followed a friendly path mostly due 
to the lack of any territorial and minority-related problems. The two states became 
signatories of the Balkan Entente and direct bilateral political relations began in 
1933. 
 c. Albania: The predominantly Muslim society in Albania and occupation 
of significant posts by Albanians in the Ottoman Empire in the past had already 
brought the two states close in the pre-1923 period. The relations improved when 
Interior Minister Ahmet Zogu annulled monarchy in 1922, which in fact lasted 
only 6 years. The relations were strained when Zogu’s sister Saniye Sultan 
married Prince Abid, the son of Abdülhamid II. 
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 d. Bulgaria: In April 1920, Atatürk sent a letter to Bulgarian Prime 
Minister Stamboliski on behalf of the newly established Turkish Grand National 
Assembly, which was the first step to build diplomatic relations. Following this, a 
Bulgarian delegation came to Ankara and Atatürk sent a representative to 
Bulgaria. Relations improved not only in the political and diplomatic realm, but 
also in culture, science and education, sports, and economy.8 
 e. Greece: Despite the experience of war, Turkey and Greece were 
successful at making up for the nature of bilateral relations. The seemingly 
unsolvable problems such as the établi issue, Turks in Western Thrace, the status 
of the Orthodox Greeks, and the Patriarchate in Đstanbul were solved, averting a 
possible war.9 
 
 
3.2. EPISODE I: BALKAN ENTENTE (1934) 
 
As the first attempt of its kind, the Balkan Entente was signed in February 1934 by 
Turkey, Greece, Romania, and Yugoslavia. The agreement intended to guarantee 
the signatories’ territorial integrity and political independence against threat by 
another regional state. In this connection, the Balkan states aimed to transform the 
Balkans into a stable and secure region. Despite the hostilities among them, the 
Balkan states engaged in efforts to form a Balkan union. As the most war-torn 
country after World War I which was swayed into economic depression in the 
immediate aftermath of the war which was coupled with remarkable loss of 
territory, Bulgaria was the first state to attempt to build a rapprochement with the 
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regional states. Bulgarian Prime Minister Stamboliski visited Belgrade and 
Bucharest and proposed the establishment of an impartial commission to find a 
just solution for the Macedonian problem. According to Stamboliski, the solution 
of this issue could bring the two states closer in Southeast Europe and could even 
lead to their organization as one state. However, this was not welcomed by 
Belgrade and Bucharest, which emerged as the winners of the war and did not 
want to discuss the issue at the table. This encouraged internal enemies of 
Stamboliski. Eventually, he was assassinated by Internal Macedonian Revolution 
Organization and soldiers who wanted close relations with Italy which was against 
a bloc in the Balkans. After Stamboliski, all military governments which took 
power in Bulgaria followed revisionist and extreme types of nationalism, 
something not uncommon in Europe at the time. It was such behaviors by Bulgaria 
that other Balkan states were prompted to come up with the inclination to build a 
union. However, one of the most significant impediments before this idea was the 
rocky relations between Turkey and Greece.10 However, rapprochement between 
Turco-Greek relations began in 1930. The Locarno Pact, Briand - Kellogg Pact, 
and Litvinov Protocol also contributed to regional cooperation. Indeed, the first 
steps for a Balkan union did not come from the Balkan governments per se, but 
through informal efforts. In the peace conference held in Athens in October 1929, 
Chairman and former Greek Foreign Minister Alexander Papanastasiou repeatedly 
put forward the idea of a Balkan Entente and all Balkan delegations approved the 
idea and the first Balkan Conference took place in Athens. These conferences 
were held annually afterwards in Đstanbul, Bucharest, and Thessaloniki, which 
paved the way for the establishment of Balkan Trade and Industry Chamber, 
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Maritime Office, Agriculture Office, Tourist Federation, Law Commission, and 
Medical Federation.11 Turkey assumed an active role for realizing political 
cooperation and received the approval of Bulgaria, which in fact proved futile 
later. Taking into account that the Little Entente12 which had assumed a 
continuous status as well as the National Socialism in Germany in 1933, the 
regional states were also prompted to act. Turkey and Greece decided to conclude 
a cooperation pact in the Balkans and forwarded their inclination to Bulgaria. 
When Bulgaria expressed its reluctance, Turkey and Greece signed the Entente 
Cordiale in 1933, which intended to secure the common borders for a period of 10 
years. While this pact raised negative concerns on the part of Bulgarians, it 
prompted Romania to sign a friendship, nonaggression, and arbitration and 
cooperation agreement with Turkey, mostly for two reasons: concerns over 
Bulgaria’s revisionist attitudes and Romania’s maritime trade links with Turkey 
which provided passage through the Straits. Yugoslavia followed suit by way of 
signing a similar agreement with Turkey in 1933 due to Bulgarian revisionism, 
and Italy’s growing control in Albania which had the potential to expand. 
Needless to say, the Turkish role in these bilateral agreements would be pivotal. 
Given these three bilateral agreements, it was time to merge them together under 
one agreement which materialized with the Balkan Entente.13 
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 The initially low levels of cohesion which were supposed to grow in fact 
loosened in face of the ensuing developments as the political situation in Europe 
underwent turmoil. In particular, there were fluctuations in Yugoslavia’s domestic 
and foreign policy. However, Yugoslavia preserved political solidarity and 
continued negotiations with Turkey until 1939. In general, the regional states 
could at least discuss issues among themselves and sometimes act together. For 
instance, they discussed the stance to be taken in case of a possible pact between 
France, Russia, and Italy, the integrity of interests of the Balkan Entente in face of 
the 1935 French – Italian pact, and the guarantee to be given to Austria.14 
Following the conclusion of the agreement, the Ministry of Foreign Affairs sent 
the following letter to the embassies, explaining the scope and the aim of the pact: 
 1. The core of the Entente is the fact that the agreements aim to keep the 
territories within and between Balkan states safe from assault and attack. None of 
the four states have undertaken any obligation vis-à-vis another concerning 
borders outside the Balkans. 
 2. Just as other governments, Turkish government also invited Bulgaria to 
join the Entente. However, the government, which is observed to value certain 
emotional concerns, did not accept the invitation. 
 3. Although the significance of the Entente in Turkish foreign policy is 
obvious, this does not imply any change in the foreign policy pillars observed to 
date, it does not conflict with mutual commitments with other states.15  
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 Just as it was Turkey which assumed a pivotal role in the conclusion of a 
Balkan agreement, it was also Turkey that loyally adhered to the Entente until it 
came to an end. However, loose cooperation between the regional states which 
was intended to be eliminated was never eliminated due to certain weaknesses. For 
instance, a secret agreement was signed together with the Entente. In accordance 
with this agreement, if a party was attacked by a non-Balkan state, and a Balkan 
state helped the aggressor, the other parties would declare war on this Balkan 
state. However, the compromise did not materialize since Turkey informed the 
Soviet Union that it would not help Romania in case of a war between the Soviet 
Union and Romania. Likewise, Greece stated that this secret agreement would not 
lead to war between Greece and Italy.16 That said, it can be argued that the 
collapse of the Balkan Entente was fivefold. First, the Entente was an easily 
dissolving group of relatively weak states which had a restricted objective. The 
member states appeared to have neglected that they also had territories to be 
defended against powerful states. Turkey realized this and that was why it opted 
for a strong organization which would be capable of defending these boundaries 
against great powers, thinking that such an organization could function as a 
balancing factor vis-à-vis European blocs.17 Second, the mistake made before the 
Great War was repeated by way of dividing the Balkan states into two hostile 
camps. In more specific terms, leaving Bulgaria and Albania out turned the 
Entente itself into an issue. Bulgaria and Yugoslavia eventually inked a friendship 
and nonaggression pact in 1937. This rapprochement harmed the spirit of the 
Entente and accelerated its dissolution. Third, when Italy attacked Ethiopia in 
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1935, and the League of Nations proved ineffective; it was observed that France, 
which was seen as influential on the Balkans, looked weak. This also had its own 
impact on the Entente states. The participation of the Entente states in the 
economic measures decreased their trade with Italy, which proved in the interest 
of Germany, which could bolster its trade relations with the Balkans. This is one 
of the reasons why some of the Entente states allied with Germany later on. 
Moreover, the dictatorships which emerged in the Balkan states in the interwar 
years facilitated German penetration in the Balkans. Fourth, the Entente could not 
go further than being a mere military alliance. The Entente could not materialize a 
comprehensive understanding as it did not lead to the establishment of substantial 
organizations. Fifth, the parties had diverging views on foreign policy. Greece was 
the most important state in this respect. Greece wanted secure boundaries only 
with Bulgaria and did not want to defend Yugoslavia in case of a possible war 
between Italy and Albania as it did not want to risk a war with Italy. What Turkey 
stressed most was the militarization of the Straits which was demilitarized after 
the Treaty of Lausanne. Romania wanted the issue to be discussed in the Balkan 
Entente conferences and wanted Turkey to consult Romania in advance regarding 
the issue. Yugoslavia and Romania were in compromise with respect to enhancing 
the Entente. Yet, while Romania approved the improvement of French – Soviet 
relations, Yugoslavia did not like the idea because it still hosted the ambassador of 
the Tsarist Russia to Belgrade.18 On the other hand, the Entente had not received a 
welcome by Czechoslovakia, either. This was to be coupled by a deepening 
depression in Europe and the appearance of Berlin – Rome Axis by 1936. When 
German influence became visible in 1936, Romania feared Germany more than it 
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feared Bulgaria and Hungary and thus weakened its ties with the Entente. 
Yugoslavia preferred to cooperate with Italy and Bulgaria in face of the said 
Axis.19 The problems were discussed during the Council of Ministers meeting in 
Belgrade in 1936. Greece’s reservation regarding Italy and Turkey’s militarization 
of the Straits were accepted. However, the parties did not reach a compromise 
regarding the expansion of the Entente. Upon such background, the Entente 
completed its lifetime and dissolved during World War II.20 
 
 
3.3. EFFORTS FOR PEACE DURING WORLD WAR II AND THE 
BALKANS 
 
German activities towards the Balkans, particularly in Bulgaria and Romania, in 
late 1940 and early 1941 raised serious concerns on the part of Turkey, Britain, 
and the Soviet Union. While there were improving relations between the Soviet 
Union and Turkey, there were deteriorating relations between Germany and the 
Soviet Union. Britain feared that Germans could get hold of Iranian and Iraqi oil 
routes and the road to Suez when the Germans entered Bulgaria, so much as to 
cause Churchill to send a relevant letter to Đnönü, and therefore Britain wanted 
Turkey to declare war. However, this was rejected by Turkey. Unlike Britain, 
Germany did not want Turkey to enter the war. Meanwhile, Britain put forward 
the idea of another combination in case the Germans settled in the Balkans: a bloc 
to be established by Turkey, Greece, Yugoslavia and Bulgaria. This was 
welcomed by Turkey but did not yield any result. Yugoslavia turned down the 
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idea since it saw it as provoking Germany. Turkey wanted the Soviets to join and 
also wanted U.S. support in that respect, as Turkey did not believe Britain would 
supply Turkey with adequate arms and equipment. Indeed, the U.S.A. expressed 
interest in the idea, which was most clearly observed when Roosevelt sent a 
representative to Ankara. However, the U.S.A. found Turkey’s aircraft 
requirement excessive for some reason and seemed to have missed the point that 
Turkey wanted to secure itself with adequate equipment if it were to wage a 
possible war.21 
 From a general perspective, it has been argued that the story of the Balkans 
during World War II can be outlined as one in which first fascism and then 
Communism emerged victorious from the battle between them.22 The first country 
to fall into the hands of Axis powers was Romania. As a country which had 
enlarged its territory after the end of World War I, Romania faced equal territorial 
loss after World War I, upon which it was prompted to restore these territories by 
approaching Germany.23 Eventually, the German army entered Romania in 1940 
under the pretext of training Romanian army and that constituted the initial step 
for Romania to turn into a totalitarian state.  
 Germany followed suit in Bulgaria as it wanted to secure the Balkans 
before it proceeded with the Soviet Union. Hitler’s aim was to enter Bulgaria and 
then Greece, which was well understood by Bulgarian King Boris. It goes without 
saying that Bulgaria’s principal aim was to gain outlet to the Aegean and to take 
back Macedonia which it had lost back in the end of World War I. King Boris was 
known for his hatred for Communism. He was also of German origin. Therefore, it 
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was perhaps no surprise that he joined the Axis front in 1941. The Axis powers 
invaded Yugoslavia and Greece in the same year. With the invasion of Crete as the 
last drop, all of the Balkans fell into the hands of Germany.24 It is acknowledged 
that the fall of the whole peninsula into Germany’s domination raised serious 
concerns in Turkey. It is argued that Turkey, as the strongest country among other 
Entente signatories, was willing to assume the mediator role between the regional 
states and had drawn attention to the dangers posed by Germany, before the war 
broke out in 1939.25 A year later, when the war was continuing at full-scale, the 
Balkans states convened in Belgrade, where Turkey made a similar appeal by way 
of drawing attention to the urgent need to take action for the second time. The 
Balkan states once again turned down the appeal maintaining that Turkey tried to 
pull the regional states to British – French line. Turkey’s appeals for taking efforts 
to formulate a common decision and action totally failed when Yugoslavia was 
invaded by the German troops in early 1941.26 
 
 
3.4. COMMUNISM ENTERS THE SCENE 
 
The establishment of Communism in the Balkans and the attempts to add Greece 
into this portrait influenced the foreign policy of Turkey. In more specific terms, 
Turkey found itself encircled by the Soviet Union geographically and isolated in 
diplomacy in the immediate aftermath of the war. Moreover, the Soviet Union sent 
a note to Turkey in March 1945 stating that it would not renew the nonaggression 
pact of 1925, demanded bases in the Straits and claimed territory in Eastern 
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Anatolia. All these drew Turkey into isolation because the spirit of solidarity 
between the Great powers was still in the air and this very fact compelled the 
thought that the West would not support Turkey in case Turkey opposed the 
Soviet Union. In this connection, Turkey considered the rise of Communism in the 
Balkans after World War II a serious issue due to the possibility that the Soviet 
Union could further proceed to dominate the Aegean and perhaps the 
Mediterranean. The intentions were seen relatively more clearly when the fact that 
the Soviet Union demanded administrative claims in Libya, and Tito’s coveting 
Thessaloniki were also taken into account. Following this, the Soviet Union 
preserved its claims and claimed more in the 1946 note demanding the amendment 
of the Montreux Convention articles in favor of the littoral states.27 When Turkey 
rejected the Soviet note on the Balkans, it was seen that the efforts to establish a 
south Slav Federation and mutual alliance agreements between Communist Balkan 
states prompted Turkey to become even more concerned.28 A possible Yugoslav – 
Bulgarian alliance in the Balkans was exactly what Turkey tried to avert since the 
Balkan Entente days. Turkey viewed this rapprochement directed against Greece, 
indirectly against Turkey and the Mediterranean. Upon Turkey’s rejection of the 
Soviet note, the Soviet Union acknowledged that it would not achieve superiority 
in the Straits with Turkey’s cooperation. So, through its domination in the 
Balkans, it would now threaten the Straits as well as Greece. That was why 
Turkey declared martial law in Thrace, the reasons of which are found in former 
Prime Minister Recep Peker’s remarks in May 1947 when he said that “[t]he area 
covering martial law in Turkey is the Straits and the Marmara basin surrounding 
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the Straits. If there is to be an assault on Turkey, one of the first and most fragile 
directions can be this region. For this reason, the most sensitive point that needs to 
be secured is the region in question”.29 In the same years, former Foreign Minister 
Necmettin Sadak’s reply to a question asked in the parliament reflected Turkey’s 
relevant concerns clearly as he said that there was a direct relationship between the 
Greek Civil War and the polarization in the Balkans; that the agreements were part 
of a larger project which obviously threatened security; and that unlike Yugoslavia 
and Bulgaria, Turkey did not perceive the mutual agreements as efforts to form a 
peaceful front.30 
 It was argued that if a Communist regime took power in Greece, the 
possibility for Turkey to become “an island in the sea of Communism” would be 
reinforced.31 The aim of internal and external pressure was to establish a socialist 
government in Greece and place Greece among other satellites of Moscow. It 
would follow that the whole peninsula would fall under Soviet hands, allowing the 
Soviets to reach the Aegean. In face of growing security threat, Turkey stated that 
UN’s efforts were not adequate and called for stricter measures.32 It has been 
correctly argued that the most important consequence for Turkey with respect to 
the efforts to establish blocs in the Balkans and Greek Civil War was that Turkey 
began to see regional conflicts as those between the U.S.A. and the Soviet Union 
and as a matter of aligning its relevant policies parallel to those of the U.S.A. as 
Necmettin Sadak’s remarks indicated: 
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The views of our government are the same with those of the 
U.S.A. and Britain. … The future measures to be taken by the 
U.S.A. and Britain with a view to averting the efforts of 
Cominform to turn Greece into a satellite state will definitely 
concern us closely.33 
 
 
3.5. THE AFTERMATH OF WORLD WAR II 
 
3.5.1. EPISODE II: BALKAN PACT AND ALLIANCE 
 
Turkey’s membership in NATO after World War II ushered a new period in 
Turkish foreign policy, in which Turkey was observed to reinforce security and 
defense systems in the Middle East and the Eastern Mediterranean and to play a 
more active role. Turkey’s membership in NATO had a negative impact on the 
Soviet Union which was most openly seen with the note sent by the Soviet Union 
in November 1951. The note stated that the responsibility to arise from joining this 
bloc directed against the Soviet Union would rest on the Turkish government. In 
reply, Turkey stated that although Turkey had acted in peaceful lines, the same 
could not be expected from the Soviet Union. The second note received in late 
November 1951 did not have a less hostile tone. This hostile attitude prompted 
Turkey to seek to form new alliances in its vicinity. Although NATO stretched 
into the Balkans, it did not include Yugoslavia. Yugoslavia was not included in the 
Soviet bloc since 1948, either. Therefore it would be easier to include Yugoslavia 
into a new alliance system. Moreover, as the efforts of Turkey and Greece showed, 
a rapprochement had started between the two states and Greek foreign minister 
visited Turkey in early 1952, which would be followed by more mutual visits. It 
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seemed that with these mutual visits, the Balkan Entente of 1934 had been revived 
and Yugoslavia was part of the contacts, too. The first positive result was seen 
when Turkey, Greece, and Yugoslavia signed the Friendship and Cooperation 
Agreement in Ankara in late February 1953. This was not an alliance agreement 
per se, yet it was an important step to that end. The agreement envisaged 
economic, cultural and security cooperation. In accordance with Article 6 of the 
Agreement, the parties would not engage in any alliance or any act which was 
against the interests of other parties.34 The pact did not last long, either. That is 
why examination of the pact is in order. The factors in the establishment of the 
Balkan pact can be summarized in four subheadings. 
 i. The threat posed by pro-Moscow Balkan states: After the exclusion of 
Yugoslavia from the Soviet bloc in 1948, the friction between the two blocs which 
was being shaped in the Balkans escalated. The Bulgarian pressure on Turkey; the 
measures by Bulgaria, Romania, Hungary and Albania against Yugoslavia; and 
the deteriorating relations between Greece, Bulgaria and Albania were key factors 
in this friction. Bulgaria’s deportation policy towards the Turkish minority in 1950 
– 1951 made Turkey concerned, and given the bipolar nature of the structure at the 
time, this was perceived as a Soviet pressure on Turkey via Bulgaria. Furthermore, 
Turkey saw itself more isolated on this occasion as the Western states remained 
indifferent. From then on, Turkey accelerated efforts to enter NATO and took the 
initiative in regional terms. Turkey’s membership in NATO was not welcomed by 
Bulgaria at all. Yugoslavia also saw itself encircled by three Soviet satellites. 
Belgrade was open to easy invasion due to geographical location. The Yugoslav 
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army was equipped by the Soviet Union mostly with inactive equipment. There 
were also rumors that the Bulgarian, Romanian and Hungarian armies would 
invade Yugoslavia. The border clashes escalated according to what Yugoslav 
news reported, killing Yugoslav soldiers. In short, Yugoslavia feared being 
attacked. On the other hand, Greece had emerged from a civil war which was 
thought to be supported by its northern neighbors. Greece had a border problem 
with Bulgaria concerning the Rhodope Mountains. It had strained relations with 
Bulgaria claiming that Bulgaria abetted gangs of Greece, mutual claims over 
Macedonia, minorities, Bulgaria’s demands concerning outlet to the Aegean, and 
Greece’s demand for reparations regarding World War II. Therefore, from the 
Greek point of view, Turkey and Yugoslavia could be seen as a front against 
Albania and Bulgaria. Thus, it would be seen that the policies of pro-Soviet 
Balkan states in the Balkans were an amalgam of significant factors causing 
Greece, Yugoslavia, and Turkey to become concerned.35 
 ii. Trieste problem: The Trieste problem emerged as an issue between Italy 
and Yugoslavia after World War II. Tito saw the issue as a matter of prestige and 
this had great impact on Yugoslav foreign policy after 1950. The Trieste problem 
strained the relations between the two states. Yugoslavia feared that Italy would 
take Trieste and enter the Balkans. This was one of the reasons why Yugoslavia 
engaged in cooperation with Greece and Turkey and tried to show that the Balkans 
were for Balkan people.36 
 iii. Economic aid: The economic aid to be received from the West and the 
U.S.A. was another important factor in pulling the three states closer. Some 
arguments even posit that there were only two reasons why Greece, Turkey and 
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Yugoslavia engaged in cooperation. Such arguments maintain that the Soviet 
Union was seen as an enemy by all of the three states and their depending on the 
West in economic and military terms.37 
 iv. Vacuum in NATO strategy and Western support: The security line 
starting from the North Atlantic stretching across Iran lacked only Yugoslavia in 
it. The need to pull Yugoslavia into European defense system was obvious as 
Yugoslavia had a strategic location.38 To fill the vacuum, the West could take in 
Yugoslavia under the NATO umbrella and draw Yugoslavia into cooperation with 
Greece and Turkey. In turn, such cooperation would strengthen the NATO front.39 
 
 
3.5.2. ON THE ROAD TO THE PACT 
 
3.5.2.1. GREEK EFFORTS FOR COOPERATION IN THE 
MEDITERRANEAN 
 
The articulation of the Balkan Pact could be taken back to 1947, when Greek 
Prime Minister Konstantinos Tsaldaris visited Rome and stressed the defense line 
established between the West and the Soviet bloc. Stretching from the Caucasus to 
the Alps, the line was composed of the Straits, Macedonia, and Thrace. This line 
was parallel to the Balkan defense line. The articulation of the issue by Greece in 
Italy was welcomed by Turkey. However, the efforts for cooperation between 
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Turkey, Greece and Italy failed because Italy secured itself under NATO umbrella 
and the separation of Italy’s and Yugoslavia’s ways due to Trieste problem. 
Therefore, the focus on Italy now shifted to Yugoslavia. This implied that rather 
than forming a Mediterranean alliance, forming a Balkan Pact against Bulgaria 
and the Soviet Union was the question.40 
 
 
3.5.2.2. TURKISH EFFORTS FOR COOPERATION IN THE 
MEDITERRANEAN 
 
After the unrest caused by Bulgaria’s deportation policies, Turkey took the 
initiative to act for cooperation in the Balkans. This began with former Prime 
Minister Adnan Menderes’ visit to Athens in 1952. The two states concurred that 
trilateral talks must begin and Turkey should take the initiative to make an appeal 
to Yugoslavia in that respect. However, it is noteworthy that although Tito 
reciprocated positively to cooperation appeals, he hesitated to engage in a written 
agreement with Turkey and Greece for a short time arguing that an oral 
compromise would be even more influential in building friendly relations. To 
reiterate, this did not last long and Tito’s attitude revealed by 1952 that it would 
cooperate with Turkey and Greece.41 
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3.5.2.3. WESTERN SUPPORT AND BILATERAL CONTACTS 
 
While the three states continued negotiating at increasing pace, the U.S.A. and 
Britain also showed their interest. Top level officials from both states had contacts 
in Greece, Turkey, and Yugoslavia.42 What was left to be done was to hold 
bilateral contacts in the military venue between Turkey, Greece and Yugoslavia. 
In this connection, Foreign Minister Fuad Köprülü’s visit to Belgrade in January 
1953 was the first official attempt to form the basis of the Balkan Pact. In the same 
month, Köprülü visited Athens during which it was openly stated that a pact 
would be signed between Turkey, Greece and Yugoslavia. The last visit was by 
Greek Foreign Minister Stephanos Stephanopoulos to Belgrade in February 1953. 
After the bilateral talks, trilateral negotiations started. The government’s Balkan 
policy also received support from the opposition in Turkey.43 
 
 
3.5.3. THE BALKAN PACT 
 
The Treaty of Friendship and Collaboration was signed by Turkey, Greece and 
Yugoslavia on 28 February 1953 in Ankara.44 As mentioned above, the treaty 
envisaged military, economic, technical, and cultural cooperation as well as not 
entering alliances against any of the parties. It was also stated that the treaty would 
not affect the liabilities of Turkey and Greece concerning NATO. Different from 
the Balkan Entente, the Balkan Pact envisaged a common defense understanding 
and cooperation among general staffs of the three parties. However, the Balkan 
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Entente stipulated that each party would defend itself with its own army in case of 
an attack. Still, the Balkan Pact was not merely a military alliance although it 
came into being as a result of military considerations. It foresaw collaboration 
between three general staffs. The reason why it was not a pure military alliance 
was that a legal ground to reconcile the status of Turkey and Greece as NATO 
members with that of Yugoslavia was not possible. Therefore, it was decided to 
sign such an agreement as a first step towards establishing a military alliance. It 
should also be stated that the pact was open to accepting other Balkan states if 
they so wished and if the signatories approved, just as the Balkan Entente. These 
two states were also called on to join the pact in 1953. It is also noteworthy that a 
socialist state concluded a treaty with Western states independent from the 
directions of the Soviet Union, the signals of which were in fact observed when 
Yugoslavia departed from the Communist bloc back in 1948. The ensuing years 
also made it clear that the country would remain socialist, but not on Soviet terms.  
 The main objective of the Soviet Union appeared to prevent the pact to turn 
into an alliance. The Yugoslavian example showed that Stalin’s Yugoslavia 
policies did not pull Yugoslavia closer to the Soviet Union; on the contrary, it 
caused Yugoslavia to build cooperative relations with the West. The Soviets 
feared that the Pact could turn into an alliance and as such it could be supported by 
the 6th U.S. Fleet in the Mediterranean and threaten the southern flank of the 
Soviet Union in Europe. This would mean that the industrial and oil sources of the 
Soviet bloc could be under risk. Seeing that previous policies had not worked, the 
Soviet Union launched a policy of friendliness towards Turkey, Greece, and 
Yugoslavia. It sent a note to Turkey stating that it did not have any territorial 
claims from Turkey in May 1953. It also lifted the economic measures on 
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Yugoslavia. Bulgaria followed suit and the former Bulgarian Prime Minister stated 
that Bulgaria wanted to build friendly relations with Turkey and Yugoslavia on the 
basis of mutual respect.45 
 
 
3.5.4. BALKAN ALLIANCE 
 
The signing of the Balkan Alliance became possible by Tito’s visit to Ankara and 
Athens in 1954. During the talks in Ankara, the parties reached a compromise that 
it was time to sign an alliance and that the fact that Yugoslavia was not a NATO 
member was not an obstacle before signing an alliance. Eventually, the alliance 
was signed on 9 August 1954 in Bled, Yugoslavia. It was a military agreement 
which recognized all parties’ liabilities concerning the U.N.’s as well as Greece’s 
and Turkey’s liabilities concerning NATO. It was based on the spirit of NATO 
because it stated that in case of an attack on one of the parties, the other parties, 
alone or together, would respond in the same way. In other words, it was based on 
all for one, one for all principle. The alliance signed in Bled can be considered as a 
significant contribution for the Western defense system since it covered 
Yugoslavia, and as such, it encompassed the Eastern Adriatic coasts, Serbian 
mountains, and Vardar and Morava valleys. Apart from military cooperation, the 
parties also signed an agreement to establish a consultation assembly in March 
1955. Moreover, in the same month, the parties stated that a trilateral conference 
on economy would be held for improvement in the economic as well as technical, 
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cultural, and other areas. The parties also signed a postal communication 
agreement.46 
 
 
3.5.5. THE END OF EPISODE II: DISSOLUTION OF THE BALKAN 
ALLIANCE 
 
When military necessities disappeared, Balkan alliance also gave signals of 
dissolution. However, first and foremost, certain changes came to fore in 
Yugoslavia’s foreign policy after 1955 when the Soviet officials visited 
Yugoslavia. This visit was one that gave the message that post-1948 policies of 
the Soviet Union towards Yugoslavia were erroneous and that Communism on 
nationalist lines was not something unacceptable. With this visit, Yugoslavia saw 
that the attitude of the Soviets would be different than before. This meant that 
military cooperation with Turkey and Greece was not a must. This was to be 
coupled with Britain’s joining the alliance which Tito considered as adding an 
imperialist characteristic to the alliance. However, Tito did not unquestioningly 
ally with the Soviet Union, either. Rather, he chose to follow active neutrality after 
1955. As its name suggested, active neutrality implied that there would be no 
place of any kind of alliance within it.47 
 On Turkey’s part, the most important development that worked to the 
detriment of the alliance was the strained Turkish – Greek relations due to the 
Cyprus issue in 1955. The Greek government applied the UN regarding the 
Cyprus issue one week after the Balkan alliance was signed. The relations further 
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deteriorated with the 6 – 7 September events in Turkey. Unlike the public reaction 
against Greece, Turkish government tried to maintain Balkan alliance. The U.S.A. 
was also pushing for the preservation of the alliance arguing that the issue of aid 
would be reconciled by the U.S.A. Although Turkey was supportive of 
maintaining the alliance, it did not receive positive reciprocation by the other two 
other parties.48 In the end, the pact ended up being an alliance on paper, in which 
even regular meetings could not be held by 1956. The pact was annulled implicitly 
by the statements of Yugoslavian and Greek foreign ministries in 1960. Viewed 
through Turkey’s lens, the alliance did not bring much benefit for Turkey. The 20-
year term foreseen for the alliance ended in 1975 and was not renewed. It has been 
correctly argued that the Balkan alliance was exemplary as being a product of the 
policy of reinforcing Western defense with regional pacts after becoming a NATO 
member. Yet, the positive consequences for Yugoslavia and Greece were far more 
than those for Turkey since the former bolstered relations with their neighbors by 
means of this pact. By 1955, in another regional attempt, Turkey turned its face to 
the Middle East for building close relations with Iraq, Iran, and Pakistan, which 
took shape as the Baghdad Pact. This did not yield a different outcome either, 
mostly due to the fact that the Soviet Union entered the stage afterwards, dividing 
the region into two hostile camps. Leaving some of the regional states out and 
taking some of them in was the commonality of both the Balkan alliance and the 
Baghdad Pact, which prepared the ground for their failure.49 
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3.5.6. POST-1955 ATTEMPTS FOR COOPERATION IN THE BALKANS 
 
3.5.6.1 THE STOICA PLAN  
 
As part of the other similar plans for cooperation in the Balkans, the Stoica Plan 
was proposed by Romanian Prime Minister Chivu Stoica in 1957. Proposed to 
Romania, Albania, Bulgaria, Greece, Yugoslavia, and Turkey, the plan aimed to 
develop economic and cultural relations, settle disputes, and launch joint economic 
enterprises between the regional states. Stoica’s plan was significant in that it 
included all Balkan states unlike the Balkan Entente and the Balkan alliance. With 
the abovementioned aims, the plan was intended to prove a lasting basis in the 
Balkans. Stoica’s plan was approved by Bulgaria, Albania, and Yugoslavia on the 
condition that all Balkan states participated but was rejected by Turkey and 
Greece. The Greek reason for rejection of the plan was stated by former Prime 
Minister Konstantinos Karamanlis on the grounds that certain Greek territories 
were still under invasion by some Balkan states, which were considered to be 
Northern Epirus in the Albanian territory as well as Macedonia at the time. Yet, 
the interpretations in Ankara and Athens said otherwise. It was considered that the 
two states were not in a state to engage in cooperation at the time. On Turkey’s 
part, the plan was viewed as an effort to weaken Turkey’s ties with NATO and 
thus to distance it from the U.S.A. at a time when Turkey had improved relations 
with the country. Not surprisingly, the Soviet Union rejected any Soviet role in the 
plan. It was enough to consider that Romania would not propose such a plan 
without consulting the Soviet Union in 1957. Therefore, although the plan was 
geared by the Soviet Union, it was shaped and proposed Romania. It did not yield 
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the expected repercussions in Turkey, excluding the views that saw it as a Soviet 
propaganda. The previous unsuccessful attempts for a cooperative framework and 
Turkey’s prioritizing the Middle East after 1955 were two other factors in that 
respect. It is noteworthy to remember that at a time when Turkey feared the 
superiority of the Soviet Union in respect of arms and approved the U.S. missiles 
to be deployed in its territory, it would not be consistent to accept the proposal. 
The second Stoica Plan came two years later and covered the following issues: to 
work for a Balkans free of nuclear arms, which aimed to remove the missile bases 
in Turkey, Greece, and Italy; a stronger Soviet influence than in the former Stoica 
Plan; and the inclusion of Italy in addition. Turkey refused this plan with the note 
it sent to the Soviet Union. It was seen that the note did not refer with a single 
word to the Balkans, and it had almost the same wording of the note sent by the 
U.S.A., Britain, and France. Last, but not least, it should be mentioned that while 
Turkey sent its note directly to the Soviet Union, Greece sent its note to Romania. 
At the heart of this attitude lied the fact that Greece considered its regional 
interests more. Apart from these proposals, annual meetings were held in the 
1960s with a view to building mutual understanding and cooperation. These 
meetings articulated a region free of nuclear weapons, however it did not receive 
positive response from Albania. Turkey did not attend the meetings. Albania was 
opposed to the meetings from the beginning and Greece wanted to use the 
meetings as another forum against Turkey.50 
 In brief, between 1945 and 1955, Turkey saw its security threatened in the 
Balkan region and preferred to ensure security through regional organizations and 
inked the Balkan pact and alliance in 1953 and 1954. When the alliance completed 
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its lifetime in 1955, Turkish foreign policy towards the Balkans also changed, to 
the detriment of its relations with the region. Turkey did not reciprocate positively 
to the appeals for a Balkans free of nuclear weapons as well as to the regional 
conferences. Turkey’s foreign policy perspective was determinant in the 
formulation of policies as such, because between 1950 and 1960, the views of 
Democrat Party were based on the consideration that peace in the world presented 
an integrity so the security of a country could not be viewed independent from 
overall security of the bloc to which it belonged. Therefore, Turkey did not 
assume an active independent attitude towards the Balkans unlike Greece, and so 
it acted in line with the Western bloc. Another foreign policy pillar during these 
years was not to hold bilateral negotiations, not to enter bilateral agreements; and 
not to cooperate with the opposite camp states. In parallel, Democrat Party 
rejected proposals by the Communist states in the Balkans. The 1960 coup and 
National Union did not alter Turkish foreign policy essentially. Yet, when the 
Cyprus crisis unfolded in 1963, Turkey acknowledged that it had serious problems 
other than the security problem with respect to the Soviet Union and tried to 
strengthen its place in the Western bloc in that respect. Turkey saw that Greece’s 
enosis policy was a direct threat for Turkey and began to seek ways to avert it 
outside the Western bloc by responding to the appeals made by the Soviet Union 
since 1953 and by building relations with the non-aligned countries. Turkey also 
saw that Yugoslavia and Bulgaria openly supported the Greek arguments of 
Cyprus by 1965. It would be remembered that Greece had begun to conduct an 
active foreign policy in the Balkans after 1954. By 1965, Turkey realized that it 
had to do the same to act as counterweight against Greece in the region.51 
                                                 
51
 ibid., 169-177. 
 59 
  
  
 
II.V.VI.II. THE 1970S 
 
In the 1960s, Turkey began to conduct multilateralism in foreign policy and this 
included the Balkans as well. It also tried to improve relations with the Middle 
East, Asia, Africa, and Eastern bloc states. In this connection, relations with the 
Balkan states were attached utmost importance, yet this did not include Greece. 
The second period in which relations with the Balkans further improved was 
during Ecevit administration since the beginning of Cold War. The first visit was 
conducted by former Foreign Minister Turan Güneş to Romania in 1974. Turkey 
and Bulgaria signed a goodneighborliness agreement and Turkey and Romania 
signed a joint declaration in 1975. Tito visited Ankara the following year. When 
Ecevit became prime minister for the second time in 1978, the Balkans were again 
paid due attention in the general framework of maintaining friendly relations 
rather than prioritizing armament. The first visit by Ecevit was to Yugoslavia and 
this was followed by a visit to Romania.52 
 
 
II.V.VI.III. THE 1980S 
 
The Balkans posed a relatively stable picture in the 1980s except for the pressure 
on Turkish minority in Bulgaria, due to which relations with this country were 
strained in 1989. The pressure had its precedent in 1950 when a similar influx was 
experienced from Bulgaria to Turkey. Approximately 154.000 Turks had come to 
Turkey until the end of 1951. While Turkey feared Bulgaria could use Turkish 
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minority as a tool as in 1950 – 1951, Bulgaria feared Turkey could use the Turkish 
minority to weaken Bulgaria from inside.  
 The Turks in Bulgaria preserved their social structure and traditions as they 
lived in the country. While the Slavic population showed a tendency to shrink, the 
fact that Turkish population indicated a growth caused Bulgaria to grow 
concerned. The forced emigration policies did not yield the expected outcome, and 
to add onto the picture, the proclamation of the Turkish Republic of Northern 
Cyprus in 1983 prompted the Bulgarian officials to think that Turkey also coveted 
Bulgarian territories. Consequently, Zhivkov administration launched an 
assimilation campaign which included changing of Turkish names as well. Former 
President Kenan Evren sent a message to Zhivkov stating the campaign to be 
brought to an end immediately, only to see shortly that the situation would in fact 
be aggravated by way of expanding into the northern part of the country. The Özal 
government which took power in 1983 preferred to act cautiously concerning the 
issue. Turkey sent a note to Bulgaria in 1985 asking for a solution through 
negotiation. The Bulgarian government saw this as interference into its internal 
affairs. Meanwhile, Turkey tried to refer the issue to international fora. In 1985, 
Council of Europe called on the Bulgarian government to end the campaign. The 
Organization of Islamic Countries (OIC) sent a delegation to Bulgaria for on-site 
observation of the developments. The U.S.A. reduced diplomatic contacts with the 
country. Helsinki Watch and Amnesty International also criticized Bulgaria’s 
practices. While the West showed its reaction, Greece pinpointed Turkey as the 
responsible state claiming that Turkey had provoked the Turkish minority against 
Sofia, although not stating it expressly. Furthermore, Greece signed a friendliness 
and cooperation agreement with Bulgaria in 1986 as the campaign was continuing 
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full scale. Yugoslavia criticized Bulgaria and accepted the Turks who escaped 
from Bulgaria giving them refugee status. However, Romania returned the Turks 
to Bulgaria. In brief, Greece and Bulgaria assumed similar stances due to the 
presence of Turkish minority in both states while relations between Turkey and 
Yugoslavia became closer on this occasion, although not expressly stated. 
However, the 1990s would tell a different story about minorities with the demise 
of Communism and the subsequent emergence of nationalism in its extreme 
forms.53 
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CHAPTER IV 
 
TURKEY’S DIPLOMATIC AND POLITICAL RELATIONS 
WITH THE BALKAN STATES IN THE POST-COLD WAR ERA 
 
 
From the beginning of the dismantling of former Yugoslavia in June 1991, the issues 
that made Turkey an important actor in the Balkans were roughly as follows: (1) 
Turkey was a Balkan country in geographical, historical and cultural terms; (2) the 
region was a strategic link between Turkey and Western Europe; and (3) the strong 
affinity between the Turks in Turkey and Muslim/Turkish people throughout the 
Balkans1, therefore a stable and peaceful Balkans was a vital area for Turkey.2 
Turkey’s relevant interests and policies put forward certain policy implications 
concerning the region. Turkey assumed a pro-status quo position in the initial phases 
of the crisis in Yugoslavia and expressly stated its hopes for internal negotiation to 
end the conflict. However, as the war showed its spillover effect in Croatia and 
Bosnia, the Turkish threat perceptions of Serbia were modified.3 Backed by Greece, 
a possible cooperation between the Serbs and the Greeks seemed like a future barrier 
capable of cutting off Turkey’s links from Western Europe: 
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 Duygu Bazoğlu Sezer, “Turkish Security in the Shifting Balkans: Reorientation to a Regional 
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The simultaneous campaign of attrition on Bosnia – Herzegovina at 
the same time as the vulnerable states of Albania and Macedonia were 
being harassed by Greece threatened to wipe out the new potential 
bridges Turkey could cross to reach Western Europe.4    
 
 Viewed through a broader lens however, other components that have come to 
shape Turkey’s policies toward the region deserve mention in order to better 
understand the process in which these policies were formulated. First, the 
disintegration of the U.S.S.R. served to make the U.S.A. a more preponderant actor 
in world politics, which involved intervention in crises and conflicts including the 
Balkans after 1991. Both the unilateral superiority of the U.S.A. and the struggle for 
influence between the U.S.A., Germany and the Russian Federation served to add 
upon the preponderance of the U.S.A in the Balkans as the newly independent states 
turned their face to the West and the U.S.A.. Second, close relations between Turkey 
and the U.S.A. were reflected also on the Balkans since both countries had common 
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Michas writes that following the Huntingtonian thesis, most Western commentators viewed Greece’s 
actions in the context of the divide between Eastern and Western Christendom. However, as Michas 
argues referring to Ramet, this approach treats the religious sphere as an autonomous part of society 
(p.9). That is why it is necessary to place the Church at the center of the political process of nation-
building in the case of Greece, in trying to understand the role of Orthodox Church in Greece. In 
Greece, the variants of nationalism was ethnic, which was composed of the myth that the 
contemporary Greeks are the direct descendents of the Hellenes of antiquity; the language as the link 
uniting classical Greece with modern Greece; and the Orthodox religion and Church which became of 
tool of the state in promoting homogenization in the country. In brief, Michas maintains that the state 
of affairs did not result from the mere fact that Greece and Serbia shared the same religion. Therefore, 
the Greek – Serb alliance was not “holy” in Michas’s words. It was an “unholy” one which is to be 
sought not in the religious sphere but in the realms of state and nation-building, because the Orthodox 
Church in Greece is not a religious but a political institution. (p. 143).   
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interests in the region. Put differently, the fact that certain newly independent states 
were inclined to build close relations with the U.S.A. through Turkey and that the 
U.S.A. wanted to be more influential in the region through the historical, cultural and 
religious ties between Turkey and the Balkans brought Turkey and the U.S.A. even 
closer. The other factors bolstering this picture were the problems both states had 
been facing at the material time, i.e. the problems between the U.S.A. and Germany, 
and the inclination of Europe to build its own defense and security body in which 
Turkey would allegedly have no place. Third and equally important was Greece’s 
policies with respect to the Balkans. The problems troubling the relations between 
Turkey and Greece have become almost constant and Greece’s policies centered on 
backing a Greek – Serbian alliance in the 1990s appeared as yet another dimension 
of the inherent set of bilateral problems. Fourth and related with the third was 
Greece’s support to PKK terrorist organization. The exacerbating element in this 
regard was the close relations that Greece established with Armenia, Syria, Iran and 
the Russian Federation. The relations between certain Balkan states and Turkey thus 
aimed to balance those established with Greece and those Balkan states although 
these relations would bring Turkey a remarkable financial cost. Given that, it would 
not be erroneous to maintain that Turkey’s Balkan policies were centered on 
Greece’s relevant policies. Finally, Turkey’s needs in defense and security increased 
in the 1990s as it embarked into a period in which it encountered almost 
simultaneous crises surrounding its borders. In the absence of certain defense 
advantages provided to Turkey by the former bipolar system, Turkey now had to 
meet its relevant needs with domestic sources. The expectations of newly 
independent states of the region from Turkey only increased the need for defense and 
security. Viewed as such, the relations between Turkey and the Balkan states were 
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functional in meeting Turkey’s defense and security needs beyond its boundaries in 
the West. At the more specific level, it served for balancing Greece.5  
The vicissitudes of the crises in the war-torn regions of Transcaucasus and the 
Gulf made Turkey’s considerations in the Balkans take on a deeper strategic shape 
seen through an integral part of the rocky security environment back in the 1990s. 
Within this framework, Turkey’s policies toward the region rested on political, 
strategic, and economic venues, the first of which shall be examined in this section. 
Due to the experience of war, the analysis shall begin with the disintegration of 
Yugoslavia. 
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4.1. THE DISINTEGRATION OF YUGOSLAVIA AND THE WAR IN 
BOSNIA 
 
The Socialist Federative Republic of Yugoslavia (SFRY) came to an end in late June 
1991, that is, when the Federal Army launched an attack on Slovenia.6 However, the 
very first ostensible sign of the disintegration was the breakup of the League of 
Communists of Yugoslavia when the Party’s collapse became irreversible following 
the interruption of the 14th Extraordinary Congress held in January 1990 as the 
Slovenian delegates walked out. This suspension ratified the dissolution of the 
League of the Communists into independent republic parties.7 
Slovenian and Croatian independence had been declared only two days before 
the Federal Army launched its frontal attack in June 1991. The example of Slovenia 
and Croatia was followed by Bosnia for full independence. In January 1992, 
Slovenia and Croatia finally received international recognition. Thereafter, the Serbs 
already started the campaign of creating enclaves in Bosnia before the Bosnians 
declared independence in October 1991 which suggested that the Serb war in Bosnia 
was not provoked but was planned.8 In April 1992, Bosnia was recognized as an 
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independent state and the Serb paramilitary forces conducted an operation upon 
which between 50,000 and 100,000 Bosnians filled the streets to protest.9 As a news 
report wrote, as voices from the crowd suggested all the Serb chauvinists go to 
Serbia and all the Croat chauvinists go to Croatia, and stated that they wanted to 
remain in Bosnia together and to keep Bosnia intact, the spectacle was interrupted 
with automatic weapon fires. However, these bursts of gunfire had already happened 
before more than a week in the Bosnian towns of Banja Luka and Mostar. 10 
 Although the observations regarding the causes and the backdrop of the war 
vary in their degree of content, they mostly depict the common points that laid the 
basis for the crisis. There were at least three significant developments that altered the 
prospects of Bosnia’s political leaders. First, the Federal Army changed its mission 
in the latter half of 1991 from defending the Yugoslav ideals to acting as an agent of 
Greater Serbian nationalism. Second, the 1991 war in Croatia strengthened national 
extremist sentiments among Bosnian Serbs. Finally, although the international 
community voiced their lofty principles, their actions worked to create a maneuver 
space for the Serbs to move on with their plans.11 In similar vein, it has been argued 
that viewed in retrospect, it is seen that the genuine causes of Bosnia’s destruction 
                                                                                                                                          
“impartial arbiter”. While the Serbs in Croatia were told that they were threatened by an Ustasa 
regime, in Bosnia, the Muslims were told they were threatened by Islamic fundamentalism. After 
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came from outside Bosnia in two forms: first as the political strategy of the Serbian 
leadership and then in the form of the miscomprehension of the Western leaders.12 
 
 
4.1.1. THE WAR AND SECRET ARMS TRANSFERS 
 
Unlike the war in Slovenia which ended in ten days, the war in Bosnia would last 
until the mid-1990s. The most significant development in the initial phases of the 
war in April 1992 was the arrival in Bijeljina of Arkan’s paramilitary forces made up 
of mostly Serbs.13 From then on, the war unfolded with a precise plan which was to 
encircle the non-Serb territories and to link the Serb-intense areas with one another 
based on “ethnic cleansing”.14  
 The initial modus operandi of the Serb paramilitary acts was two-fold. While 
the paramilitary forces15 induced the local Muslims to flee their homes, they also 
tried to convince the Bosnian Serbs to defend themselves against the local Muslims 
aided by the broadcasts of Radio Television Belgrade airing the same editorial line 
warning the Serbs against the Muslims and the Croats.16 As Milos Vasic put it in 
New Yorker on 15 March 1993, it was as if Ku Klux Klan had taken over all TV 
channels in the U.S.A.: “You must imagine a United States with every little TV 
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and the Croats. 
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station everywhere taking exactly the same editorial line – a line dictated by David 
Duke. You too would have war in five years.”17  
 Although the operations were carried out by the Federal Army and its 
paramilitary adjuncts, it has been argued that the invasion in more than 60 % of 
Bosnia was achieved mainly by the Federal Army forces directed from Belgrade. In 
other words, although the Bosnian Serbs were also involved in the entire affair, the 
the event was directed from outside, that is, from Serbian soil.18 In his book titled 
Origins of a Catastrophe (1996), Warren Zimmerman, the former U.S. Ambassador 
to Belgrade, wrote that in his last cable sent to the U.S.A. before he left Yugoslavia 
in May 1992, he stressed that Yugoslavia was not destroyed by ethnic/religious 
hatred or by the collapse of communism or by the failure of the Western countries to 
act; but “Yugoslavia was murdered by local political villains who dismantled it from 
the top down.”19  
 Throughout the war, the Bosnian Muslims, for their part, presented a state of 
extreme unpreparedness with perhaps 3500 armed men in total. The Serbs had quite 
a lot of guns. Milosevic’s police and the Federal Army were sending them guns from 
Serbia in small trucks. The local Serb leaders sold the Muslims guns as they saw a lot 
of money in the business. They coveted money more than they coveted guns.20 In 
Western Herzegovina, the local Croats had made some preparations and later were 
joined by men from the Croatian Paramilitary Force (HOS). The war also coincided a 
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time when political awareness of the unity of the country and its history was very 
weak. In the long period of growth of Serbian and Croatian ethno-political plans, it 
became clear that the weakening of Bosnian unity was the precondition for 
establishing a united Serbian and a united Croatian state.21 The Bosnian Army was so 
poorly prepared partly because Aliya Izzetbegovic clung until the last moment to the 
hope of a political settlement. Furthermore, with the hope of preventing the Croatian 
conflict from worsening, the UN had imposed an arms embargo in September 1991 
on former Yugoslavia. As such, having no borders with other states and only one 
outlet to the sea, Bosnia was the real disadvantaged party to violate the embargo 
while Serbia and Croatia could circumvent it.22 
 Regarding the role of the intelligence and gun running in the war in Bosnia 
between 1992 and 1995, it has been argued that although secret arms supplies and 
other covert actions pointed the U.S.A., indeed it was the third countries that were 
directly involved. Former CIA President Woolsey stated that the CIA did not move 
weapons to Bosnia but they were willing to do that and had enough experience in the 
field. One reason was that there were fears about possible leaks and the second 
reason was the hesitation about possible negative reactions from Britain and France 
about which Claes, Secretary-General of NATO, had warned Clinton.23 It was also 
confirmed by one prominent White House adviser that the U.S.A. did not wish to 
violate the arms embargo as it would undermine the authority of UN Security 
Council resolutions. Put differently, if the U.S.A. were to violate the embargo, then 
the imposition of an embargo elsewhere would be made impossible such as the one 
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in Iraq at the time. However, this by no means is to say that the U.S.A. was not 
involved. Washington played a role in the background. It has been argued that the 
U.S.A. turned a blind eye or simply closed its eyes to the arms transfers.24 
Among the countries which supplied arms to Bosnia were Pakistan, Saudi 
Arabia, Iran and Turkey.25 Malaysia also attempted to circumvent the embargo via 
merchant shipping and the Malaysian UN Protection Force (UNPROFOR) soldiers 
stationed in Bosnia. The reason behind such direct supplies to Bosnia was that the 
Bosnian government was dissatisfied with the Croatian authorities’ practice of 
skimming the arms supplies, and also the government did not want to become 
dependent on Zagreb. Turkey was another significant supplier of arms and had been 
involved in the secret arms in 1992 when Iran had opened a smuggling route to 
Bosnia. Bosnian officials acknowledged that in 1993, a Turkish pipeline existed 
through which arms from Saudi Arabia, Malaysia, Brunei and Pakistan was 
transferred.26 Turkey was mentioned once again in relevant conversations in early 
1993 as the direct supplier. Bosnian vice-President Eyüp Ganic had an interview in 
mid-February with President Turgut Özal. Yet, the former denied that the latter had 
promised an aircraft full of arms.27 In the summer and autumn of 1994, the CIA 
reported that the spy satellites had taken photos of Iranian aircraft on Turkish 
airfields, soon after which it was reported that satellite photos were taken of the same 
aircraft in Zagreb and in other airports in Croatia showing the arms unloaded. 
Turkish aircraft also flew directly to Tuzla. It was assumed by UNPROFOR officers 
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that Turkish aircraft flew in from “Cyprus” with U.S. military authorities acting as 
intermediary.28 French military officials also asserted that Turkey was responsible for 
the flights. 
 British Defense Intelligence Staff (DIS) was also aware of the U.S. secret 
arms supplies and like the case of CIA, it was emphasized that the DIS was not 
involved in the flights to Tuzla.29 The DIS also obtained intelligence from the 
German military intelligence service. Yet, no U.S. – German alliance existed in the 
matter of arms transfers.30 
 On the other hand, the statements of politically prominent figures in the 
U.S.A. expressly conveyed their arguments. Former President Bill Clinton, Senator 
Robert Dole (majority leader), Peter Tarnoff (Undersecretary of State), Benjamin 
Gilman (Congressman, New York) and Lee Hamilton (Congressman, Indiana) said 
in a TV interview that if the U.S.A. violated the embargo, it would lose support from 
the allies for other embargoes such as the one in Iraq; that “there was absolutely 
nothing improper done”; that in a situation like this there should have been a formal 
briefing by the administration telling them what had been done with regard to Iranian 
arms; or that many in the Congress wanted to lift the embargo but they wanted the 
U.S. arms to go into Bosnia.31 All the same, it seemed that supplies via a third party 
country were a simpler solution for the U.S.A. 
 
                                                 
28
 ibid. According to this report, Turkey’s involvement operated as follows. Specially modified C-
130s from U.S. bases in Britain and Germany would pick up their cargo on remote runways in the 
“Turkish part of Cyprus” (quotation marks not original). The cargo consisting of arms and 
ammunition would be delivered there by Iranian and Turkish aircraft. The aircraft would fly to Croatia 
via the Adriatic and then on to Bosnia. If it could not achieve this, it could always stop over the 
Croatian island of Brac. From this island, the CIA also operated its UAVs flying over Bosnia. The 
Croatian Defense Minister Susak claimed that most of the aircraft that landed there came from Turkey 
and not Iran. 
29
 ibid. 
30
 ibid. 
31
 “Gun Running” 24 April 1996, Transcript, on http://www.pbs.org/newshour/bb/bosnia/Iran_4-
24.html as retrieved on 27 December 2005 07:35:37 GMT. 
 73 
 Speaking generally, if the Bosnian government had been able to exercise the 
right of any government to acquire arms, the Serb gains would have decreased in 
many parts of Bosnia; at least it would make the Serbs realize that they would not get 
the territory they wanted by arms when they attempted to. It has been asserted that 
the war might then have ended within four to six months.32 The detailed modus 
operandi of the Serbs as the war continued showed itself as concentration, 
decapitation, separation, evacuation, and liquidation. Concentration involved 
surrounding the area to be cleansed, warning the local Serbs to leave and 
intimidating the target population. Decapitation was to execute the political leaders 
and those educated groups capable of taking their places such lawyers, judges, public 
officials and professors. Separation included dividing women, children and old men 
from men of fighting age – from sixteen to sixty years of age. Evacuation meant 
transporting women, children and old men to the border and expelling them to a 
neighboring territory or country. Finally, liquidation involved executing men of 
fighting age and disposal of their bodies.33 In such a war based on ethnic cleansing, 
which was beyond the definition of classical warfare, it seemed that the only way for 
the equality of arms to exist was to engage in secret arms transfers. 
 By early 1995, around 300,000 people had died since June 1991 and at least 
2,7 million people had been reduced to refugees, not to mention around 50,000 
Bosnian Muslim women raped by Serb soldiers in a systematic campaign of 
humiliation and psychological terror.34 It has been maintained that while accepting 
the casualty in the Bosnian conflict reached six-digit figures, most data tend towards 
lower estimates. However, the slaughter through the endgame of the Bosnian war in 
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mid-1995, and that includes the massacre at Srebrenica, should also be added to the 
overall estimates. Yet still, no reliable statistics exist as in most cases of war. The 
International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC) noted that the majority of missing 
persons in Bosnia are men and of around 18,000 persons recorded by the ICRC in 
Bosnia as missing in relation to the war that ended in 1995, 92 % are men and 8 % 
are women.35 
The Srebrenica massacre which marked the apogee of Greater Serbia design 
was followed by the offensive of the Croat – Muslim alliance armed with the U.S. 
alliance. Thereafter, the direction of the war shifted. In early August 1995, the 
Croatian Army took Knin which was the center of rebel Serbs. The Croats sent these 
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Serbs into Serb-held regions in Bosnia. With a view to protecting the safe areas, 
Clinton insisted that NATO and the UN take a more active stance. In mid-August, 
U.S. negotiators led by Richard Holbrooke began intensive shuttle diplomacy with 
the parties. In late August, NATO and the UN issued an ultimatum to the Bosnian 
Serbs to stop shelling Sarajevo, to stop offensive action against remaining safe areas, 
to withdraw heavy weapons from around Sarajevo and to allow road and air access to 
Sarajevo. In late August, NATO began its heavy air strikes against the Bosnian Serb 
military. Eventually, at the meeting arranged by the Contact Group in Geneva and 
New York, the Foreign Ministers of Bosnia-Herzegovina, Croatia and Serbia 
concluded the Dayton Peace Accord in November 1995. The Dayton Peace Accord36 
was secured by 60,000 NATO peacekeepers, yet this did not mean that Milosevic’s 
“Greater Serbia” designed ceased to exist. The year 1999 proved to be the time for 
such intentions to come to the surface once again in Kosovo. The Western attitude 
was too little and too late for Bosnia, yet it would prove too much and too soon for 
Kosovo. 
 The trial proceedings of Slobodan Milosevic, who thought that the real 
victims of the war were the Serbs, began in 2002 in The Hague and were pending 
until his death in March 2006.37 By 2004, about sixteen war crime suspects had still 
not been turned over to the tribunal among whom Radovan Karadzic and Radko 
Mladic are counted.38 Although Milosevic did not plead guilty at any point 
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throughout the trial proceedings until his death, it is remarkable to note that Bogdan 
Bogdanovic, as a Serbian architect and the former mayor of Belgrade, concluded in 
as early as 1991 that Serbia had already lost the war: 
 
Serbia has lost this war. When I say ‘this war”, I am thinking not only 
of the current one, but of all our modern wars, and our entire modern 
history from the Hatt-ı Sherif to the present day. One hundred and 
seventy years have passed since the proclamation of the Hatt-ı Sherif, 
and in the course of all that time a state like Serbia – in Europe – 
should have made a far greater civilizational, cultural and economic 
leap. Today we should be at least where Hungary is, or where the 
Czechs are. A feeling of failure lies at the very heart of Serbian 
nationalism, and with that come all the various justifications for this 
failure: all various Cominterns, Vaticans, Freemasonries and their 
unbelievable plots. There is indeed a sense of having missed out. This 
history gambled away – this century and a half gambled away – is 
what can be described as a lost war. But when I speak of the lost war, 
I am speaking also of the events taking place today. Whether we like it 
or not, when we look on TV at the various maps showing Serb and 
non-Serb villages, and how far the ‘defenders of the Serb villages’ 
have advanced, we see that these ‘defenders of Serb villages’ are 
attacking towns! The ‘defenders’ are surrounding Vukovar; the 
‘defenders of Serb villages’ are attacking Osijek. We see the map of 
destruction broaden. The irresponsible, indeed disgusting Belgrade 
press presents these as some kind of victory. They write about 
advances, liberation, etc. and the ordinary, already deeply 
indoctrinated people acquire the feeling that we Serbs are winning the 
war. This is a terrible misconception. Firstly, from a political-military 
point of view, they cannot possibly win, since nobody sensible would 
allow anything to be changed by force at the end of the 20th century. 
Sooner or later those who are there will be forced to withdraw 
shamefully – unless they are thrown back by the Croat defense effort 
itself, which if the war spreads will be aided from outside. Secondly, 
this war has been lost at another and even more terrible level: it is 
destroying our Serb feeling that our wars were just wars and that we 
behave honorably. The war now being waged is not an honorable 
war.”39 
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4.2. TURKISH FOREIGN POLICY TOWARDS BOSNIA-HERZEGOVINA40 
 
Indeed, Turkey and Yugoslavia had friendly relations before the war which was 
recorded particularly in the economic venue. Just one year before the war broke out; 
former State Minister Cemil Çiçek (MP) had gone to Belgrade to attend the 8th 
Meeting of the Turkish – Yugoslavian Economic Cooperation Joint Commission.41 
Five months later, Yalım Erez, the former President of Turkish Union of Chambers 
and Stock Exchanges (TOBB), stated that joint investments could be launched with a 
view to selling goods to third parties.42 The second Turkish – Yugoslavian Business 
Conference produced the memorandum of understanding signed by Yalım Erez and 
Milan Pavic, the former President of Yugoslav Economic Chamber, in mid-October 
1990.43 When the separatist tendencies became visible by 1991, Turkey expressed its 
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belief that the constituent republics should resolve their disputes through negotiation 
on several occasions which included former Bosnian President Aliya Izzetbegovic’s 
visit to Ankara on 15 July, Foreign Minister Safa Giray’s (MP) visit to Sarajevo on 
30 August, and a Turkish delegation’s visit to Yugoslavia on 23 October.44 However, 
when the irreversible disintegration took place, Turkey recognized Slovenia, Croatia, 
Bosnia – Herzegovina, and Macedonia in early February 1992 as mentioned 
previously. In fact, in the first half of the 1990s, Turkey’s diplomatic and political 
initiatives for Bosnia – Herzegovina had been so prioritized that the Balkans were 
viewed as “Bosnia and the remainder of the Balkans” from the official Turkish 
view.45 After shortly supporting the continuation of the status quo, Turkey changed 
its position upon increasing Serbian aggression and the irreversible disintegration. 
The new policy was threefold: to bring an end to the war in Bosnia – Herzegovina to 
preserve its independence; to prevent the spillover effect of war in Kosovo, Albania, 
Macedonia, Sandjak and Vojvodina; and to draw the international attention to the 
crisis.46 
 In face of increasing attacks, Hikmet Çetin announced that if requested, 
Turkey could send troops to the UNPROFOR in early January 1992.47 As the tension 
increased in March, the Federal Army announced that it would intervene in the 
fighting if Croat and Muslim militia continued attacks on the Serbs’ Federal Army in 
Bosnia – Herzegovina.48 The European Community (EC) recognized Bosnia – 
Herzegovina in early April 1992, which was welcomed by Turkey, yet afterwards the 
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events turned into a full-scale fighting. Upon this, former Prime Minister Süleyman 
Demirel discussed the escalation with former President Özal and stated that Turkey 
would raise the issue in the OIC in mid-April 1992. Turkey launched its diplomatic 
initiatives in mid-April 1992 and sent a diplomatic delegation to Belgrade in mid-
April 1992 for a six-day visit to hold contacts with the political leaders of Serbia and 
Bosnia – Herzegovina and missions of the EC and the CSCE. Meanwhile, former 
Bosnian Deputy Prime Minister called his counterpart Erdal Đnönü to say that despite 
the recent ceasefire, the Serb militia could not be controlled and asked for support.49 
After this, Turkish and Bosnian presidents exchanged their views on the situation 
after which Özal called upon George Bush, François Mittérand, King Fahd, 
Khashemi Rafsancani, and Hosni Mobarak for support.50 Nevertheless, the 
opposition parties such as the DLP accused the government of being indifferent to 
Bosnia – Herzegovina by stating that not even a single Turkish minister was sent to 
Sarajevo, but to Belgrade.51 
 
 
4.2.1. PARLIMENTARY DEBATES IN THE YEARS OF WAR 
 
In late April 1992, State Minister Akın Gönen (TPP) announced that Turkey had 
officially recognized Slovenia, Croatia, Bosnia – Herzegovina, and Macedonia on 6 
February 1992 and given the state of affairs at the material time, the relations with 
these new republics would be regulated by the Turkish Embassy in Belgrade. Gönen 
pointed out the appeal made by Bosnian Foreign Minister Haris Sladzic and Deputy 
Prime Minister Muhammed Cengic for support in face of increasing attacks on the 
                                                 
49
 15 April 1992, Hürriyet. 
50
 19 April 1992, Cumhuriyet; 19 April 1992 Türkiye. 
51
 27 April 1992, Cumhuriyet. 
 80 
Muslims on Bosnia.52 In similar vein, Mustafa Baş (WP) emphasized that just as the 
country-wide spirit of support during the Turkish – Greek War in 1919 - 1922, the 
Turkish support to Bosnia must display the same intensity and vigor. As a member of 
parliament of the opposition, Baş criticized the government’s attitude as being 
insufficient with respect to the arrest of Aliya Izzetbegovic. He particularly stated 
that after Izzetbegovic’s arrest, the government preferred to question the accuracy of 
the event itself instead of showing an active stance, while Italy, for instance, 
expressly stated that Izzetbegovic must be released immediately. Baş’s speech at the 
Assembly manifested the approach of the WP when he stated that they wanted to see 
the spirit of Sultan Murat and Osman Gazi in the government.53  
Upon Baş’s statement, while endorsing such evaluations, Foreign Minister 
Hikmet Çetin (SDPP) asserted that the only viable solution could be found through 
diplomacy and that steps must be taken within the framework of international 
organizations. Çetin also added that any other solution would not be viable and make 
the situation even more complicated.54 In early May 1992, Çetin submitted Turkey’s 
appeal to the UN Security Council. The letter stated that international community 
should take on an active stance and the destruction of cultural heritage must be 
stopped. Recalling that Bosnia – Herzegovina was accepted as the 52nd member by 
the OSCE, Çetin maintained that it was upon Turkey’s proposal that senior OSCE 
officials assessed the suspension of Serbia’s membership and holding a meeting to 
discuss the force of any future sanctions.55  
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 A week later, Bosnian Deputy Minister Muhammed Cengic addressed the 
Turkish parliament. Cengic first stressed that had there been no war in Bosnia, he 
would be very pleased as the first Bosnian official to address the Turkish Parliament 
after 125 years.56 After briefly portraying the plight of the Bosnians, Cengic stated 
that they had been of the opinion that the West would not allow such a thing to 
happen in the middle of Europe and that the crises in Europe had now become a 
thing of the past. He emphasized that the weak measures taken by the UN did in no 
way suffice for even passing from one point to another in Sarajevo. That was why, 
said Cengic, the Bosnians looked to Turkey for help. This was not to suggest that 
Turkey should wage a war against Serbia but that it should protect the Bosnians. As 
mentioned in the previous section, Cengic stressed that the Bosnians did not have the 
means to build a body of resistance as the Federal Army held all the weapons.57 
Cengic also underlined that although there was news reporting that some generals in 
the Federal Army were discharged from office, they were discovered to be de facto 
on duty and were determined to wipe out the Muslims from the map of former 
Yugoslavia.58 Cengic concluded that without any commitment by Turkey, he would 
not be able to return to Bosnia.  
 Upon the proposal by Adnan Kahveci (MP) and thirty other members of 
parliament regarding a general discussion on necessary measures to bring an end to 
the conflict in Bosnia and Sandjak, Kahveci maintained that the government did not 
take on an active stance. Kahveci particularly stated that the government had 
developed a new sort of diplomacy which was labeled as “statement diplomacy” 
instead of the “telephone diplomacy” which it had previously criticized. Stating that 
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this type of diplomacy proved ineffective during the Karabagh crises, Kahveci 
maintained that the OSCE was not an effective organization to deter Serbia and 
added in black humor that it was possible to describe the acronym as “Allah’ın 
Gariplerinin Đç Dökme Klübü” (Poor Men’s Club of Effusion) in Turkish (AGĐK).59 
Kahveci went on to argue that the government prevented Turkish Radio and 
Television (TRT) from broadcasting the developments so that the public would not 
be sufficiently informed while prominent TV channels in the world did the exact 
opposite. According to Kahveci, the reason behind this could be to keep the public 
attention down to curb any possible pressure on the government. Kahveci said that 
despite being the opposition, his party put forward proposals. As other members of 
parliament would stress, Kahveci invited the government to send arms to Bosnia in 
face of the fact that the Federal Army possessed all the arms.  
 In the same session, Mustafa Baş (WP) said that on 11 May 1992, the UN, the 
Red Cross and the EC had announced that they would withdraw their representatives 
which he thought would serve the Serbian interests as there would be no international 
deterrence mechanism left in the country. 60 Baş recalled that in the Falkland Islands 
War, Britain had found a prompt solution, and in the Gulf War, the U.S.A. took 
immediate action. However, there was nothing at stake for the great powers in the 
Balkans. Baş stressed that the allegation that the UN did not have enough finance 
was just that, an allegation. Taking religion as the departure point, he stated that upon 
the allegation that Libya had shot down a plane, Libya was imposed severe sanctions 
and Turkey was the first to act accordingly as a Muslim state. He proposed that the 
Poised Hammer (Çekiç Güç) troops be sent to Bosnia, and if not, the spillover of the 
clashes to Sandjak and Kosovo would be expected, and also added that sending arms 
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and providing monetary aid was a duty for Turkey.61 While repeating the 
indifference of TRT to the matter, Baş noted one development as a positive measure 
and that was the submission by Abdullah Gül (WP) of a proposal to the Council of 
Europe signed by approximately twenty members of parliament suggesting that 
Serbia be removed from Council of Europe membership. He also maintained that the 
news claiming that Izzetbegovic wanted to take refuge in Turkey was lacked basis 
and had the possibility of creating a psychological breakdown among the Bosnians 
who struggled for survival.62 
 The session proceeded with Đsmail Cem speaking on behalf of SDPP and with 
emphasis that he spoke on behalf of his group and not the government. Cem 
described the situation in Bosnia as a massacre and not “war” and stated that he 
partly agreed with the previous arguments which particularly asserted that Turkey 
engaged in futile attempts by calling upon international organizations such as the 
OSCE.63 The main problem according to Cem was the failure of aid attempts which 
included medicine and food. He proposed that Turkey withdraw its ambassador to 
Yugoslavia just as the EC had done. Different from previous arguments, Cem 
stressed that the suggestions regarding the arms transfer are proposals that add 
another degree of intensity to the problem and that they must be proposed after 
thorough research of availability and not with simple suggestions.64 
 Cem’s speech was followed by Coşkun Kırca speaking on behalf of TPP. 
Kırca first and foremost emphasized that no issue resembled another in diplomacy 
and that every single issue must be assessed in its unique circumstances. Second, 
while protesting, it was necessary for Turkey to find a remedy. Kırca fully endorsed 
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Cem’s portrayal of the situation. He said that Germany and Austria were the only 
two states that supported Bosnia. France had recently begun to disapprove Serbia. 
Greece continued to act in harmony with Serbia which was lastly observed by 
Mitsotakis’ visit to Belgrade. Turkey should expect opposition partly from Romania 
and even more from Russia due to historical reasons. Bulgaria’s interest lied in 
balancing Serbia. The OIC countries were expected to show due interest. Kırca 
expressly stated that the issue of arms supplies should be the one that is the least 
mentioned both the by the government and the opposition.65 If there was to be an 
arms procurement, said Kırca, it should be revealed years later as their transfer and 
use rested on keeping the issue confidential. Kırca invited Turkey to acknowledge 
that the UN peace forces could only be stationed in Bosnia after a ceasefire. As such, 
Turkey could do something else and it was to try to get the West and its 
organizations to think that the new Serbia did not and could not represent former 
Yugoslavia in legal terms and not to recognize it as a natural successor of the latter. 
Kırca added that the suspension of Yugoslavia’s membership would not suffice and 
it should be stressed that Serbia could not fill in former Yugoslavia’s seat in the 
OSCE. The second option could be to cut off diplomatic relations. Third, Turkey 
should immediately apply to the Security Council as Germany and Austria had done. 
Fourth, Turkey should invite the Security Council to implement the provisions of 
Section 7 of the UN Charter concerning aggression. Fifth, Turkey should invite the 
Security Council to impose an economic, trade, transportation, and communication 
embargo against Serbia. Sixth, talks within NATO should be started to discuss 
possible military measures.66 
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 Following Kırca, Vehbi Dinçerler (MP) stated that Turkey faced a serious test 
in face of the fact that Foreign Minister Hikmet Çetin held the presidency of Council 
of Europe Committee of Ministers which put additional responsibility upon Turkey 
with respect to taking an active stance.67 Dinçerler invited the government to apply 
the crisis management implemented during the refugee influx from Iraq to Turkey. 
Regarding the aid issue, Dinçerler maintained that the Bosnian Deputy Prime 
Minister Muhammed Cengic had come to Turkey before this visit on 12 May 1992 
and that he was called to the Ministry of Foreign Affairs. Cengic and senior officials 
had lengthy talks with maps open upon which it was decided to send a hundred 
thousand tons of fuel-oil via one point through the sea. It was soon reported that at 
least twenty-five thousand tons had reached Bosnia. This meant that aid could reach 
although the airports and the railways had been closed.68  
 Upon these discussions, State Minister and Deputy Prime Minister Erdal 
Đnönü (SDPP) criticized those who perceived the war in Bosnia as a tool for domestic 
politics and asserted that Turkey did not act belatedly, particularly pinpointing 
Kahveci’s statement. Đnönü first stated that even prior to the clashes, an official 
delegation was sent to the region to submit Turkey’s concerns. He further argued that 
attempts were made in the OSCE and the UN Security Council. The Foreign Minister 
had also sent a letter to the OIC for resource allocation. In reply, the President of the 
Islamic Development Bank sent a letter indicating that one million USD was 
allocated to meet the needs of the Bosnians.69 
 The succeeding discussion in the Assembly was held on 20 May 1992. Apart 
from Bosnia, the Assembly also discussed the developments in Nagorno – Karabagh. 
Foreign Minister Hikmet Çetin (SDPP) maintained that the efforts were primarily 
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directed to medicine and food aid. After talking the matter over with his French 
counterpart, he emphasized that opening and functioning of the airport in Sarajevo 
must be ensured under the supervision of international organizations. 70 After Hikmet 
Çetin’s speech, Mesut Yılmaz (MP) delivered a speech on the general outlook of the 
situation in Bosnia. It was made clear by Yılmaz that there had been a quite 
important misunderstanding between MP and the government on the issue of sending 
troops to Bosnia. MP never supported any suggestion that included Turkey’s 
unilateral intervention in military terms. It supported all diplomatic initiatives in 
which the government engaged. More importantly, Yılmaz described their point of 
divergence as follows: if the government took a diplomatic initiative as to halt the 
armed conflict, that diplomatic initiative must bear a sufficient degree of deterrence 
in order for it to be effective. According to Yılmaz, Turkey had the power of 
deterrence but it did not use it.71 Through the end of his speech, Yılmaz said that in 
case the Assembly opens the issue to discussion, MP would agree to grant authority 
to send troops to Bosnia. 
 In the speeches delivered out of the agenda in the same session, Bülent Ecevit 
(DLP) also dwelled on the issue and criticized those who maintained that the 
proposals by DLP were all based on military solutions. He particularly pinpointed 
Mümtaz Soysal’s (SDPP) comment in which he accused those who wanted concrete 
and effective measures as “little Enver Pashas”.72 However, Ecevit said that he never 
suggested Turkey become a party as interventionist into the war neither in Bosnia nor 
in Nagorno – Karabagh. He submitted his proposal in two headings the first of which 
suggested that a force unit similar to Poised Hammer must be set up in Bosnia if their 
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duration of stay were to be prolonged. Second, Turkey should immediately call upon 
all countries of former Yugoslavia to convene in Đstanbul and try to leave the EC out 
of the process. 
 It is seen that no particular session was held for the discussion of the issue in 
length after 20 May 1992. The developments in Bosnia, along with the Cyprus issue, 
were deliberated only after three months, on 25 August 1992. This extraordinary 
session was the discussion on Bosnia and Cyprus which involved heavy criticism of 
the government.73 As the first speaker of this session, Kamran Đnan (MP) recalled 
that the government must closely follow the developments as the events and their 
reflection on international TV channel commentaries signaled spillover possibility to 
Kosovo and Sandjak taking into account the fact that the fall of Bosnia was 
imminent.74 Đnan warned that Albania and Macedonia would be drawn into the 
conflict which could lead to a Third Balkan War. Therefore, the most viable strategy 
according to Đnan was to issue an ultimatum to Serbia which would give Serbia 
twenty-four hours for ceasefire. If not obeyed, the next step would be to carry out an 
air bombardment. Đnan observed that this was already echoed in the leading British 
newspapers such as The Observer and London Times and was not a new strategy. In 
line with the arguments of other members of parliament both from the government 
and the opposition, he maintained that Turkey had moral and historical responsibility 
which could have prompted Turkey to be preponderant in getting the issue discussed 
in the U.S. Congress and the European capitals, which he thought had not been 
accomplished yet.75 Meanwhile, in mid-August 1992, Serbian prime Minister Milan 
Panic visited Turkey and asked not to intervene in the Bosnian conflict. Panic called 
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on the Turkish military to duty and proposed Demirel that the Yugoslav Army, under 
the command of the Turkish officers, seize all the weapons in Bosnia and 
demilitarize the area which of course was not welcome by Turkey76. Đnan said it was 
not acceptable to receive the Serbian Prime Minister in Ankara with an official 
welcome. However, more disturbing was a press statement which included the 
following remark: “Turkey and Yugoslavia invite all parties fighting in Bosnia to 
bring an end to war”.77 Đnan harshly criticized this statement as it implied that the 
offender and the victim were treated on equal grounds as two warring sides in the 
classical sense. Đnan recalled the government repeatedly announced that no unilateral 
action would be taken but Turkey would be the first to take a step within the 
framework of the UN. However, France, and Britain unexpectedly declared that they 
would send 1,100 and 1,300 troops to Bosnia, respectively. Italy also announced that 
it would send 1,500 soldiers. Đnan noted that in Turkey, there was only one news 
column reporting that 480 troops would be allocated within NATO.78  
 Following the speech by Đnan, Đrfan Demiralp (TPP) began his words by 
stating that Turkey had done everything in order to ensure that war in Bosnia was 
brought to an end except for sending troops, just as Hikmet Çetin had remarked. The 
UN Security Council Resolution 770 and 771 had been issued as a result of intense 
diplomatic initiatives taken by the Coalition government under the leadership of 
Süleyman Demirel. Although Demiralp said both resolutions lacked the potential to a 
prompt solution to the situation, he asserted that getting the Security Council to issue 
the said Resolutions was itself a political success. He made an appeal to the 
government that it should revisit its diplomatic and political efforts in the OSCE, 
OIC and the UN. It was equally important to establish the proportion of troops for 
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every state within the UN in the framework of Resolution 770 and to undertake the 
coordinating function.79  
 It was seen that the next speech by Ercan Karakaş (SDPP) was a criticism of 
international organizations but a full endorsement of government actions regarding 
the war in Bosnia. Karakaş held that the UN, the EC or the WEU had not shown the 
expected sensitivity during both the Croat – Serb war and the war in Bosnia that had 
been going on for eight months by then since the “the Arika plain did not smell of 
oil.”80 Karakaş openly stated that SDPP was of the opinion that the Ministry of 
Foreign Affairs took the necessary steps in both Bosnia and Nagorno – Karabagh 
issues. On the other hand, he maintained that SDPP interpreted the opposition’s 
proposals as to direct military intervention to Bosnia and Nagorno – Karabagh as 
plain irresponsibility. 
 Nevertheless, the speech that involved the harshest criticism came from 
Necmettin Erbakan (WP) who accused both the government and the international 
organizations. Erbakan emphasized that the government acted so belatedly in 
convening the Parliament, that is, after Bosnia was almost totally destroyed. He saw 
a causal link between the events in Bosnia and what he called the influence of 
“certain Zionist and other” elements who infused in their societies the idea that 
Muslims were to be wiped out from Europe. Therefore, it was important that the 
Western intellectuals remedy this “disorder” in their societies for the sake of peace 
and stability.81 Pinpointing Boutros Gali’s statement that there were more important 
events than Bosnia in the world such as famine, drought, and poverty, Erbakan 
argued that such a mentality was utterly devoid of providing peace in the world. He 
said he was struck by the fact that the government strictly dismissed the arguments 
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suggesting a polarization between Islam and Christianity while, for instance, Velibor 
Estovic, the Information Minister, said they had undertaken the mission of the 
Crusaders.82 Turkey had historical, humanitarian and strategic reasons to be involved 
according to Erbakan. He warned that if the Serbs accomplished their plan in Bosnia, 
they would proceed with Sandjak, Macedonia, Kosovo and Albania. 
 Erbakan’s speech was an assertive one in terms of the accusations towards the 
government it involved. Erbakan argued that while WP members engaged in such 
efforts, the Đstanbul and Ankara municipalities of SDPP ordered five hundred Ikarus 
public buses produced in Serbia. He added that while the Greeks procured arms to 
Serbia, the Turkish government did not provide arms to Bosnia for the reason that the 
arms had serial numbers on them which made them easy to be identified.83 He called 
upon Demirel that these numbers could be concealed and it would not be such a 
daunting task. Drawing upon the financial contributions of Saudi Arabia and Kuwait, 
he asserted that Turkey simply watched what was going on while the Muslim states 
were doing their best of efforts. Erbakan’s fears fundamentally centered on the 
allegations that the Bosnian children were taken to churches to be converted into 
Christianity. According to Erbakan, some ministers in the government stated in that 
respect that if these children were brought to Turkey they would fall into the hands of 
the tariqats and that was why they should not have been brought.84 Erbakan stated 
that instead of mason forces, Turkey should cooperate with Muslim states. Recalling 
the letter by Hikmet Çetin to UN Security Council regarding military intervention, 
Erbakan maintained that this was a futile effort since the U.S.A. was already 
planning such an intervention at the material time. He concluded that the right thing 
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was to say openly that Turkey shall resort to force along with Iran, Pakistan and 
Egypt if the UN did not intend to.85  
 Upon such criticism, Đnönü stated that Turkey simultaneously held the 
presidency of Council of Europe Committee of Ministers, the OIC, and the group of 
Islamic countries at the UN. Đnönü said that Turkey showed every effort it could in 
the orientation of international community towards the issue and that Bosnia was 
recognized by many states and accepted by the UN thanks to Turkey’s due efforts. 
The OIC foreign ministers convened in Đstanbul in mid-June 1992 at the end of 
which the international community was called upon to intervene militarily. 
Furthermore, Turkey allocated a cargo aircraft by which $ 1,7 million aid was sent to 
Bosnia by then. In reply to Erbakan’s arguments, Đnönü said that a total of sixteen 
deliveries were sent to Bosnia. The Red Crescent procured an aid of $ 240 thousand 
including food and medicine which was delivered in November 1991. Three tons of 
medicine and other medical equipment were sent by Turkish Airlines May 1992. The 
Turkish cargo aircraft carried similar aid of ten tons to Zagreb. Đnönü underlined that 
the accusations by the opposition were unsubstantiated as Turkey provided 
accommodation for more than 15,000 refugees. A Turkish vessel participated in the 
marine force stationed in the Adriatic for the supervision of the embargo on Serbia. 
The commander of the NATO group within this marine force was a Turkish officer.86 
Đnönü reminded that Turkey had submitted the Action Plan for Bosnia to the 
ambassadors of UN Security Council to Ankara in early August 1992 emphasizing 
that Turkey was the only country to prepare and submit such a plan by then. The said 
plan proposed that the Security Council allow military intervention if the political 
efforts of the Security Council did not prove effective, the heavy artillery were not 
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handed over to the UN in two weeks, and the fighting did not end in forty-eight 
hours. In the military operation to be carried out, Banja Luka Airport used by the 
Serbs would be the first target. The secondary targets would be the heavy Serbian 
artillery deployed on Serbian hills. The neighboring states would be called upon to 
open their airports for use by the UN aircraft. The countries that possessed aircraft 
carriers would send their fleets to the Adriatic to support the operation. The Action 
Plan did not target Serbia proper but was against Serbian aggression in Bosnia.87  
 After Đnönü, Ecevit argued that Turkey did not have a well-defined Balkan 
policy. Ecevit stated that he had pointed out the need to formulate a Balkan policy 
back in 1990 when Yugoslavia had not yet disintegrated but that the dangers he had 
foreseen by then were not taken into account by the government. Ecevit also agreed 
that the conflict had turned into a Crusade against the Muslims and the Turks, 
pioneered by Serbia and its main supporter Greece.88 In brief, this extraordinary 
session on Bosnia and Cyprus produced the following parameters to be observed: 1) 
The parliament does not and shall not accept any forced change regarding the 
territorial integrity and the boundaries of Bosnia, 2) The parliament is in solidarity 
with the Bosnian Muslims subjected to one of the most severe massacres of history 
and is prepared to extend aid, 3) The Turkish parliament deems international use of 
force necessary to end Serbian attacks as a humanitarian and peace-bound duty and 
expects the same from the international community and 4) Should the international 
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use of force be exercised belatedly, the parliament shall see it a humanitarian duty to 
take every effort to bring an end to Serbian attacks.89 
 On 24 August, the UN General Assembly convened upon Turkey’s initiative 
and accepted a resolution condemning the acquisition of territory by force in Bosnia 
which was interpreted as a notable success for Turkey. However, it was known that it 
was easier for the General Assembly to take such bold decisions as a body that did 
not have any effective sanctioning power.90 In late August 1992, a conference was 
held by the initiatives of the EC in London attended by approximately 500 diplomats. 
The international diplomatic efforts displayed a turning point with the London 
Conference. While the pre-London efforts were targeted at ending Serb-Croat 
conflict, post-London efforts were a combination of efforts by the UN, the OSCE, 
and the OIC for Bosnia.91 At the conference, Hikmet Çetin stated that Turkey did not 
exclude the use of military power to end the conflict. Slovenia did not attend the 
conference while Macedonia stated that it could withdraw.92 After the conference, 
the talks of military intervention were shelved; the leaders issued a 96-hour 
ultimatum on Serbia.93 
 After one month, the parliament convened in mid-September 1992 and the 
fourth session began with Adnan Kahveci’s remarks. Kahveci preserved his 
criticisms towards the government. He stated that he had talked to one commander 
from Bosnia and that one of them said they had 5,000 people ready to fight yet they 
had neither weapons nor other auxiliary equipment.94 He repeated that Turkey could 
at least give weapons for defense and open the $ 35 million credit at the Eximbank 
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for use by Bosnia. Kahveci noted that he had talked over the matter with the Defense 
Minister yet the latter replied that there would be no arms transfer.95 At one point, 
Kahveci did not refrain from saying that he had no hope from the government and 
held that while Turkey boasted about how it protected the lives of the Turkish Jews 
during World War II, it was devoid of showing even the sympathy for the Bosnians 
and their plight. He stressed that if the embargo had been imposed effectively in the 
long-term, then perhaps Serbia would pay indemnity for all the damages it caused. It 
was acknowledged by Kahveci that the Ministry of Foreign Affairs was of the 
opinion that the embargo simply accelerated the massacre. Yet he suggested that it 
was upon the Ministry of Foreign Affairs to get the embargo modified in a way that 
would work for the Bosnians and not against them. 
 It was seen that Turkey switched track in autumn 1992. The government 
began to argue that in the absence of military help from the international community, 
Bosnia should not be deprived of the right of self-defense. By mid-autumn 1992, 
Ankara decided to concentrate its diplomatic efforts on trying to get the UN arms 
embargo revoked in the case of Bosnian government. Turkey formulated a threefold 
demand: for the lifting of the arms embargo, the establishment of safe havens, and 
limited military intervention.96 When the U.N. Security Council adopted Resolution 
781 banning all military flights in the Bosnian air space, excluding UNPROFOR and 
other flights supporting UN operations through mid-October 1992, Turkey began to 
press for its implementation. After the adoption of this Resolution, the Vance – 
Owen Plan was proposed to the Serbs, the Croats and the Muslims in Geneva in late 
October 1992. After Izzetbegovic’s visit to Ankara in August 1992, Cyrus Vance and 
Lord Owen paid an official visit to Ankara. In early November 1992, Turkey 
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criticized the Vance – Owen Plan for creating ethnically pure zones, punishing the 
victim and encouraging the aggressor. The plan had a three part package comprising 
ten constitutional principles, a cessation of hostilities agreement and a map. It 
defined Bosnia – Herzegovina as a decentralized state, gave autonomy to the 
provinces but denied them any international legal character. Vance and Owen argued 
that the territorial implications in the proposals gave the message of withdrawal to 
Bosnian Serbs and that in order to convince the critics who accused them of 
rewarding ethnic cleansing they emphasized that the Serbs had to withdraw from 
nearly 40 % of their land holdings. From their own eyes, it seemed that the proposal 
of a decentralized state with no international legal character was not much of an issue 
when compared to the issue of portion of land the Serbs would have to withdraw.97  
 It was observed that while Turkey’s allies in the West listened to the pleas of 
Turkish politicians and officials with respect, Turkey remained unable to realize its 
central goals. Through the end of 1992, rather than appealing for the international 
community to take on full action over Bosnia, the efforts of Turkey seemed to be 
focused on specific and limited diplomatic aims. As an example, foreign ministers of 
the Balkan states convened in Đstanbul in late November 1992. The final declaration 
of this meeting centered on the aid issue. The draft resolution proposed by Turkey 
and the U.S.A. at the UN Human Rights Commission on 30 November – 1 December 
1992 was adopted. The resolution defined the Serbs as the aggressor and the 
Muslims in Bosnia as the victim while confirming the view that the main actors of 
the cleansing campaign were the Serbian leadership in Bosnia, the Yugoslav Federal 
Army and the leadership of the Republic of Serbia.98 
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 In early December 1992, the parliament voted for the government proposal 
that the government be given full authority to contribute to UNPROFOR according 
to Resolution 743 and for the deployment of troops in foreign countries which was 
published in the Official Gazette two days later. Following this, UN Security Council 
decided to intervene in Somalia which prompted the government to raise the issue of 
troop deployment on foreign territories. The parliament approved both authorizations 
and the international force in Somalia was later headed by a Turkish General, Çevik 
Bir.99 However, the opposition criticized the government once again by claiming that 
the government decision concerning Bosnia was not noteworthy as it was not 
produced independently of other issues but was taken in relation to the humanitarian 
intervention in Somalia.100 Two days later, Turkish Chief of Staff repeated in its 
Bosnia Report that unilateral intervention was impossible. The main reason in the 
report was the fact that due to the inability of fuel transfer in the air, the Turkish F-
16s could fly only for a limited time.101 Eventually, the UN General Assembly 
adopted Resolution 47/121 which was proposed jointly by Bosnia and Turkey. Since 
the resolution condemned ethnic cleansing and stated that Bosnia had the right to 
self-defense and asked the Security Council to decide for military intervention unless 
the Serb militia attacks stopped by 15 January 1993, it was the closest UN resolution 
to Turkish views.102 
 At the turn of 1993, with the idea that it might be effective on the West to 
take action, Hikmet Çetin appealed to the Islamic countries to impose an oil embargo 
on the Western states. However, Demirel argued that this appeal belonged to Hikmet 
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Çetin and that did not reflect a uniform government consensus.103 To make things 
worse, it was quite unpleasant to see that Bosnia was disregarded in the Islamic 
Summit to be held in Dakar. It appeared that the Palestine Liberation Organization 
lobbying acts overweighed that of Turkey’s initiatives for Bosnia since priority was 
given to discussing the Palestinians deported by Israel.104  
 In the framework of new efforts, the Turkish delegation consisting of State 
Minister Orhan Kilercioğlu (TPP), Đsmail Amasyalı (TPP, an MP who spoke 
Bosnian), medical staff, correspondents of the TRT, Anatolian Agency, and other 
press members flew to Zagreb in January 1993. The delegation had contacts with the 
Bosnian Deputy Prime Minister Hakkı Turajlič among other officials who said they 
received most of the aid sent and requested that Prime Minister Demirel be informed 
that 270 thousand people were confined in six regions and could not receive aid for 
nine months by then. Turajlič requested aid to be delivered by the UN helicopters 
into the said six regions.105 The Bosnian Deputy Prime Minister also stated that after 
Demirel’s last contact with Mittérand, there had been remarkable changes in the 
French stance and that he had been very pleased for that matter.106 Due to heavy fire, 
Kilercioğlu had to hold contact with Turajlič at the airport. After the one-hour 
meeting, while Kilercioğlu flew back, Turajlič was assassinated by two Serb tanks 
and in the presence of the UN convoy.107 Later on, the news reported that Deniz 
Baykal’s statement that there were soldiers in the UNPROFOR who collaborated 
with the Serbs in the shooting was proved right.108 Almost simultaneously, Demirel 
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and Kilercioğlu stated that the real target of the Serbs who shot Turajlič dead was the 
Turkish delegation.109 President Özal argued that the assassination clearly showed to 
what extent the mediation efforts were undermined by the Serbs.110  
 During the short visit in Zagreb, the Croatian Deputy Prime Minister Granic 
was also contacted. The government in Zagreb stated that they did not trust the UN 
and said that Turkey must support Croatia in the OIC. The Turkish delegation 
submitted the urgent requests to the Turkish Foreign Minister and Prime Minister via 
telephone. These also included the continuation of financial and humanitarian aid 
among others. The Croatian officials also stated that they wanted Turkey to support 
the articles concerning Croatia in the conferences to be held in Dakar and Jeddah.111 
Shortly after the assassination, Özal went to Dakar for the Islamic Summit, yet 
declared in the Summit that there were no persuasive signs as to the willingness of 
the Western states to take effective measures as regards Bosnia.112 Özal put forward 
a set of proposals including nine points concerning air bombardment, which was 
approved without any modification.113 All states agreed to force the UN to take 
effective measures and to send more aid to Bosnia. Özal also called upon the 
participants to cut off their relations with Serbia114 and stressed that it was not 
sufficient to see the U.S.A. willing to engage in a military intervention, and that 
Britain, France, Russia and China, as the other members of the Security Council, 
must also act accordingly.115 Özal stated further that the contacts held with Russian 
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officials who were against military intervention had in fact been quite positive on the 
matter this time.116 
 Meanwhile, on the part of the government, it was interpreted that Turkey was 
seen as a strong and a reliable mediator. It was observed that Turkey’s objective was 
to reforge the anti-Serb alliance between the Bosnian Muslims and the Croats. 
Within this framework, Stejepan Mesic, the President of the Croatian Assembly, held 
contacts with his Turkish counterpart Hüsamettin Cindoruk through late January 
1993. After the meeting, Cindoruk stated that he felt as if he were listening to a 
medieval tyranny as Mesic briefed him on the war.117 It was seen that the emphasis 
on the limitations concerning a possible intervention was echoed more frequently 
although there was speculation outside Turkey that it planned to intervene by use of 
force by January 1993.118 The government and the military began to frequently draw 
attention to the issue. 
 In early January 1993, while speaking on behalf of his group, Atilla Mutman 
(SDPP) underlined that although it had the resolve, Turkey would not unilaterally 
engage in an intervention. First, any attack carried out outside the UN framework 
would not be legitimate. Second, Turkey would have to ask Bulgaria for air space 
permission and call off the blockade in the Adriatic Sea, both of which were 
impossible.119 Turkey eventually joined the NATO operation in 1993 within the UN 
Resolution 816 for the enforcement of the no-fly zone over Bosnia. A squadron of 
eighteen F-16s joined the operation.120 This was followed by fervent demands of the 
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opposition with respect to the proposal of holding a general session on the issues of 
Bosnia and Azerbaijan on 13 April 1993.121  
 Amidst these efforts, it was alleged that Turkey received an import of 
approximately $ 7 million from Serbia. In a written question, the government was 
asked if this was true, and if so, what were the goods that Turkey “had to” import 
from Serbia. It was underscored that sustaining bilateral relations with the Serbs 
while requesting harsh measures against them was but hypocrisy. In reply, Hikmet 
Çetin stated in writing that there were no records of such a trade. The issue was also 
forwarded to the Undersecretariat of Treasury and Foreign Trade. The answer by 
both state bodies confirmed that there had been no record of import from Serbia 
between June 1992, i. e., the date of government’s ban on trade, until August 1993, 
the last date of the available record data.122  
 While the fighting continued in early 1994, former Prime Minister Tansu 
Çiller and her Pakistani counterpart Benazir Bhutto went to Sarajevo and announced 
that they visited Sarajevo not as statespersons but as mothers and human beings. 
Following this visit, in February 1994, the bazaar in Sarajevo was bombarded killing 
around 68 and injuring 168 people.123 In early February 1994, Kamran Đnan put 
forward a number of proposals. According to Đnan, the first step to be taken would be 
to withdraw the Turkish vessel from the Adriatic Sea as this made Turkey appear as 
if it was part of the ongoing international strategy. In line with the NATO decisions 
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of June 1993, the Bosnian air space must be protected, the safety of aid corridors 
must be ensured and the air fleets at Aviano Air Base must be operated in case of an 
assault on the said aid corridors.124  
 In February 1994, NATO gave an ultimatum by telling the Serbs to pull back 
all the heavy artillery. NATO announced that if the Serbs did not comply with the 
ultimatum it would bombard the Serb targets, which was welcomed by Turkey. The 
following day, news headlines observed that the new President Clinton gave clear 
signals to Greece and Russia in three ways: 1) NATO now openly confronted the 
Serbs, 2) the recognition of Macedonia after the NATO Summit, which was too 
sudden for Greece and 3) the decision to intervene implied that the U.S.A. was the 
only superpower.125 Indeed, it was soon stated by Çiller that the NATO plan had 
already been proposed to the UN Security Council by Turkey in August 1992 and it 
was in essence the Turkish thesis.126 Meanwhile, the war continued to have 
repercussions in the domestic politics. Çiller accused WP of not having sent the aid 
collected for Bosnia in late February.127 It was soon reported that a certain amount of 
the aid which, according to Şevket Kazan’s (WP) statements, were not sent via any 
bank, were found to be transferred via Faisal Finans to Germany.128 When former 
Bosnian State Minister Hasan Muratovic stated that not a single currency had 
reached Bosnia in the form of aid,129 the accounts of WP in Germany were frozen130 
and in May 1995, the Interpol initiated an investigation concerning WP.131 
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 By March 1994, the UN approved the deployment of Turkish troops in 
Bosnia.132 Following this, the Bosnians and the Croats signed a peace treaty in 
Washington to establish a federation.133 Upon increasing Turkish efforts, the UN 
decided unanimously to send Turkish troops to Bosnia despite the Greek opposition. 
President Demirel openly expressed that Turkish troops did not go to Bosnia to 
revive the Ottoman Empire but to help bring peace.134 
 By April 1994, Bülent Akarcalı (MP) touched upon the legal aspect of the 
problem as part of the efforts and put forward the issue of the international court 
found to establish the crimes and to try the guilty. Stating that the court could not 
function due to financial restrictions, Akarcalı asked in what ways the government 
would extend aid to this court in order for it to begin the trial of the crimes in Bosnia. 
In reply, Hikmet Çetin stated in writing that aside from the studies carried out in the 
Interministry Study Group set up to establish the amendments to be made in Turkish 
law, Turkey had given $ 10,000 to be allocated in February 1992 to the relevant UN 
foundation research on mass rapes. Çetin added that the UN expert commission 
would visit the refugee camps in Turkey to be assisted by Turkish jurists and 
doctors.135 Through mid-April 1994, Çetin made a detailed statement out of agenda 
regarding the latest developments in Bosnia. According to Çetin, Turkey not only 
called upon the OIC to convene but also made the OIC discuss an issue different 
from Israeli – Arab conflict during the presidency of Turkey, perhaps for the first 
time.136 
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 Turkey brought together the Muslims and the Croats for ten times in Turkey. 
Upon the initiatives of Turkey, the basis of trilateral cooperation between the 
Bosnian Prime Minister Sladzic and the Croatian Deputy Prime Minister Granic was 
established which was followed by the Washington Agreement. Addressing 
particularly the opposition, Çetin emphasized that it would not be just to criticize the 
government when the Turkish position regarding the war had reached such a desired 
level despite the Greek opposition in international platforms. It was understood from 
Çetin’s remarks that the “desired level” included sending troops to Bosnia.137   
 In the same session, Kamran Đnan laid out his criticisms against both the 
government and the international community regarding the implementation of the 
no-fly zone as laid out in UN resolution 816. Đnan argued that while there were six 
countries at the Aviano Air Base which would participate in the air force which 
consisted of the U.S.A., France, Italy, Britain, Holland, and Turkey, the defense 
ministers of the five countries convened at Aviano to discuss the decisions to be 
taken on the last day of the ultimatum issued i.e. on 20 February 1994. The 
ultimatum had been issued on 9 February1994 and the last day for it was 21 February 
1994. Đnan pointed out that Turkey was not invited to this meeting which was an 
open disrespect. He went on to argue that the plan that Turkish Air Force would be 
used as supplementary and that it would not participate in the operation reflected 
mistrust on the part of NATO. Therefore, Đnan called the government to pull back the 
eighteen F-16 war planes. Furthermore, Đnan stressed that while a troop of 800 
soldiers waited at the Esenboğa Airport, Boutros Gali stated that they had received 
only 3,500 troops but had originally requested 10,000 troops and that they “would 
have to” allow Turkish troops if they could not reach the sufficient number. 
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According to Đnan, upon such a statement, the government should have announced 
that it would not send any troops.138  Đnan argued that the ultimatum which was 
supposed to be in force as of 21 February 1994 still was not implemented. To make 
things worse, the small amount of arms that the Bosnians possessed were collected 
which put them in a completely defenseless situation. Đnan feared that given the 
economic crisis of April 1994 and all its recent consequences, the position of Turkey 
would appear weak in foreign issues. He concluded that they did not approve the 
Prime Minister’s planned visit to the U.S.A. in such circumstances as he suggested 
that the Prime Minister would represent a weak position.139 
 Ahmet Dökülmez’ (WP) speech in the same session was centered on the 
reactions toward the creation of a new Bosnian state. Dökülmez recalled the letter by 
British Prime Minister John Major to Foreign Minister Douglas Hurd which stated 
that Britain would not be part of any policy that would support the creation of a 
Muslim state in the European continent. Later on, the news on one British TV 
channel reported that the said letter led to a popular indignation among the Bosnians 
and neither John Major nor Douglas Hurd stated that the news was unsubstantiated. 
That said, he argued that as RP, they did not approve any future confederation plans 
that involved the Croats and the Bosnians together and that the only viable solution 
was an independent Bosnian state. He also stressed that WP did in no way participate 
in unauthorized assemblies and demonstrations about Bosnia in Ankara and 
Đstanbul.140 Fahri Gündüz (SDPP) touched upon the same issue by maintaining that 
as a result of irresponsible broadcasts on TV which clearly abused public sensitivity, 
the groups which filled the streets in Ankara and Đstanbul were primarily provoked 
by the political elements close to Algeria and Iran. The actual target of these illegal 
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assemblies who used the plight of the Bosnians as a political tool were the Turkish 
political parties, diplomatic missions, the TRT, the media correspondents, and the 
Turkish Grand National Assembly. The crowd, stressed Gündüz, chanted slogans of 
sharia and damned secularism.141 It seemed that the government would have to deal 
also with this issue as much as it had to deal with the Bosnian war itself. 
 In June 1994, the first and second group of Turkish troops went to Bosnia on 
15 and 25 June respectively142 and arrived in Zenica in early July 1994 to participate 
in the UNPROFOR.143 A week later, Demirel’s planned visit to Sarajevo was 
cancelled due to serious Serb threat.144 In late November 1994, while the war 
continued with intensified attacks, Vehbi Dinçerler put forward a list of proposals 
about what should be done. First and foremost, he proposed that subcommissions be 
set up in the Foreign Affairs Commission, Defense Commission, Justice 
Commission, and Human Rights Commission for the close follow-up and reporting 
of developments. Second, a research commission should be established in 
accordance with the by-law of the parliament. The said commission would undertake 
on-site research for a temporary period as almost all of the representatives of NATO 
member states did in Bihac for instance. Third, a joint action commission should be 
formed to coordinate the steps to be taken by the government, the military and the 
executive. Finally, Dinçerler suggested that a delegation should be formed to 
facilitate the follow-up and coordination of state efforts to be directed by the 
President himself. These proposals were received positively by the speaker of the 
parliament.145 The Bosnia Inspection Commission was set up through mid-December 
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1994 and conducted investigation in Turkey for two months and then in Croatia and 
Bosnia as the first field search with a view to providing support to the Turkish 
executive. The research visit took place in mid-February 1995. The fact that a Bosnia 
inspection commission was set up within the Parliament – although belatedly – was 
welcomed by Bosnian officials during the Commission’s visit in Bosnia which was 
carried out in three phases. The first stop was Croatia where the Commission had 
official contacts with the Speaker of the Croatian Assembly, the Speaker of the 
Federal Assembly, the Prime Minister, the leaders of the Islamic community, and 
Ambassador Akashi of the UN.146 The Turkish delegation expressed its concerns 
regarding the safe delivery of aid to Bosnia through Croatia which was positively 
received by Croatia. The Croatian officials said that they would support the 
establishment of a federation in Bosnia and that they were determined to get the UN 
forces removed as of early July 1995. Following this, the delegation visited Bosnia 
where they met the Speaker of Bosnian Assembly, the Speaker of Federal Assembly, 
the Prime Minister, and President Aliya Izzetbegovic. Turkey agreed with 
Izzetbegovic’s statement that there was no peace in Bosnia but just a ceasefire, which 
was not adhered to by the Serbs. It was the common diagnosis of Izzetbegovic and 
the Turkish military in Bosnia that the fighting would begin in Bosnia again soon. 
Turkey was of the opinion that a multiethnic, multicultural, and multireligious state 
should be established in Bosnia and wanted the decisions of the UN and the Council 
of Europe be implemented.147 The Turkish division in Bosnia did not merely 
participate in peace-keeping but also took part in humanitarian aid, restoration of 
cultural and historical heritage and of schools. Although this visit took place as 
planned, the plane carrying the Turkish delegation which would prepare for 
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Demirel’s visit to Bosnia did not materialize.148 It was observed that the UN waited 
until the last minute to give a definitive answer to Demirel who had been in Split and 
eventually announced that the planes would not fly to Sarajevo at the last minute in 
late February 1995.149 It was soon reported that the Serbs would hit the plane 
carrying Demirel. The UN officials declared that the Serbs would hit the German 
cargo plane by missiles, thinking that it was carrying Demirel.150 On the part of 
Turkey, the UN was seen as having undermined Demirel’s visit. Demirel expressed 
his deep regrets.151 The repercussions of the event continued the following month as 
well and Boutros Ghali stated that the Turkish Embassy in Zagreb was in fact 
notified that Demirel would not be able to visit Sarajevo and expressed his regrets, 
too.152 
 Another visit took place in late March 1995. During the negotiations in this 
visit, Bosnian and Croatian officials stated that the UNPROFOR heralded the 
delivery of aid and did implement the embargo on the Serbs. Nevertheless, the 
coordination of the issue improved later when the Presidency of the Refugees and 
Social Affairs took over administration of the relevant issue. The National Bank of 
Bosnia had also opened accounts in various countries.153 
 When former Bosnian Foreign Minister Đrfan Lubjankic was killed, the failure 
of the UN was proved once again, in late May 1995. Regarding the event, Abdullah 
Gül (WP) stated in early June 1995 that Turkey did not take all the efforts that it 
could and that as the news reports had reflected, considering future relations, it gave 
                                                 
148
 26 February 1995, Milliyet. 
149
 28 February 1995, Hürriyet. 
150
 28 February 1995, Sabah. 
151
 1 March 1995, Türkiye. 
152
 10 March 1995, Sabah; 12 March 1995, Türkiye. 
153
 Turkish Grand National Assembly Journal of Minutes, Session 95, Period 19, Legislative Year 4, 5 
April 1995, vol. 83, pp. 326-327. 
 108 
positive messages to Serbia while it should act as the “representative” of Bosnia.154 
Almost simultaneously, NATO and UN defense ministers and chiefs of staff 
convened in Paris to discuss an urgent intervention force of 4,000 soldiers.155 
Defense Minister Gölhan stated that Turkey would also participate with F-16s in this 
multinational urgent intervention force”.156 Whether upon relevant news or not, it 
was interesting that Serb attacks on Turkish division in Zenica and Embassy in 
Sarajevo coincided Turkey’s relevant declaration.157 When Demirel received 
Izzetbegovic’s urgent help call subsequently, he contacted eleven presidents and 
heads of government to stop the war in early July 1995.158 From then on, it was seen 
that the UN became one of the targets of the Serbs who began to take UN soldiers 
hostage. The UN could not protect its own soldiers anymore and rumors spread that 
it would pull back. However, right after the UN headquarters in Sarajevo was hit by 
the Serbs injuring Colonel Mahmut Ergün and a French captain,159 Turkey 
announced that it would not pull back.160  Turkey and Bosnia signed an agreement on 
military cooperation on 10 August 1995.161 
 The belated NATO intervention began through the end of August, joined by 
sixty war planes including Turkish F-16s. The news reported that the attacks 
resembled the intervention in Iraq. A total of ninety targets of ammunition, command 
centers and defense systems were hit with approximately 300 sorties.162 Within a few 
days, the diplomatic contacts in Ankara suddenly gained acceleration. Izzetbegovic 
came to Ankara on 4 September and met former U.S. Deputy Secretary of State 
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Richard Holbrooke. Turkey reaffirmed its full support for Bosnia.163 It was later 
reported that during his visit, Holbrooke stated that any peace operation would 
necessitate the participation of Turkey. The Bosnian peace plan was not publicly 
discussed by Holbrooke. It was argued that the U.S.A. wanted Turkey to use its 
influence upon the Bosnian Muslims in the future peace talks.164 
 On 8 September, Foreign Ministers of Bosnia, Croatia and Serbia reached a 
compromise in Geneva. Bosnia was divided into “Croat – Muslim Federation” and 
“Republica Srpska” which meant that the Serbs officially recognized Bosnia.165 The 
Serbs began to pull back in mid-September upon which NATO ended its air 
strikes.166 Accordingly, the fighting parties convened in New York in late September 
for peace negotiations which would last for twenty-one days. The final document of 
the negotiation came into being as the Dayton Peace Accord and constituted the final 
settlement of the three-year fighting. 
 By and large, it was observed that the opposition parties were critical of the 
government’s policies mostly by way of alleging that they were ineffective, 
inadequate and devoid of any deterrence. While WP’s criticisms hinged more on the 
common denominator of religion as the departure point, other opposition parties, MP 
and DLP, stressed the lack of active stance on the part of the government and the 
lack of attempts of call on the international community to halt the conflict. Their 
common criticism was that the government did not have a well-defined Balkan 
policy. On the other hand, the statements of the government centered on the 
argument that Turkey would in no way engage in a unilateral intervention but act in 
compliance with the international community. 
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The written records in the Turkish Grand National Assembly Journal of 
Minutes display a sudden shift in the attitude toward Bosnia after the Dayton Peace 
Accord was signed on 21 November 1995 in Ohio. Although Turkish military 
existence continued in Bosnia, Turkish diplomatic/political and economic initiatives 
remained to be taken further. After the war had ended and Bosnia declared its 
independence, Turkish interest towards the region lost intensity. Although Turkish 
military existence continued in Bosnia, Turkish diplomatic/political and economic 
initiatives remained wanting. After the war ended and Bosnia declared its 
independence, Turkey’s interest towards the region lost its former intensity, because 
Ankara had to prioritize other issues, such as PKK terrorism supported by its Syrian 
neighbor.  Turkey’s foreign policies towards Bosnia-Herzegovina and Serbia minded 
balances even during most challenging of times. Ankara acted along with the 
international community, but perhaps most significant, it refrained from turning the 
discourse on war into a matter of Christian-Muslim conflict. 
 Although the post-1995 period will be examined in detail below, it is worthy 
at this point to note that it was not until 2000 that the diplomatic/political relations 
with Bosnia were seriously re-evaluated upon the decision by Bosnia to establish 
diplomatic relations with the Greek Cypriots and the subsequent reaction in March 
2000. Hüseyin Kansu, the Head of Bosnia – Herzegovina/Turkey Interparliamentary 
Friendship Group stated on 22 March 2000 that the issue must be assessed in view of 
both Turkey and Bosnia.167 In the light of the fact that the Greek Cypriots attach 
importance to establishing friendly relations with those countries with which Turkey 
has close relations, it was understandable that such a development coincided a time 
when the Cyprus issue was debated once again with respect to Turkey’s full 
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membership in the EU in a process which involved mediated negotiations. Recalling 
that the same unrest had been experienced with Pakistan and the Central Asian 
Republics except for Azerbaijan and Turkmenistan, Kansu said Turkey would view 
the issue from both perspectives. According to Kansu, Bosnia was forced to establish 
diplomatic relations with the Greek Cypriots and this would hamper the recognition 
of the Turkish Republic of Northern Cyprus (TRNC) by Bosnia. Kansu said the 
Serbs and the Croats wanted to facilitate the accession of Southern Cyprus in the EU 
and to rebut Turkey’s theses of Cyprus by forcing Bosnia.168 Kansu also said it was 
worth to note that this decision was taken during the presidency of Croat Ante 
Jelavic on 11 October and was signed in New York on 7 February 2000. Aliya 
Izzetbegovic declared that this decision did not imply that an embassy would be 
opened in Southern Cyprus and that Bosnia had the resolve to open an embassy in 
the TRNC. Furthermore, it was known that although decisions were taken by 
absolute majority in the Council of Presidency, all the three members of the Council 
were obliged to put their signatures for any decision to be implemented. This, said 
Kansu, meant that Izzetbegovic would not sign. It appeared that although Bosnia was 
an independent state, the Bosnian officials at times felt compelled to act in 
accordance with the Western attitude which displayed a discord from the Turkish 
policies as the dispute on the Cyprus issue exemplified.169 Upon such background, it 
is upon the succeeding section to examine the relations between Turkey and Bosnia 
in the post-1995 period. 
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4.2.2. LOSING MOMENTUM: THE POST-1995 PERIOD 
 
The post-1995 period reflected stagnation in the intensity of Turkish-Bosnian 
relations in general. However, the bilateral visits did not lose their frequency. In June 
1997, Izzetbegovic visited Ankara to discuss a number of issues in the agenda of the 
relations between the two countries. Most importantly, Izzetbegovic reminded the 
$80 million credit to be given by Eximbank in accordance with the protocols signed 
by PM Necmettin Erbakan and his counterpart Hasan Muratovic in 1996. Later on, it 
was decided that the $20 million of the said credit be given as a grant. However, only 
$2,2 million was given to Bosnia although one year had elapsed. Furthermore, the 
way that Izzetbegovic raised another issue was telling. As the WP and TPP coalition 
(Refah-Yol) had not taken efforts in the restoration of the Mostar Bridge, 
Izzetbegovic brought the mayor of Mostar with him to hold contacts with President 
Demirel and to discuss the issue. Izzetbegovic also requested Turkey not to forget 
Bosnia’s problems when dealing with its domestic problems.170 During the Turkish 
delegation’s visit in late January 1998 in Bosnia, the issue was talked over again. It 
was observed that Hikmet Çetin outlined Turkey’s Bosnian policy for the post-1995 
period. Çetin stated that Bosnia was a multicultural, multireligious, and multiethnic 
country, the borders of which were recognized internationally. Çetin stressed that 
Turkey would continue to give its support for the implementation of the Dayton 
Peace Accord in both civil and military terms.171 He noted that the two delegations 
dwelled on the importance of the return of Bosnians which would normalize life in 
Bosnia and stressed that the international community should continue to contribute in 
economic and infrastructure-related issues. After former Deputy Prime Minister and 
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Defense Minister Đsmet Sezgin’s (TPP) visit in early February 1998, Hikmet Çetin 
visited Bosnia in mid-April for bilateral contacts.172 
The purpose of these visits was to keep the pace with the frequent visits by 
the Western leaders to Bosnia. A senior official at the Ministry of Foreign Affairs 
gave German Foreign Minister Klaus Kinkel’s most recent visit as an example and 
stated that Turkey should follow suit in that respect.173 During his visit in mid-April 
1998, Đsmail Cem (DLP) made Turkey’s Bosnian policy clear by way of stating that 
Turkey was equidistant to the three populations living in Bosnia. Cem added that 
Turkey acknowledged the difficulties concerning the implementation of the Dayton 
Peace Accord yet that it was the only viable alternative for Bosnia. It was soon 
reported that Cem’s statement regarding the equidistance policy was a reply to the 
former Serbian Deputy Foreign Minister Dragan Bozonic’s statement that the 
Republika Srpska was part of Bosnia and as such, they also wanted to establish 
friendly relations with Turkey.174 
However, a few days later, it was reported that Turkey did not have a 
definitive view regarding the Republika Srpska within Bosnia established as foreseen 
by Dayton although Turkey supported Dayton as a whole. It was also suggested that 
Turkish public opinion favored close relations with Muslim Bosnians yet the 
diplomats were of the opinion that it was necessary to establish relations also with 
the Serbs as it would serve to improve peace conditions in Bosnia.175 Touching upon 
the same issue, Đlter Türkmen also pointed out that although Turkey had a military 
existence for strategic reasons in Bosnia, this was not reflected onto other fields as 
economic and cultural relations. He suggested that the degree of the close ties with 
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the Bosnians was exaggerated for a certain period of time which caused tension in 
the relations between Turkey and Serbia.176 
The frequent visits continued in June with former Bosnian Federation 
President Eyüp Ganic’s official visit to Ankara. The two sides discussed how Turkey 
could contribute to the sustainability of the Federation mostly in the economic venue. 
It was observed that former Deputy Prime Minister Bülent Ecevit stated in 
accordance with Turkey’s equidistance policy that the Bosnians, the Croats, and the 
Serbs took their best of efforts to live in peace.177 The return of the refugees and the 
unrest in Sandjak were among the other issues discussed.178 Two months later, Ecevit 
visited Bosnia. The visit centered on Turkish economic contribution, grants and 
credits. The Turkish delegation visited the Turkish division and attended August 30 
ceremonies.179 
 The same policy was observed in 1999, too. After former State Minister Sadi 
Somuncuoğlu’s (NMP) visit in June 1999, President Demirel visited Bosnia in early 
December 1999.180 This was Demirel’s sixth visit to Bosnia and also to the Turkish 
division in Zenica.181 It was seen that Iran, Saudi Arabia, and Libya also contributed 
to restructuring of Bosnia in economic terms. The news reports wrote that although 
the Socialist approach was replaced with nationalism, and atheism was replaced with 
fundamentalist religious trends, Bosnia, as a war-torn country, did not lend itself to 
any of these trends.182 
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 Eventually, the visits were postponed due to the Kosovo crisis and the 
earthquake in Turkey in 1999. The old hostilities were alleged to have ceased among 
the Muslim, Croat and Serb Presidents constituting the Council of Presidency and 
they were more open to acknowledging an increased role for Turkey. The fact that 
the Serb and the Croat Presidents mentioned “strategic partnership” with Turkey was 
telling in that respect. It can be argued that Demirel’s personal efforts had had a 
determining effect in the evolution of such a conjuncture.183  
 However, the year 2000 displayed ups and downs in the bilateral relations. 
The ties between Turkey and Bosnia took on a rocky form when Bosnia decided to 
establish diplomatic relations with the Greek Southern Cypriots in February 2000 as 
mentioned above. The second negative development was experienced when Bosnia 
decided to impose a visa obligation on Turkish citizens in the same year. The 
Bosnian Ministry of Human Rights decided to do so on the grounds that many Turks 
had illegally passed through Bosnia to go to other countries in Europe. The Bosnian 
officials stated that approximately 6000 Turks were recorded as having passed via 
Bosnia to European countries. Former Ambassador Ahmet Erozan expressed 
Turkey’s concern duly by stating that this development would harm the relations 
after the decision to establish diplomatic relations with the Greek Cypriots. Erozan 
also stated that Turkey would do the same if Bosnia did not alter its decision.184  
 By 2002, the restoration of the Mostar Bridge turned into an issue which 
eventually made the Ministry of Foreign Affairs take due efforts to support the bid 
winner Turkish construction company ER-BU. Such a step was taken upon the 
French move to assert the French company into the restoration process. When ER-
BU informed the Ministry of Foreign Affairs that the French government opened a 
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stone handicraft school in Mostar in order to win the bid, the Ministry of Foreign 
Affairs contacted the Ministry of Culture, the Office of the Prime Ministry, and the 
Presidency about what could be done. The Ministry of Foreign Affairs announced 
that the restoration would be undertaken even if it did not yield any profit.185 The 
situation became even more unpleasant when the Italian President was invited to the 
symbolic opening ceremony on 27 June 2002. Erozan stated that he would not attend 
the ceremony to show Turkey’s protest. It was argued that the event lacked official 
manners and seriousness.186  
 Despite the previous negative developments, it appeared that Turkey’s 
conduct of foreign policy towards Bosnia was preserved in essence. Within this 
framework, members of the Bosnia – Herzegovina Council of Presidency visited 
Turkey in early July 2002. Although Turkey officially invited the Bosnian member 
of the said Council, Beriz Belkic, who held the seat at the material time, it also 
invited the Croat member Jazo Krizanovic and the Serb member Zivko Rasidic. The 
issue of focus in the meetings was the UNPROFOR. The U.S.A. objected to the trial 
of UNPROFOR soldiers by the International Criminal Court and had accordingly 
vetoed the prolongation of UNPROFOR period of stay in Bosnia. In that respect, 
Belkic requested Sezer to use every means that Turkey could in order to lift the veto 
which was received positively by Sezer.187 
 The reciprocal visits continued in 2003 with the Speaker of the Turkish Grand 
National Assembly Bülent Arınç’s visit on 30 April 2003.188 Following this visit in 
May, Adnan Terzic, former President of Council of Ministers, stated that Turkey was 
a model for Bosnia and EU membership was the future target for Bosnia until 2009. 
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During his visit in Ankara, Terzic stated that Bosnia took Turkey as a model.189 By 
2005, Turkey included Bosnia along with Macedonia, Tunisia, Iran, Morocco and 
Kyrgyzstan in its list of states subject to visa in accordance with the adjustment 
process with the EU. The EU Commission had called upon Turkey to revise its visa 
regime in its 2004 Regular Report.190 As part of the frequent visits, Prime Minister 
Recep Tayyip Erdoğan went to Bosnia to hold contacts with the members of Council 
of Presidents191 and Bülent Arınç accepted Şefik Caferovic, the Speaker of the 
Bosnian Assembly of Representatives, to discuss the situation of around 300 
thousand refugees and land mines awaiting urgent solution. It was reiterated that 
Turkey would continue to give active support in calling for international support for 
Bosnia.192 
As one scholar has argued, if Bosnia had won its independence without war, 
if the Bosnian Muslims had not been subjected to ethnic cleansing, if the 
international community had not committed fatal mistakes as a result of which the 
Bosnians looked to Turkey for support, relations between Turkey and Bosnia would 
still develop on a friendly basis, yet they would not possess the nature of such a close 
alliance.193 Turkey not only continues to contribute to Bosnia in economic, military, 
and humanitarian venues but also provides support in the reconstruction of the 
country and takes efforts to reinforce the Bosnian – Croatian alliance which it sees as 
the only way to protect the territorial integrity of Bosnia.194 Ankara closely follows 
the developments in the region and preserves the pace of bilateral contacts. Yet, with 
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the end of war, Bosnia has lost its previous diplomatic and political priority in 
Turkey’s foreign policy agenda.195 
 The current state of affairs between the two states hinges on several demands 
which remain to be fulfilled by both sides in the foreseeable future. Among others, 
three important points that Turkey hopes to see accomplished can be outlined as 
follows. First, Turkey wants that the Agreement on Educational Cooperation to be 
signed after the education reform carried out in accordance with the OSCE is 
completed. Second, Turkey calls upon Bosnia to provide the Turkish entrepreneurs 
with necessary facilities. Third, Turkey expects to see that the bureaucratic problems 
faced by Turkish citizens at border gates be eliminated. Bosnia wants Turkey’s 
support for its membership in the PfP program, increased Turkish investment, 
support for the return of the refugees and the displaced; and the establishment of 
coordination between the EU Directorate in Bosnia and the General Secretariat of the 
EU Affairs in Turkey.196   
 
 
4.3. TURKISH FOREIGN POLICY TOWARDS SERBIA (AND 
MONTENEGRO) 
 
After the end of the Cold War, particularly after the Bosnian war broke out relations 
between Ankara and Belgrade seemed to hinge on a complex reality: bilateral 
relations would witness a change for the worse as they both witnessed threat 
perceptions with the outbreak of war, which was not an issue in bilateral relations 
until then. Subsequently, although the components of economic relations were there, 
                                                 
195
 ibid., p. 116. 
196
 Report on Bosnia – Herzegovina, Ministry of Foreign Affairs, 2005. 
 119 
they eventually fell victim to power politics with the war. Although Ankara tried to 
break out of the vicious circle of war through diplomatic means by actively trying to 
make its pleas be heard by the West, this concerned a larger picture whereby 
Turkey’s relations with the Balkans was not totally free, but worked in the shadow of 
the U.S.A. as in the Cold War. The case study of post-Cold War relations between 
Ankara and Belgrade is also worthwhile to ascertain how relations could end up 
altered, as Slobodan Milosevic’s latent designs came to surface. When ethnic 
problems appeared in Yugoslavia in the early 1990s with Milosevic’s assumption of 
power, ensuing developments forced Turkish – Yugoslavian relations to a precarious 
situation. 
 
After the declaration of independence by Croatia and Slovenia in 1991, 
Yugoslavia began to take efforts to be in good terms with Turkey with the aim of 
convincing Turkey not to support the secessionist movements in Yugoslavia. Within 
this framework, Slobodan Milosevic came to Ankara in January 1992, right after one 
week the former Yugoslav republics were recognized by the international 
community. Milosevic stated that “Turkey had shown that it followed a responsible 
policy by acting in accordance with the general international attitude that hoped to 
see Yugoslavia intact”.197 The Serbian President was met by former Deputy Prime 
Minister Erdal Đnönü and taken to Çankaya to hold contacts with President Demirel 
which would be the last meeting between Demirel and Milosevic. In a 2000 
interview, Demirel stated that the message given to Milosevic during this one-day 
meeting was plain and clear: Turkey expressed its concerns and warned that Serbia 
would not be able to bear the results of bloodshed – if it should happen. The visit was 
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not planned; Milosevic was not invited, either. However, it appeared that the Serbian 
President came to express Serbian concerns more than to listen to Turkey’s relevant 
fears regarding the situation. Milosevic expressed his content on Turkey’s non-
interventionaist attitude which would in fact last short. Viewing the meeting in 
retrospect, Demirel argued that Ankara saw certain developments coming, however it 
appeared that the former Serbian President did not seem to have received the 
message given by Turkey as was seen by the subsequent bloodshed in Bosnia with 
Milosevic’s return. 198 
The Yugoslav government withdrew their Macedonian-origin Ambassador to 
Ankara in June 1991. From then on, Turkey’s relations with Yugoslavia displayed a 
dual course: while the relations were strained due to the Bosnian War and the anti-
Turkish attitude of ultranationalist Serbian leaders, the fact that Yugoslavia was the 
gateway for Turkish trade routes to Europe was the primary concern in Turkey’s 
policy formulation.199 Equally importantly, Turkey took efforts to avert an Orthodox 
– Muslim conflict in the region in respect of which it avoided to follow a policy not 
to antagonize Serbia’s main ally Greece when the two states already had strained 
relations due to almost constant bilateral conflicts.200 While most criticism came 
from religious – nationalist circles, the official viewpoint in Turkey maintained that 
the developments should not be attributed to the Serbian government and the Serbian 
population, and that a differentiation should be made between them.201 
 During the war, there appeared a contradiction in Yugoslavia’s foreign policy 
and the Islamic countries and that included Turkey as well. While Yugoslavia’s 
policies revolved around pragmatism, they also hinged on Serbian nationalism based 
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on an anti-Turkish and anti-Islamic attitude.202 According to Ivo Banac, this anti-
Turkish and anti-Islamic attitude had its roots in the fall of individual South Slavic 
national elites and states to the Ottoman Turks with the process that began in 1389 
with the Battle of Kosovo and ended in 1459 with the abolition of the vassal Serbian 
despotate.203 The Serbian uprisings against the Ottomans eventually assumed a 
suspicion of religious and national diversity.204 In the course of time, the opposition 
to diversity and the pursuit of homogenization materialized in the attempt to establish 
an ethnic unity which gave its initial signs in Milosevic’s speech at the field of 
Kosovo on the occasion of the 600th anniversary of the Battle of Kosovo, an excerpt 
of which, as far as relevant, reads as follows: 
 
I ... ask the critics of homogenization, why are they disturbed by the 
homogenization of peoples and human beings in general if it is carried 
out on the basis of just, humane, and progressive ideas, in one’s own 
interests, and is no harm to others? Is this not the meaning, the aim, to 
which humanity has always aspired? Surely, the sense of the human 
community is not to be inhomogeneous, divided, even when its 
aspirations are progressive and humane?205 
 
 The unity Milosevic had in mind was opposed to Muslims and Turks in the 
region. Therefore, it was difficult to understand the framework of Yugoslavia’s 
policies which were simultaneously based on Turcophobia and Islamophobia and 
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having close relations with fundamentalist states such as Iran.206 More specifically, 
the official Yugoslav argument in the first half of the 1990s was based on the belief 
that Washington wanted to help establish a new Ottoman state through Turkey, 
which laid the basis of NATO attacks to build the alleged Green Corridor – the line 
densely populated by Muslims crossing Bosnia, Sandjak, Kosovo, Macedonia and 
Western Thrace.207 In a 1992 interview, Milosevic expressly stated that the Muslims 
in the Balkans were getting more and more fundamentalist as Izzetbegovic was in 
cahoots with the radical Islamic states as Iran, Libya, and Sudan had always been. He 
accused Izzetbegovic of being a fascist fundamentalist  
 
who was jailed in 1947 under Tito for his membership in the 
underground ‘Young Muslims’ and his sympathies for the Grand 
Mufti of Jerusalem, Hitler’s war-time ally. We call it the Green Snake 
of Islam. It is crawling westward through the Balkans via Turkey, 
Kosovo and Macedonia.208 
 
 However, Turkey did not pursue a policy which would antagonize Serbia. 
Turkey’s Kosovo policy contributed to averting the deterioration of relations with 
Belgrade in that Turkey assumed a policy that supported the territorial integrity of 
Yugoslavia and described the problem as a human rights issue in all platforms.209 
 Although relations began to develop between Serbia and Turkey, they 
remained at minimum levels until at least four years after the Dayton Peace Accord 
was signed. Turkey and Serbia opened embassies reciprocally and bilateral contacts 
began by 1996.210 Within this framework, Onur Öymen, the Undersecretary of the 
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Ministry of Foreign Affairs, went to Belgrade and he was told by Yugoslav officials 
that Yugoslavia did not support the PKK or its activities. The Turkish delegation 
touched upon the statement by the Office of Chief-of-Staff that Serbia appeared in 
the list of the countries providing the PKK with missiles. The Yugoslav officials 
reiterated that they were prepared and willing to cooperate against terrorism. This 
was the first high level visit after former Deputy Speaker of the Turkish Parliament 
Uluç Gürkan’s visit to Belgrade. It was reported that the second and equally 
important issue on the agenda of this visit was economy in respect of which Turkish 
officials expressed their hope to see facilitated transit passages through Serbia.211 
This visit was interpreted as being part of new openings within the framework of 
regionalism in foreign policy introduced by Özal. As one renowned columnist had 
observed back in 1997, there was no reason that could potentially impede the 
normalization of relations between Ankara and Belgrade given the Bosnian war had 
ended and that it was seen that the Milosevic government wanted to open a new page 
in bilateral relations.212 This was observed once again when the Serbian Academy of 
Sciences invited Professor Bozkurt Güvenç to the conference held on 15 December 
1997. The title of the conference “The Balkans and the World Powers” and Professor 
Bozkurt’s title “Cultural Consultant of the Turkish Presidency” were telling in that 
respect. Senior Turkish diplomats at the time also confirmed that the Serbs were 
willing to hold further high level contacts.213  
Turkey also reciprocated and invited Serbia to join the Black Sea Economic 
Cooperation (BSEC).214 Former Prime Minister Mesut Yılmaz’s talks with Milosevic 
during the 1997 Balkan Summit in Crete gave signals of normalization in 
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relations.215  However, as mentioned above, the relations were strained once again 
when the crisis broke out in Kosovo in 1998 which put Turkey and Yugoslavia on 
opposite camps. It has been argued that Turkey saw Kosovo crisis as another grave 
mistake by the Serbs. Yet, it did not articulate the matter as fervently as it called for 
support during the Bosnian war. This policy received criticism from different circles 
in Turkey and also by the Kosovars. First, the criticism asserted that Kosovo would 
already be an independent state as was understood from the American policies based 
on restoration and aid plans toward the region.216 Second, it was held that Turkey 
tied itself too much to the view that saw Serbia as Turkey’s trade gateway to Europe. 
Third, Turkey conducted too much self-restraint so as not to be seen as attempting to 
revive the Ottoman heritage. The critics alleged that Kosovo was already swayed into 
bloodshed while Turkish officials emphasized the importance of its territorial 
integrity.217 As the crisis continued, former Yugoslavian Foreign Minister Zivadin 
Jovanovic described the relations between the two countries as quite “normalized” in 
economic, cultural and, scientific venues but not as much in the political venue.218 It 
seemed that the PKK problem reflected itself onto the bilateral relations once again 
as the newspaper columns pointed to a “Serbian – Greek – PKK” alliance in 1998 by 
writing how terrorists were financed and equipped with the provision of missiles and 
weaponry in Greece and Serbia and later sent to Damascus after being trained. It was 
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alleged that the IGNA missiles were brought by the PKK owing to the good relations 
between Milosevic and Öcalan, and also to a Greek colonel’s efforts.219  
In 1999, Darko Tanaskovic, the former Yugoslav Ambassador to Ankara, 
evaluated relations with Turkey as well as the Western states with respect to the 
Balkans. While Tanaskovic maintained that there were approximately 30 Kosovo-
like places in the world, the West had chosen to target Kosovo and stated that the 
entry of the Turkish Army to Kosovo after 300 years was not something that should 
be turned into such an issue. Tanaskovic further said that if there was a commonality 
to be established between Kosovo and the Southeast of Turkey, it would only be the 
reality of terror and nothing else. He refuted the news reports reflecting his views as 
seeing a full similarity between the situation in Kosovo and the Southeast of 
Turkey.220 
 Just as NATO’s response to Bosnia was too little and too late, it was too 
much and too soon for Kosovo. Turkey took part in the Kosovo operation with a 
relatively cautious attitude when compared to the Bosnian war due to the 
abovementioned reasons as well as the readiness of the international community to 
take harsh measures as opposed to the Bosnian experience.221  
 After Vojislav Kostunica was elected President in the elections held in 
September 2000, the first meeting between the two states took place in October 2000 
at the unofficial meeting of Presidents and Heads of Government within the 
Southeast European Cooperation Initiative (SECI) in Skopje. Former Prime Minister 
Ecevit held contacts with Kostunica and stated that the regional states were willing 
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and ready to support Belgrade to which Kostunica reciprocated by way of stating that 
they also wanted to see improvement in the relations.222 It has been argued that 
Kostunica’s participation constituted the most important dimension of this meeting 
by way of which Belgrade showed that it was willing to integrate with the rest of 
Southeast Europe. It was argued that the past burdened relations between Belgrade 
and Ankara in fact stemmed from Milosevic’s unilateral policies and that the 
bilateral relations have indeed been friendly ever since the end of World War I.223 
However, it would not be erroneous to argue that bilateral relations had come to the 
verge of breaking pursuant to NATO attacks in which Turkey also took part. The 
new period of conciliation began with former Foreign Minister Đsmail Cem’s visit to 
Belgrade on 2 March 2001. It was the first high level visit after 5 October 2000 when 
Milosevic was ousted in Belgrade and replaced by Vojislav Kostunica.224 Cem held 
contacts with President Kostunica, Prime Minister Zoran Zinzic, and State Minister 
Rasim Ljalic after which it was decided that there would be increased cooperation 
between the two states. The diplomatic sources stated that the invitation of Cem by 
Kostunica for a separate meeting was interpreted as a sign of cordiality.225 Following 
this, former Foreign Minister Goran Svilanovic paid an official visit to Ankara in 
April 2002 which was seen as part of the Yugoslav government’s efforts to erase the 
vicissitudes of Milosevic period and to become a member of international 
community. Svilanovic referred to Cem’s visit in 2001 as the start point of future 
cooperation and stated that Yugoslavia supported the initiative for dialogue between 
religions and cultures as well as combat against terrorism. When asked how to 
restore the memories of Bosnia and Kosovo, two issues which shadowed the bilateral 
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relations, it seemed that the Yugoslav Foreign Minister had positive expectations as 
he stated that the two states preserved the economic relations also during the war. 
According to Svilanovic, it was time to take economic relations even further.226 
Svilanovic visited Turkey again in early February 2003 to hold contacts with former 
Prime Minister Abdullah Gül and former Foreign Minister Yaşar Yakış. The Serbian 
Foreign Minister said that he was quite hopeful concerning the new state of “Serbia 
and Montenegro” and that he expected to see Serbia and Montenegro in the EU in ten 
years’ time, that is, before Turkey became a full member.227 The same expectation 
was voiced also by the new President of Serbia and Montenegro Svetozar Marovic 
during his visit to Ankara in early December 2004. Marovic acknowledged the 
imprint put into the history of Southeast Europe by Turkey in respect of which he 
argued that Serbia and Montenegro and Turkey had common strategic priorities such 
as EU membership which could be accelerated if the two states took joint efforts.228 
During the talks, President Ahmet Necdet Sezer said that further improvement in 
bilateral relations was essential for regional peace and stated that “Turkey and Serbia 
and Montenegro have accepted themselves as neighbors although they do not share 
borders.”229 It was argued that this visit was particularly important on the part of 
Serbia and Montenegro as to emphasize their resolve to enter NATO and to ask 
Turkey for due support.230 
 By September 2004, Turkey expressly stated that it strongly wished to see 
Serbia and Montenegro overcome possible obstacles to its entry into the Euro-
Atlantic integration processes as soon as possible. However, it was added that Serbia 
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and Montenegro must first meet the requirements for entry including full cooperation 
with the UN War Criminals Tribunal at The Hague.231  
The most recent contacts were held during Foreign Minister Abdullah Gül’s 
visit in Serbia and Montenegro which took place following a visit to Kosovo which 
was administered by the UN and NATO since 1999. Gül and Boris Tadic, the 
President of Serbia, discussed the situation in Kosovo, EU integration and other 
topics. Given that Serbia wished to retain at least formal control over Kosovo, Tadic 
stated that Kosovo should remain part of Serbia and Montenegro and called for 
protection of all minorities in the province.232 The official stance of Serbia and 
Montenegro was affirmed by Tadic’s statement that an independent Kosovo would 
have serious implications for the region.233 However, Gül openly stated that Turkey 
wanted Kosovo to have a democratic multiethnic and structure where everyone was 
fairly represented.234 For further improvement of economic relations, Abdullah Gül 
and his counterpart Vuk Draskovic signed two agreements on the prevention of 
double taxation and on social security.235  
In 27 February 2005, Serbia adopted a new law on citizenship with a view to 
facilitating citizenship procedures and thus to increasing the number of Serbian 
citizens while Montenegro continued to apply the related law in its previous form. In 
accordance with the said law put into effect on 27 February 2005, those who were 
born in Serbia and emigrated to another country for various reasons, their children, 
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grandchildren or kinship, regardless of the fact that they had been born and raised in 
Serbian territory shall enjoy the rights guaranteed by the said law on the condition 
that they prove in writing that the applicants or their family members are of Serbian 
origin or were born in Serbian territory. The law does not stipulate settlement in 
Serbian territory which is an advantage for those who intend to apply. Irena 
Kuzmanovic, Vice Consul at the Serbia and Montenegro Consulate in Đstanbul, stated 
that the law was new and yet they had received approximately 30 official 
applications.236  
 The new application by Serbia was interpreted as an effort to increase the 
number of citizens by Selim Yusufoğlu, the Secretary General of Rumeli Turks 
Federation and Member of Bosnia – Sandjak Association, who stated that those who 
immigrated to Turkey were Muslim Bosnians, mostly from Sandjak, which implied 
that they would not be interested as opposed to Serbian expectations. Given Serbia’s 
efforts concerning EU integration, it appears that Serbia introduced the said law to 
act in accordance with the EU laws and regulations. Yet, it is not likely to receive 
much attention as far as the Bosnian Muslims in Turkey are concerned. 
 There remains a set of issues awaiting solution on Serbia’s road to the EU and 
the rest of Southeast Europe. The EU declared that there were still some obstacles to 
start accession negotiations with Serbia and Montenegro in early October 2005. The 
prospective membership of Serbia and Montenegro is pronounced as 2010. This may 
be seen as too early a date when compared to Turkey’s relevant experience and 
expectations. In fact, Belgrade’s foreign policy has to resolve two major issues: 1) its 
Kosovo policy and 2) the recent separation of Montenegro from Serbia. Last but not 
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least, there is overwhelming pressure and criticism towards Serbia concerning the 
handover of Radko Mladic.237 
 As far as the status of Kosovo is concerned, it is known that the international 
attitude has come to be supportive of independence while calling upon the Albanians 
to give Serbs their minority rights as expressed by Richard Holbrooke, Former U.S. 
Special Envoy to Bosnia, in an interview on 11 March 2006.238 On the other hand, 
Turkey supported the full implementation of UN Resolution 1244 and continues to 
contribute to security and stability in Kosovo in KFOR and OSCE mission with its 
military existence and police239 while Serbia wished to retain at least formal control 
over Kosovo as mentioned above. In face of the recent declaration of independence 
by Kosovo, Serbia will have to reshape its Kosovo policies radically and that is what 
has exacerbated the rift between the pro-European and conservative groups in the 
Serbian parliament which resulted in an early election in 2008. Turkey, on the other 
hand, supports Kosovo’s recent independence while trying not to strain relations with 
Serbia and Russia. 
 The second and equally important issue concerned the separation of Serbia 
and Montenegro. In accordance with the agreement between Serbia and Montenegro 
dated 14 March 2002, both Serbia and Montenegro were entitled to hold a 
referendum for independence as of February 2006.240 Accordingly, Montenegro 
submitted an official proposal of separation in February 2006 stating that the union 
did not function effectively and its institutions were sluggish. In the draft document 
signed by Montenegrin President Filip Vujanovic and Prime Minister Milo 
                                                 
237
 “Sırbistan Karadağ Pazarlığı”, 10 October 2005, BBC Turkish. 
238
 Live interview on CNN International after Milosevic was found dead in his cell, 11 March 2006. 
239
 “Tükiye, Sırbistan – Karadağ ve Kosova Đlişkileri”, on 
http://www.bilimarastirmavakfi.org/html2/yayinlar/yayinlargiris.html as retrieved on 22 February 
2006 06:13:49 GMT. 
240
 “Karadağ’ın Bağımsızlığına Yeni Bir Engel”, Erhan Türbedar, 12 February 2005, on 
http://www.turksam.org/tr/yazilar.asp?kat=53&yazi=169  
 131 
Djukanovic, it was said that Montenegro favored a new, permanent and a more stable 
model which would eliminate the current shortcomings. Prime Minister Gjukanovic 
further stated that due to its previous problems related to nationalism and the Kosovo 
issue, Serbia shadowed the efforts of Montenegro for entering the EU.241 While the 
EU preferred to see a union in which the two states take part on the eve of the 
referendum,242 the U.S.A. supported an independent Montenegro as from the U.S. 
viewpoint, it would not work with more than one prime minister, foreign minister 
and internal borders.243 By 4 March 2006, all of the 68 members of parliament 
present out of 75 at the session voted for referendum to be held on 21 May 2006 in 
Montenegro. The polls before the referendum showed that 41.4 % of the population 
supported independence; 32.2 % were against; 14.9 % abstained and 11.4% did not 
comment on the issue.244  
 While Serbia and Montenegro took efforts to restore its image and become 
integrated to the international community, the news that Milosevic was found dead in 
his cell evoked various arguments as to divine justice, total defeat of Serbia, 
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elevation of Milosevic to a hero, etc. It is dubious that the tribunal in the Hague has 
had any chastening effect upon the ultranationalist Serbs245 bearing in mind the fact 
that Milosevic remained somehow as a symbol of Serbian nationalism that 
Kostunica, whom the opposition swept into power initially, indeed, balked at 
handing him over to The Hague.246 Just as there are factions in Russia nostalgic for 
Stalin and those in Germany nostalgic for Hitler, Milosevic still has supporters 
although a few. It can be argued that the issue is not all over but close to the end. 
Milosevic’s death is not likely to matter a lot; his removal from Belgrade had already 
removed him from Serbian domestic and foreign policy. Eventually, Montenegro 
declared independence forming a new European state and dissolving the last shred of 
the former Yugoslavia on 2 June 2006. The independence ceremony was not 
attended by any Serbian official and Prime Minister Kostunica did not congratulate 
Montenegrin leaders on the results.247 Now, in face of the possibility that with 
Milosevic dead, there is an opportunity that Serbia’s main opposition party and the 
Socialist Party would not miss the time to elevate Milosevic posthumously to a 
national hero. That implies a remaining threat to the security of the Balkans, 
particularly in respect of Kosovo’s recent independence and talks of change in the 
administration of Bosnia - Herzegovina. 
In sum, relations between Turkey and Serbia followed a dual course after the 
Bosnian War, which indicated a complex reality: relations were strained but Ankara 
had to take into account the fact that Yugoslavia was the gateway for Turkey’s trade 
routes to Europe. While Turkey actively tried to make its pleas concerning the war be 
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understood by the West through diplomatic means, it realized that this was limited as 
its relation to the Balkans worked in close connection with that of the USA. 
 Turkey also had to avert the arguments that it tried to play the Muslim card in 
the Balkans. After the Dayton Peace Accord was signed, Turkey and Serbia 
embarked on a process of reconciliation in 1996. However, relations took on a rocky 
form once again with the Kosovo crisis in 1999. When Milosevic was ousted to be 
replaced by Vojislav Kostunica, disrupted relations were said to have originated from 
the former’s policies, otherwise bilateral relations have always been cordial since the 
end of World War I.  
After Kosovo declared independence and was recognized by Turkey in 
February 2008, Ankara was determined to maintain good relations with Belgrade. 
Prime Minister Recep Tayyip Erdoğan stated that Serbia had an important role and 
responsibility in the future of the Balkans and that Turkey attached importance to 
improving relations and cooperation with Serbia both on a bilateral and a regional 
basis. However, Serbian officials did not balk at withdrawing Vladimir Curgus, 
Serbian ambassador to Ankara in protest when Turkey decided to recognize Kosovar 
independence.248 The Serbian ambassador left Turkey few days after Kosovo’s 
declaration of independence by handing out a note of protest to the Ministry of 
Foreign Affairs. Expressly stating that bilateral relations should not be expected to be 
the same any more, the ambassador said that they expected Turkey to revise its 
decision concerning Kosovar independence.249 The first ostensible sign of this policy 
was Serbia’s refusal to allow Süha Umar, Turkish ambassador to Belgrade, to submit 
his credentials to be able to start his official duty in May 2008, not to mention 
Serbian demonstrators’ pelting stones earlier at the Turkish embassy in Belgrade 
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only few days after the declaration of independence.250 The Turkish ambassador 
performed his duties however, as such he was not expected to receive high level 
acceptance. It can be expected that relations may further deteriorate as Turkey now 
opened an embassy in Kosovo. In the short- and medium-term, bilateral relations 
strained since the wars in Bosnia and Kosovo have yet to lend themselves to 
reconciliation between the two states due to divergent stances on Kosovo. 
Consequently, reciprocal strains continue but the job got done although in low 
profile. Şule Kut’s apt prognosis of ‘duality in relations’ remains constant. Neither 
Turkey nor Serbia need attract additional enmities, and Ankara’s good will may be a 
significant component for Serbian legitimacy in international affairs. 
 
 
4.4. TURKISH FOREIGN POLICY TOWARDS CROATIA 
 
Although there was an overwhelming pro-independence mood in Croatia, the 
Tudjman administration hesitated a long time over declaring independence from 
Yugoslavia and pressed for a confederal option due to the combined Serb Army 
pressure in 1991.251 Eventually, Croatia declared independence a few hours before 
Slovenia did on 25 June 1991. As one Croatian career diplomat had put it back in 
1998, in historical terms the relations between Turkey and Croatia were defined by 
competing national interests. However, the two states now share the common view 
that the EU and NATO are the basis of stability and peace in the Balkans and 
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Europe.252 The diplomatic and political relations between the two states were 
established in 1992 after Turkey recognized the independence of Croatia on 6 
February 1992. Turkey upgraded its Consulate General in Zagreb to embassy level 
the same year in September. The Turkish Embassy in Zagreb officially opened and 
started to function on 1 April 1993.253 Although Turkey had the will and the resolve 
to establish good relations with the newly emerged states in the region, relations with 
Zagreb were particularly important to the Bosnian War.254 The basis of close 
relations were the attempts to establish a joint front between Croatia and Bosnia in 
respect of which Turkey assumed an active role along with the U.S.A. and Germany 
to form the Bosnian – Croat Federation with the 1994 Washington Agreement.255 
Indeed, diplomatic and political relations between Zagreb and Ankara retained its 
importance as high level visits and bilateral agreements implied. Although there was 
an alleged discord between Turkish and Croatian stance during the war, Croatian 
Head of Assembly Stejepan Mesic’s visit in Ankara indicated that the two states had 
similar concerns on the question of Bosnia as former President of Turkish Grand 
National Assembly Hüsamettin Cindoruk stated on 21 January 1993.256 Similar 
views were confirmed by Croatian Deputy Prime Minister Mate Granic during Hasan 
Celal Güzel’s visit in Zagreb two weeks later.257 
 On 18 March 1994, when Croatia and Bosnia signed an agreement to 
establish a federation, Turkey’s role as an active mediator was acknowledged. 
Hikmet Çetin made Turkey’s position clear by emphasizing that there could be no 
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genuine solution to war unless the Serbs pulled back completely and the refugees 
returned home safely.258 Although the Washington Agreement was a significant 
accomplishment, Turkey preserved cautiousness by way of stressing that the 
application of the agreement was now more important than the signing of the 
agreement.259 Addressing the joint session of the Croatian Parliament Sabor on 16 
July 1994, former President Demirel remarked that as the mastermind of the new 
Federation, Turkey would continue to sustain its mission in the region and would like 
to see the Bosnian Serbs join in, which would serve their self-interest and to the 
interest of all concerned.260 
 Besides common Turkish and Croatian European orientation and values, 
Croatia’s interests in developing closer relations with Turkey is prompted by 
Croatia’s concern about regional policies with respect to a Balkan integration.261 
Croatia aspires to become part of Western institutions and welcomes the fact that 
Turkey has a similar understanding of Western orientation which it has made clear 
since the end of World War I.262 Accordingly, Turkey’s role in stabilizing 
Southeastern Europe as a responsible and conducive actor was confirmed once again 
through the end of war in 1995 by Franjo Tudjman as being the strongest regional 
power.263 
 Given that Turkey’s relations with Croatia are likely to be linked to Croatian 
– Bosnian relations, the three states have developed a system of trilateralism to 
further their relations as of 1994 which provided a forum for periodic consultations 
and discussions on how to overcome the bottlenecks in the Bosnian – Croat 
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Federation and on the need to create a Federation Army.264 By 1996, Tudjman 
referred to Turkish – Croatian political relations as “extremely good” yet stated that 
economic relations had not so far matched the intensity of political ties.265  
 President Demirel’s visit to Croatia at the invitation of President Tudjman 
confirmed the existing good relations in September 1997. In the wake of this visit, 
Dr. Ivica Tomic, Croatian Ambassador to Turkey, stated that the solidity of bilateral 
Croatian – Turkish relations can be substantiated by the fact that cooperation with 
Turkey has great importance in fulfilling each of four major strategic tasks of 
Croatian foreign policy: accomplishment of the peaceful reintegration of the Croatian 
Danube region; implementation of the Dayton Peace Accord and support of the 
Bosnia – Herzegovina Federation; admission in Euro – Atlantic organizations, and 
the improvement and development of relations with other non-European countries.266 
On the part of Turkey, this visit was of utmost importance given the fact that Serb – 
Greek – Russian alliance had proved a failure for peace in the region and that was 
why Turkey’s relations with Croatia was a strategic one along with Bosnia, 
Macedonia, Romania, and Bulgaria.267 President Demirel did not visit Croatia for the 
mere purpose of returning Tudjman’s visit or to fulfill the requisites of international 
protocol. On the background of the said visit was the objective to carry Turkey’s 
foreign policy optimization to world state level in line with Özal’s foreign policy 
understanding which saw Turkey at the center of Balkan – Middle East – Caucasus 
triangle. Although this visit prima facie could be seen as a step to improve bilateral 
relations with Croatia, it was indeed carried out to contribute to future security in 
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Bosnia. Last but not least, it can be argued that Turkish foreign policy was conducted 
with Demirel’s personal attempts after 1995, due to mostly which the Croatian 
attitude toward Bosnia displayed a conciliatory nature after Dayton and equally 
importantly averted collaboration with the Serbs.268 Demirel’s humorous and 
meaningful remark “I deserved it!” at the honorary doctorate ceremony at Zagreb 
University when he was given a plate by Rector Zelijko Katic was a telling moment 
in that respect.269  
 The two states took a step on 13 March 1998 to boost bilateral cooperation by 
signing two protocols on developing political consultation mechanisms and 
cooperation between educational centers. Former Croatian Foreign Minister Mate 
Granic, who was on an official visit to Turkey, and his counterpart Đsmail Cem 
signed protocols after having talks on bilateral and regional issues. The parties 
discussed how to strengthen the position of the Bosnia – Herzegovina Federation and 
how to increase the effectiveness of Turkey and Croatia regarding the full 
implementation of the Dayton Peace Accord. Mutual concerns over Kosovo were 
another important point on the agenda. Granic expressed readiness to boost bilateral 
cooperation and praised Turkey’s efforts to end the war in Bosnia and asked for 
Ankara’s support for Croatia’s bid for NATO and expressed Croatia’s support for 
Turkey’s bid for a non-permanent seat in the UN Security Council in the 2000 - 2002 
period.270 Three months later the same year, the two states stepped up joint efforts to 
carry out a more effective offensive against drug-trafficking and other crimes. The 
two interior ministers, Murat Başesgioğlu and Ivan Penic, met in Đzmir to discuss 
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bilateral issues, particularly the fight against drug-trafficking and the deterioration of 
the situation in Kosovo.271 
 By 1999, Turkey and Croatia paved the way for accelerated bilateral relations 
by signing five cooperation agreements after a meeting between visiting President 
Franjo Tudjman and his counterpart Süleyman Demirel. The agreements signed on 
10 February 1999 covered an array of issues, including cooperation in justice, 
science, technology, customs services, agriculture and veterinary services. As in the 
previous bilateral meeting, Demirel and Tudjman said they exchanged views on a 
number of issues and voiced concern over Kosovo. The two leaders hoped that the 
Dayton Peace Accord would be fully implemented.272 Although the visit did not 
attract the attention of Turkish media as much as it should, it was noted that good 
relations between Turkey and Croatia would have a positive impact on the future of 
Bosnia in the short- and medium-term since as a country that aspired to be a member 
of NATO and the EU, Croatia’s officials were cognizant of the fact that Croatia 
would need Turkish support in international platforms as much as Turkish officials 
acknowledged that friendly relations with Croatia would increase Turkey’s influence 
on this west most point of the region.273 
 When Tudjman died in December 1999 and his party was defeated in the 
general elections in January 2000, it was argued that conditions were better than ever 
for peace and stability to return to the area. More specifically, experts maintained 
that not only the authoritarian Tudjman regime did pursue hostile policies both 
towards the Serbs and his Bosnian allies, but also prevented a number of items in the 
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Dayton Peace Accord from being implemented. Concerning these historic 
developments in Croatia, Besim Spahic, Bosnian Ambassador to Ankara, stated that 
after Tudjman, a new epoch would come in which the Dayton Peace Accord would 
be implemented. It was known that Tudjman was strongly resented by the Bosnians 
to host intentions of partitioning their country and annexing parts of it. However, 
when asked his opinion on Demirel’s attending Tudjman’s funeral as the only head 
of state, the Ambassador refrained from commenting and only said that “the 
President had his own reasons for attending”. Yet, whether the Croats perceived this 
as a support to Tudjman’s antidemocratic policies or a moral outside support to 
Croatia in its transitional period was disputable.274 On the other hand, Turkey’s 
Balkan policy received criticism once again as it was seen that Turkey’s policy was 
not likely to change after Tudjman’s death and the new elections since it focused 
solely on EU integration at the time. Early prospects alleged that there was a chance 
of Turkey being affected by a possible application from Zagreb to the EU as Croatia 
was more advanced that Turkey in economic terms.275 
 By February 2001, Croatia’s new President Stipe Mesic visited President 
Ahmet Necdet Sezer and voiced Croatia’s concern over membership in the EU and 
NATO.276 On 3 July 2001, Sezer returned Mesic’s visit. The two leaders agreed that 
exchanging views in every area regarding the EU membership processes of the two 
countries could create new cooperation areas.277 The same year, on 17 November, 
Neven Mimica, the Croatian Minister for European Integration, said that Turkey 
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already had candidate status as of December 1999 and was expected to obtain a date 
for negotiation at the European Council. Mimica stated that since Turkey was further 
along on the road towards the EU membership, Croatia could benefit from the 
Turkish experience arising from its candidate status, particularly concerning pre-
accession assistance.278 Nevertheless, it was observed that during the EU meeting 
between the Ministers of Foreign Affairs of the member states, before 3 October, the 
so-called “Croatia front” against Ankara was becoming larger. Turkey’s relations 
with the EU assumed a rocky outlook as Austria, Hungary, Slovakia, and Slovenia 
stated that it would be difficult for them to accept the fact that the negotiations with 
Turkey would begin before Croatia was granted a date for negotiation.279 The 
Austrian stance focused on not to guarantee that the negotiations will end with the 
full membership; to discuss other alternatives to full membership; and to emphasize 
the capacity of the EU to absorb a new member. In contrast, Jack Straw, the former 
British Foreign Minister, stressed that there was no link between the negotiations 
with Turkey and the starting of negotiations with Croatia.280 The same point was 
voiced once more in late September by former Croatian Prime Minister Ivo Sanader 
in that it was not right to establish a linkage between the negotiations of the two 
states.281  
 As a clear indication of Croatia’s political will for furthering cooperation with 
Turkey, Croatian President Stejepan Mesic visited Turkey in early December 2005 at 
a time when his country’s agenda had been busy with the newly started EU 
negotiations and the 2000 budget which was adopted by Sabor only few days before 
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Mesic’s arrival in Turkey. Mesic expressly stated that Turkey helped Croatia 
significantly during the war yet now they were looking for partnership and wanted to 
enhance cooperation with Turkey.282 During the visit, Turkey and Croatia signed 
agreements in various fields such as free trade, supporting mutual investments, 
double taxation and a cooperation protocol between the Croatian Bank for 
Reconstruction and Development (HBOR) and Turkish Eximbank.283 Although 
political figures voice their concern that the membership of both states should not be 
linked but treated separately, expert opinions point out that Turkey is likely to have a 
difficult time in convincing not only the politicians but primarily the public opinion 
of EU countries that its accession to the EU should take place before Croatia.284 
Despite the significant number of high level visits since the end of Cold War 
between the two states, it can be argued that as previously mentioned, Turkey’s 
relations with Croatia is likely to be linked to Croatian – Bosnian relations as the 
system of trilateralism launched by the three states in the second half of the 1990s 
indicates. 
 
 
4.5. TURKISH FOREIGN POLICY TOWARDS MACEDONIA 
 
Unlike the other former Yugoslav republics, Macedonia displayed hesitation with 
regard to declaring independence.285 Indeed, Macedonia had shown its will to 
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establish close relations with Turkey even before it declared independence in mid- 
September 1991.286 Before Turkey announced that it recognized Macedonia on 6 
February 1992, former Prime Minister Demirel gave an interview for the 
Macedonian daily Nova Makedonya published in Skopje and stated that Turkey 
would recognize Macedonia in late January.287 It was emphasized by Fahri Kaya, 
former member of Macedonian Council of Presidency and former deputy Foreign 
Minister, the recognition of Macedonia by Turkey would mean that it would have a 
say over the new map to be drawn in the Balkans.288 Turkey recognized Macedonia 
with the name “Republic of Macedonia” as written in the constitution of the country 
which proved to have an antagonizing effect on the part of Greece.289 It has been 
argued that the relations in the first five years improved better than expected, 
however it was equally maintained that although the dispute between Macedonia and 
Greece had been one factor that pulled Turkey and Macedonia closer, it cannot be 
suggested that it was the only factor that shaped future bilateral relations between 
Turkey and Macedonia.290 To give a couple of factors, the fact that almost 85 % of 
the Turkish population in former Yugoslavia lived in the Socialist Federation 
Republic of Macedonia291 and that Macedonia tied high hopes to Turkey for the 
solution of the problems it faced in the aftermath of the Yugoslav disintegration had 
not been less important.292 
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 After Turkey recognized Macedonia, the diplomatic relations began in late 
August293 and Turkey was the first state to open an embassy in Skopje.294 In 
November 1992, former Macedonian President Kiro Gligorov stated that they saw 
Turkey as one of the key states that would shape peace in the Balkans and described 
the recognition by Turkey as a very positive step.295 It has been suggested that 
Gligorov’s positive approach towards Turkey and his due style in foreign policy had 
been particularly important in maintaining the fragile domestic peace in he 
country.296 When Gligorov stated that Turkey had extended invaluable help which 
would not be forgotten by the Macedonians, he referred to Turkish aid to Macedonia 
which proved vital in the winter of 1992 when the country had to face the Greek 
embargo and reminded Özal’s subsequent statement that those who threatened 
Macedonia would find Turkey as a party.297  
 Such an open support raised many question marks on the part of Greece. 
Greece interpreted this support as a move toward encircling Greece. The Albanian 
minority alike expressed restlessness regarding Ankara’s support for Orthodox 
Macedonians ruling the Albanian minority.298 Although Turkish foreign policy 
towards Macedonia was criticized by some circles in Turkey and Albanians in 
Macedonia on grounds of being pro-ethnic Macedonian, it can be maintained that 
ethno-religious ties were not seen as primary instruments in Turkey’s foreign-policy 
making towards Macedonia. It is true that the existence and prosperity of 
approximately 100,000 Turks in Macedonia was an important consideration, yet 
although Turkish support in line with this consideration increased the political and 
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social prestige of the Turks in the country, it was not equally projected onto their 
economic standing.299 
In February 1993, President Özal paid an official visit to Macedonia yet Süha 
Noyan, former Ambassador to Macedonia, was not included in the visit which was 
seen as part of Özal’s own way of acting in foreign policy.300 Özal stated that Greece 
engaged in unnecessary confrontation over the name of Macedonia and that implied 
open chauvinism.301 Pointing to the issue, Lieutenant General Erdoğan Öznal, Head 
of Operations Section at the Chief of Staff, criticized Greece of conducting “an 
emotional, fanatic, and imperialist policy” towards Macedonia.302 As Greece’s 
hostile policies continued to grow, Turkey’s support to Macedonia increased duly. 
Former Foreign Minister Hikmet Çetin visited Macedonia after he paid an official 
visit to Albania in early December 1993. Çetin held contacts with former Foreign 
Minister Stevo Crvenkovski and President Kiro Gligorov and the two states signed a 
political cooperation agreement.303  
As Gligorov’s statement in 1994 that “Turkey has always been a guarantor 
state for Macedonia”304 implied, Turkish – Macedonian relations has assumed an 
alliance nature by 1995.305 In 1995, approximately 30 agreements were signed 
between the two states which was an indication of growing relations. In early 
February 1995, former Minister of Culture Timurçin Savaş stated that the signing of 
                                                 
299
 idem, “Soğuk Savaş Sonrası Türkiye’nin Balkan Ülkeleriyle Đlişkileri” p. 399. See Đlhan Uzgel, 
“Balkanlarla Đlişkiler” in Baskın Oran ed., Türk Dış Politikası, p. 506 on the Turkish minority in 
Macedonia. For a compact account on the religious and national identity of Turks in Macedonia, see 
Baskın Oran, “Balkan Müslümanlarında Dinsel ve Ulusal Kimlik (Yunanistan, Bulgaristan, 
Makedonya ve Kosova Üzerine Karşılaştırmalı Bir Đnceleme)”, AÜSBF Dergisi, 48 (1–4) (January – 
December) 1993, pp. 116–119; and idem, “Balkan Türkleri Üzerine Đncelemeler (Bulgaristan, 
Makedonya, Kosova)”, AÜSBF Dergisi, 48 (1–4) (January – December), 1993, pp. 131–142. 
300
 17 February 1993, Hürriyet. 
301
 21 February 1993, Cumhuriyet. 
302
 26 April 1993, Hürriyet. 
303
 8 December 1993, Hürriyet. 
304
 3 July 1994, Cumhuriyet. 
305
 Şule Kut, “Türkiye’nin Balkanlar Politikası”, p. 118 
 146 
a cultural agreement was under way.306 The two states concluded the Military 
Training and Cooperation Agreement on 14 July 1995 during Demirel’s visit to 
Macedonia.307 Demirel delivered a speech at the Macedonian parliament which 
received remarkable applause. Demirel criticized the Greek threat toward Macedonia 
and stated that Macedonia should take its place in the family of nations as an 
independent state.308 Turkey and Macedonia signed the Skopje Document on 
“Mutually Complementary Confidence and Security Building Measures” in late July 
1995.309 In mid-September, with the U.S.A. acting as the mediator, Macedonia made 
certain changes regarding the name, the flag and the constitution of the country, all 
of which were stipulated by Greece and it was eventually recognized by the U.S.A. 
and Greece with an agreement signed in New York.310 From then on, Macedonia’s 
relations with its neighbors improved, yet Turkey’s interest diminished in 
comparison to the 1992-1995 period as was the case for Turkey with other Balkan 
states. While Turkey lagged behind other states in respect of trade and investment in 
Macedonia, Greece’s activities in the same venue increased.311  
 Macedonian President Kiro Gligorov started an official visit in Ankara as part 
of similar trips by Balkan leaders as Turkey sought to reassert its role in the Balkan 
peninsula. Foreign Ministry officials stated that talks between Macedonian and 
Turkish delegations were to focus on economic matters.312 After the fall of Erbakan 
government in 1997, the relations between Ankara and Skopje gained new 
momentum. Turkey chose Macedonia as a base for trade to regional states. Pointing 
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to the fact that there had been almost no customs fees between Macedonia and 
Greece, the diplomatic sources stated that if Turkish investors chose Macedonia as a 
base, they would easily reach Yugoslavia, Bosnia – Herzegovina and regional states. 
During Foreign Minister Đsmail Cem’s visit to Skopje in October 1997, Macedonia 
asked for Turkish support for membership in NATO, BSEC and the EU. Cem 
referred to the cooperation between the “Balkan project,” in respect of which he 
underlined that the project was not directed against any state.313 This visit was the 
first high-level visit since two and a half years by then.314 However, the meeting of 
the EU Council of Ministers in Luxembourg evoked more repercussions but Cem’s 
visit did not receive equal attention in the media. During the visit, a project similar to 
GAP (Güneydoğu Anadolu Projesi/Southeast Anatolia Project) called the “Vardar 
Project” was announced together with the prospective sale of CASA planes. This was 
one of the visits that followed in the ensuing years upon which it was argued that the 
Mesut Yılmaz government tried to put the Balkan policy back on track which was 
heralded in the Refah-Yol coalition period due to discord between Çiller and 
Erbakan315, although some arguments still held that as Macedonia and Greece had 
entered thaw by boosting their ties, Turkey still faced the reality that the attempts 
remained only in words.316 
 In late April, former Macedonian Foreign Minister Blagoy Handziski came to 
Turkey for a two-day official visit at the end of which Foreign Minister Đsmail Cem 
stated that Macedonia’s membership to NATO was essential and that Turkey 
wholeheartedly supported Macedonia’s bid and was ready to do its utmost on this 
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issue.317 The Macedonian Foreign Minister expressed satisfaction with the level of 
ties, adding that Turkey was the country with which Macedonia had signed the 
greatest number of bilateral agreements.318 At the end of the meeting, Handziski 
stated that the meeting was very productive as they had discussed the enhancement 
of financial and technical support provided by Turkey to the Macedonian Army, 
cooperation and defense projects, the plans for opening a Turkish Cultural Center in 
Skopje among others which included Cem’s proposal for starting direct flights from 
Turkey to Macedonia.319 Almost three months after this visit, former Prime Minister 
Mesut Yılmaz paid a two-day official visit to Macedonia which was the first Turkish 
visit at the ministerial level to the country. The delegations discussed the 
improvement of bilateral trade, educational issues, and Kosovo problem.320 Mesut 
Yılmaz and his counterpart Crvenkovski signed the joint declaration on trade. 
Former Minister of Labor and Social Security Nami Çağan and his Macedonian 
counterpart Naser Ziberi signed the Agreement on Social Security. Kemal Gürüz, 
President of Turkish Higher Education Board (YÖK), and former Macedonian State 
Minister Vlado Naumoski signed the agreement on the equality of diplomas between 
the two states. Yılmaz’s visit to Macedonia marked the beginning of Turkish Airlines 
flights from Istanbul to Skopje.321 In October 1998, President Demirel paid a two-
day visit to Macedonia aiming to boost bilateral relations. The talks centered on the 
Kosovo issue and a possible intervention and its ramifications in the region. In the 
economic realm, the talks concentrated on the possible contribution that Turkish 
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contracters can make to the construction of a major highway that will connect 
Bulgaria’s Black Sea port of Varna with the Adriatic port of Dures via Skopje. The 
final details of a free trade agreement between Turkey and Macedonia as well as the 
opening of Ziraat Bank in Skopje were discussed.322 It was observed with this 
meeting that although the fifth visit was paid at the presidential level and a total of 32 
agreements had been signed by 3 October 1998, what was critical was the economic 
venue given that Greece and Russia tried to enhance their influence in the region.323 
 When the Kosovo crisis broke out, Ankara speeded up diplomatic efforts with 
NATO and other regional states to end the crisis while it continued its humanitarian 
efforts for Kosovar refugees who had fled Serbian atrocities. Upon a series of 
ministerial level visits to the region by the U.S.A. and Western states, Demirel 
decided to pay another visit to Macedonia and Albania in early April 1999 to 
examine the plight of Kosovo refugees.324 Demirel had earlier appointed Turkish 
Ambassador to Belgrade, Ahmet Acet, as his special envoy for Kosovo and sent him 
to Macedonia and Albania prior to his visit to the two states. Regarding the refugee 
flux, Macedonian Prime Minister Lubco Georgievski praised Turkey’s efforts in 
alleviating Macedonia’s huge refugee burden. It was reported in the news columns 
that billions of Turkish lira from state funds were allocated to meet the needs of the 
refugees in Kırklareli refugee camp.325 In early April, a total of 1,000 Kosovar 
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refugees were airlifted from Macedonia to Turkey bringing up to nearly 8000 the 
number taking refuge in the refugee compound or those taken in by relatives.326 It 
would be recalled that it was Turkey that proposed to take in approximately 20,000 
refugees from Macedonia and Albania without any prior request by the two states 
and that Ankara did so not only for humanitarian concerns but also for alleviating the 
burden of the two fragile countries.327  
 In early 2000, a serious diplomatic crisis with Macedonia broke out due to 
Macedonia’s preparation to recognize Southern Cyprus at a time when relations 
between Greece and Macedonia had already entered thaw after Macedonia changed 
its flag.328 Ankara asked Macedonia to suspend the issue until a final solution for the 
Cyprus was reached.329 However, in fact, Fazıl Keşmir, Turkey’s ambassador to 
Skopje, had stated on a Macedonian TV channel that the diplomatic relations would 
be cut off and the embassy would be closed if Macedonia recognized Southern 
Cyprus.330 It was also noted that the Macedonian media warned the government that 
relations with Turkey would deteriorate as one comment in the Macedonian paper 
Dnevnik wrote “the closest friend” would be lost if Macedonia recognized Southern 
Cyprus.331 In March 2000, the members of parliament in the Interparliamentary 
Friendship Groups initiated a “letter diplomacy” by way of which it was recalled that 
Turkey was the first state to open an embassy in Macedonia. Turkey had helped 
Macedonia with its government, diplomats, military, and financial resources just as is 
had assisted Bosnia – Herzegovina. It was argued that the journalists who 
accompanied Demirel in his official visits to the Balkans or elsewhere had constantly 
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written that the Constitution required an amendment in order to make it possible for 
Demirel to be re-elected as it would be difficult to find a similarly powerful figure 
who would have a visible influence on the leaders of the Balkans as well as on the 
Middle East and the Turkic republics.332 Following this diplomatic crisis, Macedonia 
entered into a chaos environment as of February 2001. A group named Ushtaria 
Çlirimtare Kombetare (UÇK – National Liberation Army) launched attacks in the 
areas densely populated by the Albanians. Until February 2001 however, Macedonia 
had been referred to as a “model” in the war-torn Balkans.333 The motives and 
demands of the Albanian militants reportedly reflected an array of issues: 1) they did 
not threaten the territorial integrity of Macedonia; 2) they demanded that Albanians 
were granted constituent nation status and equal rights with the Macedonians; 3) they 
asked for the unitary political structure in Macedonia replaced with a Macedonian – 
Albanian Federation. They also stated that they wanted to annex the Albanian-
intense regions with Kosovo. Some also implied that they were after Greater Albania 
in the Balkans.334  
 As the clashes continued, Turkey repeatedly stated that it supported the 
territorial integrity of Macedonia and condemned the militia acts. In early March 
2001, President Sezer maintained that respect for internationally recognized borders 
was the basic condition for regional stability. Sezer conveyed the same message to 
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his counterpart Boris Trajovski on a telephone conversation and assured him of 
Turkey’s continued support for security in Macedonia.335 The officials of the Foreign 
Ministry also made a statement that Ankara condemned all sorts of terrorism and 
emphasized the urgent need to stop the terrorist attacks on the northern borders of 
Macedonia.336  
 Ankara’s close follow-up of the developments did not only concern the 
Turkish minority in the country but also the spill-over effect of the clashes in the 
region. One Turkish columnist even asserted that the Bosnian Serbs and the Croats 
still possessed similar aspirations to take back “what was taken from them”.337 The 
Macedonian crisis also came at a time when Turkey and the EU were at odds over 
the developing European Security and Defense Policy (ESDP). While Turkey wanted 
to have a seat at the decision-making mechanisms of the ESDP, the EU stated that 
only the members could have a say during the process of decision making. Former 
Defense Minister Sabahattin Çakmakoğlu had already offered thousands of Turkish 
troops to the European Army in case Ankara was admitted to the decision making 
process. In that respect, it was argued that while there was a good chance that Turkey 
could increase its influence and use the occasion to push ahead of the ESDP agenda, 
it was also argued that Turkey did not have such a vision. Turkey was militarily the 
strongest state in the region and this crisis could be a chance for Turkey to be 
dominant in the Balkans and the Foreign Ministry was criticized for not having a 
devised and well-worked strategy for the Balkans. The Albanians, meanwhile, stated 
that Turkey could not do anything in the Balkans because “Ankara had been heeding 
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Athens’ calls not to get involved in regional politics for the sake of a possible EU 
membership”.338 
 As the clashes continued increasingly, Macedonian Foreign Minister Sırcan 
Kerim came to Ankara and asked for support. Turkey and Macedonia reached a 
compromise for continued defence aid to Macedonia. Macedonian officials said they 
did not want military support from Turkey yet added that they would like Turkey to 
assume a more effective role in the NATO.339 In this regard, Sezer said that Turkey 
was concerned about the possibility that the clash may spill over Tetovo and noted 
that the NATO decision to deploy 1,000 troops on the Kosovo – Macedonian border 
was a positive development.340  
 Meanwhile, Erdoğan Saraç, the leader of the Macedonian Turkish Democratic 
Party came to Đstanbul. Saraç stated that the Macedonian government did not duly 
deal with the domestic issues as the latest developments had shown. He further 
argued that the clashes proved that the claim that there were friendly relations 
between the communities in Macedonia lacked basis and showed his party’s opposite 
views had been proved right.341 Saraç shared the view that Macedonia’s territorial 
integrity must be preserved and he rejected any proposal supporting a federation to 
be established between the Macedonians and the Albanians. He argued that the Turks 
should be included in the negotiations to take place between the Macedonians and 
the Albanians, warning that giving privilege to only one ethnic group would cause 
further deterioration in the inter-communal relations.342 Finally, a peace agreement 
was signed in August 2001 in Ohrid, according to which the Albanians agreed to 
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hand over their weapons to NATO in return for a constitutional amendment which 
would improve their legal status. Turkey announced that it was pleased by the truce 
reached between the Albanian and Macedonian parties.343 A week after the 
agreement was signed; Macedonia Foreign Minister Ilinka Mitreva came to Turkey 
for a two-day official visit and asked for more effort. Mitreva also thanked Turkey 
for its decision to send troops to Macedonia.344 The Macedonian Foreign Minister 
also asked for financial aid yet it was not possible to extend economic aid due to the 
ongoing crisis in Turkey by then. This led to interpretations that Turkey’s image in 
the region maintained its importance in spite of the economic crisis.345 
Macedonia had elections in mid-September 2002 after which Turkey stated 
its consent that Turkish minority was justly represented in the parliament. Leader of 
the Turkish Democratic Party Kenan Hasipi stated that his party won two seats 
within the scope of “Together for Macedonia” election alliance and presented his 
thanks to Turkey for support in the elections.346 The last of the bilateral visits, which 
take place almost annually, was in mid-June 2006 during which it was reiterated that 
Turkey would continue to support Macedonia’s NATO bid. The talks focused on 
fostering mainly economic cooperation along with commercial, military and cultural 
cooperation. Macedonian Prime Minister Vlado Buckovski said the two countries 
had perfect ties in the political field.  
 Macedonia gained EU candidacy status in mid-December 2005 and expects 
invitation for membership in the following NATO summit. Turkey has already 
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repeatedly stated its support for Macedonia’s integration into these organizations and 
is likely to continue to do so in the ensuing years. 
 
 
4.6. TURKISH FOREIGN POLICY TOWARDS ALBANIA AND KOSOVO 
 
As the most isolated and the weakest communist state in the 1970s, Albania found 
itself in an even weaker and more fragile environment in 1991. As such, Albania 
paid particular attention to its relations with Turkey and wanted to establish good 
bilateral ties. Albania asked for electricity supply of 150 million kW from TEK 
(Turkish Electricity Institute) in 1990 when President Özal and his counterpart 
Ramiz Alia had contacts in late September the same year.347 The appeal made by 
Albania in 1990 did not merely concern economic venue; it included urgent 
diplomatic and humanitarian support in respect of which Turkey supported Albania’s 
bid for European organizations, extended diplomatic, military, police, and judicial 
assistance and accepted Albanian students in Turkish universities. The absence of 
any major dispute in bilateral relations coupled with such support and Albania was 
seen as the natural ally of Turkey.348 Turkey also played an important role in 
Albania’s enterance into the BSEC. As a secular country, Albania became a member 
of the OIC despite opposition from certain factions in the country.349  
 Turkey and Albania signed the Agreement on Friendship and Cooperation 
during Demirel’s visit in Albania in June 1992350 and Turkey stated that it would 
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extend a $ 50 million humanitarian and technical aid to Albania.351 The two states 
also signed the public safety cooperation protocol in early August 1992.352 Such an 
improvement in bilateral relations made former Greek Foreign Minister Andonis 
Samaras define Albania as part of the alleged “Muslim Axis” led by Turkey in the 
same year.353 The high level visits continued the following year. President Özal gave 
certain recommendations in his speech at the Albanian parliament in February 1992. 
Özal advised the Albanian officials to draw up a 15-year plan, to focus on tourism 
and service sectors and to improve relations with Macedonia.354 In the same year, 
Albanian officials stated that they would like to build a more systematized 
cooperation with Turkey and described the main deficiencies as threefold: inadequate 
levels of coordination concerning the issues envisaged in bilateral agreements; lack 
of implementation of decisions jointly taken; and lack of any tactical studies (in the 
military field) and lack of any relevant consensus.355 Despite such conditions, Turkey 
and Albania strengthened their relations. In 1993, Albanian Prime Minister 
Alexander Meksi paid an official visit to Turkey. The following year, Albanian 
President Sali Berisha visited Turkey and asked Turkey’s support in the economic 
and security field as well as support for Albania’s NATO bid and for peaceful 
solution of the problems in Kosovo.356 However, bilateral relations lost momentum 
as of 1995 when Greece translated its aggressive approach into a friendly one in 
respect of regional states. Greece and Albania settled their bilateral disputes 
concerning the rights of the Greek minority in Albania and the situation of illegal 
Albanian workers in Greece. Greece lifted its veto concerning the EU aid to Albania 
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and the beginning of mutual visits between the two states added on to the positive 
change in bilateral relations. Moreover, Greece succeeded in pulling Albania to its 
side by extending economic aid in 1997.357 
In 1997, a financial crisis swayed the country into chaos and serious internal 
conflict. In face of thousands of demonstrators filling the streets and demanding the 
compensation of their money siphoned by the bankers, Albania had to call upon 
international support to quell the riots. The Berisha government faced the most 
difficult period of its six years in power by then as it had to deal with criticism from 
both the victims and the opposition.358 Meanwhile, Albania began to conduct 
equidistance policy in its relations with Turkey and Greece. Although this can be 
interpreted as playing both sides against each other, from the official Albanian point 
of view, Albania had good relations with both countries. 
 Although Turkey participated in the international force with 800 troops 
within the UN umbrella with Resolution 1101, it was seen that it ranked after Italy 
and France which contributed with 2,500 and 1,000 troops respectively.359 The 
almost inherent discord in bilateral relations with Greece was observed once again 
when Greece objected to the Turkish troops’ location of deployment in Albania. 
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Greece did not want the Turkish troops to be deployed in the south of the country 
where Greek minority lived. Former Greek Defense Minister Chohalopoulos stated 
that “they did not think Turkey was directly affected by the developments in Albania 
and that the situation in Albania must not constitute a reason for Turkey’s hegemonic 
tendencies”. The Greek Defense Minister did not refrain from saying that any change 
in the status quo in respect of Turkey’s relations with its neighbors would be an 
element of bargain in Turkey’s enterance in the EU.360 Almost a year later, in 
February 1998, during Albanian President Recep Meydani’s visit in Ankara, it was 
stated that relations between Albania and Turkey were of an exemplary nature. 
President Demirel expressed his consent to see Albania strengthen its democracy 
after the difficult period it faced in 1997.361 Yet, it was to be observed in the ensuing 
years that Albania was closer to Greece than to Turkey. However, the crisis to draw 
Albania closer to Turkey erupted in Kosovo in March 1998 when Milosevic’s latent 
Greater Serbia designs came to the surface once again. 
 
 
4.6.1. TURKISH FOREIGN POLICY TOWARDS KOSOVO 
 
Turkey and Kosovo developed intimate political and cultural relations during both 
the Ottoman state and the republican era. Central to such amicable relations was the 
positively perceived heritage of shared history as well as the often expressly 
pronounced will on both sides to further improve the existing ties. When the post-
Cold War era set in, Kosovo’s particular situation concerning independence 
presented its problematic nature in a different context. While Turkey wanted to take 
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due efforts for a viable solution for Kosovo’s status, it had to do so when it was also 
dealing with the repercussions of the problem in domestic politics and its 
implications due to the sensitive nature of the issue for Turkey. By 1999, Turkey not 
only participated in the decision making process that resulted in the air attacks on 
Federal Republic of Yugoslavia (FRY) but also contributed with its own military. In 
the ensuing years, Turkey’s Kosovo policy was framed around Kosovo’s final status, 
the preservation of the vested interests of the Turks in Kosovo as well as their 
representation in Kosovo’s political and administrative structures, and bilateral 
economic and military relations. Prior to Kosovo’s declaration of independence on 
17 February 2008, Turkey stated that it would be supportive of an independent 
Kosovo with a UN Security Council resolution. More importantly, considering that a 
new and a just solution was necessary, it conducted lobbying activities at the UN and 
tried to seek support from the Security Council members to back UN Special Envoy 
Martti Ahtisaari’s report: a pattern of behavior not so common for the status quo-
oriented Turkish foreign policy. 
The problem in Kosovo proved to be the most complicated and difficult to 
deal with in the Balkans for Turkey in the post-Cold War era. It would be 
remembered that Turkey acted with a clear stand with respect to the crises in 
Bulgaria, Bosnia and Macedonia. However, the crisis in Kosovo put forward certain 
implications as it was based on demands of central administration as opposed to 
separation and simultaneously of the unification of Albanians in Albania, Kosovo, 
and Macedonia.362 When unrest in Kosovo turned into armed conflict in March 1998, 
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Turkey supported Kosovar Albannians against the Serbs for the following reasons. 
The Kosovar Albanians were mostly Muslim and Turkish public opinion was 
favorable towards them. Turkey would not afford to assume a pro-Serbian stance or 
act neutrally after the Bosnian experience. Furthermore, Turkey had close relations 
with Albania and this was particularly important in respect of Albania’s relations 
with Greece. In addition, Serbs were committing severe human rights violations in 
Kosovo and had no prestige after the war in Bosnia. The U.S. stance was important 
for Turkey and Washington wanted urgent action in Kosovo.363 Although these 
factors were enough to prompt Turkey to take due effort, they were accompanied 
with certain difficulties.  
 
 
4.6.1.2. 1990 - 1998 PERIOD 
 
While Kosovo’s situation preserved its protracted problematic nature for regional 
and global relations, it also did so for Turkey in the post-Cold War era. While Turkey 
acted with a rather clear attitude towards the crises in Bulgaria, Bosnia-Herzegovina, 
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and Macedonia, the crisis in Kosovo put forward certain difficulties as it was based 
on demands of separation. For Turkey, whose foreign policy attaches importance to 
territorial integrity of countries, this was a big question. When the dormant unrest in 
Kosovo turned into armed conflict, bringing once again to the surface Milosevic’s 
designs for Kosovo in March 1998, Turkey supported Kosovar Albanians against the 
Serbs for a number of reasons. After the Bosnian experience, the path Turkey would 
follow would not be based on acting neutrally or assuming a pro-Serbian stance. 
Furthermore, Turkey had close relations with Albania and this was particularly 
important in respect of Albania’s relations with Greece through Turkey’s lens. In 
addition, Serbs were committing atrocities in Kosovo and had no prestige after the 
war in Bosnia. The U.S. stance was important for Turkey as Washington urged 
action in Kosovo. Last, but not least, Turkish public opinion was favorable towards 
the Kosovar Albanians.364 
 These factors prompted Turkey to take due effort, though there would be 
certain difficulties ahead. The translation of the problem into armed conflict in 1998 
destroyed regional stability to which Turkey attached importance. The problem of 
Kosovo made relations between Albania and Macedonia tense, which put Turkish 
diplomacy into a tricky situation. What placed Turkey in an even more difficult 
situation with regard to supporting the Kosovar Albanians’ separatist attempts was 
the Kurdish problem in Turkey.365 Although Turkey initially could not deal with the 
Kosovo problem as much as is should, it switched track after the armed clashes 
started. Until the beginning of the armed conflict, what the Serb officials heard from 
Turkish officials was that Turkey saw the issue as the domestic problem of Serbia.366  
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In face of the fact that Turkey’s previous interest for the Balkans diminished 
in the 1995 – 1997 period with the signing of the Dayton Peace Accord, it was 
essential to take due efforts as a key actor that could contribute to the stability in the 
region. In this context, Foreign Minister Đsmail Cem visited Belgrade in early March 
1998 after the contacts held with UN Secretary-General and the foreign ministers of 
the regional states. Cem proposed a 3-stage plan to Slobodan Milosevic according to 
which the clashes would be stopped immediately; the enhanced rights granted by the 
1974 Constitution would be given back; and the autonomy of Kosovo would be 
restored. Turkey took due efforts to enhance its Albanian policy by emphasizing that 
the protection of all minorities in Kosovo was important.  
It was observed that this was expressly conveyed to Albanian Prime Minister 
Pandeli Mayko during his visit in Turkey in early March 1998. In fact, this policy 
was formulated rather belatedly in face of relevant criticism which asserted that 
Turkey should be active with regard to Kosovo; should try to convince the U.S.A. 
that it was necessary to resolve the issue within the framework of territorial integrity 
of FRY; and act as a mediator. It was equally important to state that Turkey would 
not welcome separatist tendencies from Albanians in Macedonia. Such a policy was 
a comprehensive one which covered not only the Albanians of Kosovo but also of 
Albania and Macedonia. This implied that in due course, Turkey’s efforts would 
draw Albania and Macedonia closer to Turkey as well as Romania and Bulgaria. 
That, in turn, would make Turkey an important actor in the U.S. perspective.367 The 
official Albanian viewpoint expected Turkey to exert more pressure on Belgrade. 
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Saimir Bala, Albanian Ambassador to Ankara, stated in an interview that Turkey 
should exert pressure on Belgrade both in the context of bilateral relations and the 
NATO.368 
 
 
4.6.1.3. 1999 NATO INTERVENTION 
 
When conflicts escalated in 1998, Đbrahim Rugova began to seek support in Turkey 
and stated that they expected more support from Turkey than any other NATO 
country.369 When Belgrade rejected an internationally-brokered peace deal, which 
had been signed by the Kosovo Albanians, international peace monitors evacuated 
Kosovo. Thereafter, NATO prepared for imminent air attack. At the time, although 
analysts did not expect Turkey to take an active part in the operations, Ankara 
prepared its air, naval, and land forces, which was confirmed by Air Force 
Commander General Đlhan Kılıç’s statement that Turkey had eleven F-16s at NATO 
bases in Italy. Defense Minister Hikmet Sami Türk also stated that Turkey prepared 
for a possible involvement in a NATO strike saying that Turkish air force was on 
duty, one of the warships was in the Adriatic and the army prepared a battalion 
although a land operation was out of question.370 
At the time, Turkey had made arrangements to receive more than 20,000 
refugees in Turkey and established camps for another 20,000 refugees in Macedonia 
and Albania which was a decision as part of the NATO effort to help frontline 
countries to handle the burdens of the flow of refugees.371 In late May 1999, the 
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Pentagon said that 54 American F-15 and F-16 fighter jets would be deployed in 
June 1999 at three Western Anatolian air bases that Turkey opened for use by 
NATO. Although Turkish officials did not make any statement about direct Turkish 
participation in the NATO air strikes, Pentagon spokesman Kenneth Bacon stated 
that eighteen Turkish jets would also take part in the air strikes.372  
As clashes continued, Turkey acted in accordance with the West and 
supported the economic embargo on FRY and announced that it would contribute to 
aerial maneuvers over Albania and Macedonia. When the talks did not yield the 
desired effect, NATO launched air attacks on FRY in late March 1999. Turkey not 
only participated in the decision making process that resulted in air attacks on FRY, 
but it also contributed with first eleven and then eighteen F-16s and sent a fleet to the 
Adriatic to supervise the embargo on FRY. Moreover, the Council of Ministers took 
a decision to open Balıkesir and Bandırma airports at the disposal of NATO war 
planes and to open Çorlu airport at the disposal of tanker planes. Due to the 
agreement reached between FRY and NATO in mid-June 1999, there remained no 
need to use these air bases. The UN established a group for counseling which 
consisted of G-7 countries, Russia, China, Holland, Greece, and Turkey. Turkey 
decided to send 1,000 troops to participate in the KFOR to be deployed around 
Mamusa, Dragas and Prizren, densely populated by the Turks and Gorani’s.373 
Seeking to assume an active role in post-war Kosovo, Turkey expanded 
efforts to secure a concrete Turkish participation both in the peacekeeping mission 
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and the reconstruction plans in the region. Turkish Battalion Force set off for Kosovo 
in early July 1999.374 
 
4.6.1.4. POST-2000 PERIOD 
 
4.6.1.4.1.TURKEY AND THE TURKS IN KOSOVO  
 
Kosovo’s outlook by 2000 was still far from boding well as there was still no 
permanent administration model and ethnic tension was still in the air. Accordingly, 
Prime Minister Bülent Ecevit did not balk at calling for the protection of the rights of 
the Turkish minority during talks with Albanian Prime Minister Ilir Meta in Tirana in 
late February 2000. The Albanian Prime Minister stated that their purpose was to 
protect the rights of all minorities including the Turks.375  
Indeed, the question of situation of the Turks in Kosovo had become an issue 
at times after 1989, when Milosevic annulled Kosovo’s autonomy, causing the 
Albanians to go on a general strike. Around 150,000 Albanians lost their jobs and 
subsequently were deprived of other rights. However, the Turks in Kosovo who were 
only around  60,000 did not follow suit because as opposed to almost 2 million 
Albanians, the Turks in Kosovo were not in a position which would afford engaging 
in acts of reprisal against the Serbs, which, if attempted could wipe out Turks from 
the map of Kosovo. Concerning the issue, Ankara wanted the Turks in Kosovo not to 
participate in the general strike, and not to leave their homes and jobs. Throughout 
1990s, Turkey’s Kosovo policies were argued to have worked to the detriment of the 
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Turks in Kosovo. For instance, when Rugova asked support from Özal for the 
recognition of the Republic of Kosovo declared by the Kosovar Albanians back in 
1992, Ankara replied that it give political support but would not recognize the 
Republic of Kosovo. It supported a solution within the framework of FRY’s 
territorial integrity and under the constitution. Such an approach was said to have 
created a pro-Serbian Turkey image in the eyes of the Kosovar Albanians, and 
negatively effected the Turks’ position in Kosovo. After the NATO intervention, 
Turks in Kosovo faced pressures when Albanians attempted to ban the use of Turkish 
language and to suspend the employed from offices, which caused Ecevit to call for 
the protection of the rights of the Turks in Kosovo in Tirana in 2000 as mentioned 
above.376 
However, closer analysis showed that although this was prima facie a sound 
attempt by Ankara, in fact it was not for a number of reasons. First and foremost, it 
was not right to see Albania proper as the leader of Kosovar Albanians as there were 
important political, cultural, and economic differences among Kosovars and 
Albanians. Furthermore, to assume that the political figures in Albania and Kosovo 
had positive considerations regarding each other was erroneous.  
It was known that there was a nationalist cooperation between Đbrahim 
Rugova, the leader of Kosovar Albanians, and Sali Berisha, the Prime Minister of 
Albania. However, the socialist Prime Minister Fatos Nano who came to power after 
Berisha in 1997 had so much of a pro-Greek attitude that he lost Kosovar Albanians’ 
confidence. Later on, when the clashes began in Kosovo, Nano tried to create a 
divide within the UÇK. Rugova and his administration considered that these were 
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planned by Nano and the Greek intelligence.377 In March 2000, it was estimated that 
Rugova, together with former Prime Minister Buyar Bukoshi, would announce an 
overwhelming victory in the then upcoming elections. Rugova and Bukoshi did not 
favor the administration in Albania. It followed that, under such circumstances, the 
official Turkish attempts to talk to the officials in Tirana rather than talking to 
Rugova and Bukoshi was seen as part of the not well-worked Balkan policy of 
Turkey.378 
During the talks held between the Albanian and Turkish officials in April 
2005 at the Turkish parliament, Zyhidi Pepa, head of the Albania – Turkey 
Interparliamentary Friendship Group stated that unless Kosovo gained a definitive 
status, the problems in the Balkans were not likely to be eliminated. Pepa conceded 
to the fact that it was necessary for Kosovo to grant equal rights to everyone, yet it 
was a difficult task and asked for U.S. and Turkish support.379  
 
 
4.6.1.4.2. KOSOVO AND THE SOUTHEAST OF TURKEY 
 
To add onto the complexity of the situation, while Turkey was dealing with the 
problem in Kosovo, arguments that no similarity existed between the situation in 
Kosovo and the Southeast of Turkey as opposed to the arguments that rejected 
NATO intervention emerged as yet another issue for Turkey to deal with.380 At the 
center of the arguments that the situation in Kosovo and the Southeast of Turkey 
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resembled was the assertion that two different groups who saw themselves separate 
existed in these regions. Second, these groups were scattered throughout two or more 
states and were inclined to unite under a common state. Third, both tendencies were 
taken to violent acts by two separatist organizations. Fourth, both regions were 
backward in economic terms, which, the people living in these regions thought, was 
the result of a deliberate state policy.381  
 However, these arguments were devoid of ground since, first and foremost, 
Kosovo was given an autonomous status during the leadership of Tito, yet Turkey 
has always been a unitary state. For instance, the fact that there have been and are 
village guards, most of whom are of Kurdish origin, in the Southeast of Turkey who 
serve for the preservation of the unitary state status and the territorial integrity of 
Turkey against terrorist acts is self-explanatory when compared with the hostile 
social (non)communication between Serbs and Albanians in Kosovo. Furthermore, 
people of Kurdish origin in Turkey serve in all state institutions and at every level 
including high level political posts. However, for instance, it would be too optimistic 
to expect to see a Kosovar Albanian to hold a top level political post in the Serbian 
parliament because neither the Albanians would be inclined to live in Belgrade nor 
the Serbians would welcome such an idea as there has been no intermingling 
between these two populations throughout the years.  
Still, this is not to say that Albanian population was a closed one, because 
they lived in togetherness with their Muslim neighborhoods. Furthermore, while 
intermarriage between people of Kurdish and Turkish origin in Turkey is very 
common, intermarriage among Albanians and Serbs in Kosovo is a social 
phenomenon which is almost nonexistent. This social fact regarding the Serbs and 
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Albanians, which hinges on viewing themselves as “the other”, is nothing new and 
dates back to ages; to the Ottoman Empire, Serbian Kingdom, SFRY and FRY 
periods. In addition, while the Albanians in Kosovo live in compact places, people of 
Kurdish origin live everywhere including big cities and coastal areas in Turkey.382 
Thus, the situation in Kosovo and the Southeast of Turkey does not present a 
common ground upon which to build an argument of similarity. It can be argued that 
the social and political facts mentioned concerning these two regions seem to point 
out to the fact that while there is an identity conflict in Kosovo between Serbs and 
Albanians, the same cannot be maintained for Turkey’s southeast.  
 
 
4.6.1.4.3. KOSOVO’S STATUS NEGOTIATIONS AND TURKEY 
 
Living through many troubled periods through its history, Kosovo embarked a new 
period with Rugova’s death in January 2006. Unlike other Balkan leaders, Rugova 
was a politician who was successful at not swaying his people into war. Rugova’s 
death came at a very critical period as the negotiations on the status of Kosovo were 
scheduled to start in January 2006 in Vienna, which meant that the negotiations 
would be postponed for at least one month. It was among the expectations that 
domestic politics in Kosovo could be altered in the post-Rugova period. To give an 
example, it was argued that the Kosovo Democratic Union (LDK) founded by 
Rugova could witness divides within in the future.383  
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The first round of postponed talks for Kosovo’s future status was held 
between the Serbian and Kosovo delegations in Vienna on 20 and 21 February 2006. 
After that, a total of 19 rounds of negotiations took place. 
In early February 2007, Ministry of Foreign Affairs Deputy Undersecretary 
Ambassador Ahmet Acet visited Kosovo and announced that Turkey’s support for 
Kosovo would continue after status negotiations were finalized. Prime Minister Çeku 
also asked for Turkey’s support.384 Turkish officials were cognizant of the fact that 
there was no concrete outcome from the said negotiations but a visible discord 
among the parties and they continued to preserve a stance which was in line with 
international community. After the final proposal by UN Special Envoy Martti 
Ahtisaari was submitted to UN Security Council in late March 2007, Turkish 
Ministry of Foreign Affairs reiterated Turkey’s approach and confirmed its support 
for the said proposal by way of stating that Turkey preserved its view that a just and 
sustainable solution which would not lead to new tension or clashes in the 
foreseeable future be found. It was also stressed that as things stood as of March 
2007, it was considered that a decision by UN Security Council which would replace 
Resolution 1244 was the only way to establish stability in Kosovo and the region.385 
Turkey’s approach to the Ahtisaari report was one which supported Kosovo’s 
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independence within the framework of a UN Security Council resolution, one which 
also did not engage in any speculations about the recognition of independence. In 
that respect, Turkey’s approach was in line with the Balkan states which supported 
Kosovo’s independence. Turkey had repeatedly expressed stated that the recognition 
of Kosovo’s independence can be within the framework of a UN Security Council 
resolution. Furthermore, to this end, it conducted lobbying activities at the UN and 
asked UN Security Council members’ support.386 
Although Ahtisaari stated in early April 2007 that he would not want to 
describe the process launched with his proposal as a marathon, but may be at least a 
10,000 meter run, Russia’s customary pro-Serbian attitude said otherwise. Even 
during these negotiations that took place in early April 2007, Russia’s UN 
Ambassador Vitaly Churkin insisted that Serbian President Vojislav Kostunica as the 
representative of a UN member state address a closed council meeting in its chamber 
while Kosovo President Fatmir Sejdiu speak to the council members informally in 
basement conference room; and in fact this was what happened. Kostunica stated 
with satisfaction that the plan for the future status of Kosovo was not accepted by the 
Security Council. Moreover, he reiterated Serbia’s offer of “substantial autonomy” 
for Kosovo and insisted on further negotiations with a new envoy to replace 
Ahtisaari. Ahtisaari did not balk at saying that this year or even more had been lost. 
On the other side, Britain’s UN Ambassador Emyr Jones Parry rejected these 
statements by Kostunica by saying that any suggestion that the proposals had been 
refused or that a new negotiator was sought had been erroneous.387 
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As talks for Kosovo’s future status approached the latest round in early 
December 2007, no breakthroughs were achieved. The Kosovar leaders were 
reported to be preparing to declare unilateral independence while the Serbian 
officials announced they would employ all diplomatic and legal means to annul such 
an independence declaration. The U.S.A. was expected to recognize Kosovo’s 
independence rather rapidly and Secretary of State Condoleezza Rice stated that 
Washington would not support more negotiations after 10 December 2007. However, 
at the time, the EU did not present a unified approach towards a possible 
independence declaration. Key countries such as the UK, France, Germany, and Italy 
were supportive of Kosovo’s independence while some members were expected to 
follow suit in a more slowly fashion.  
Meanwhile, Russia preserved its staunchly opposed position towards 
Kosovo’s independence. Russia’s accustomed support to Serbs would be recalled as 
the underlying reason behind its current attitude, however the more convincing 
rationale is perhaps marked in Russian Foreign Minister Sergei Lavrov’s argument 
that Kosovo’s independence will set a precedent for the rest of the world: “Certainly 
the way the Kosovo crisis is resolved will set a precedent, and it is not because we 
say it will, and not because our partners, for example, say it will not. It is not up to 
them or us to decide. A precedent will be set only because it will take place,”388 
which implied Russia’s concerns especially over Abkhazia. Russia called for more 
talks on the issue between the Kosovar Albanians and Belgrade, which the U.S.A. 
rejected as a whole. However, it was in fact Belgrade who put forward the argument 
that Kosovo’s independence would set a precedent in the world, with the aim of 
preventing states in similar situation from supporting Kosovo’s independence. Later, 
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this strategy was voiced further by Vladimir Putin after January 2006 for Russia’s 
own foreign policy considerations. It is widely accepted by Moscow officials that the 
West has been building an international system designed for its own interests since 
the end of the Cold War. On that account, it can be argued that Putin’s ‘marketing’ of 
the domino effect argument was carried out with a view to strengthening Russia’s 
own foreign policy objectives. Consequently, Kosovo turned into an issue between 
the U.S.A. and Russia and also between the West and Russia, which pulled Brussels 
even closer to Washington.389 
After Kosovo finally declared independence on 17 February 2008, Turkey 
was one of the first countries to recognize Kosovo. The following day, Foreign 
Minister Ali Babacan stated that Turkey welcomed the independence of Kosovo, 
underscoring also the importance of improving regional and bilateral relations 
between Turkey and Serbia as well as Turkey’s resolve to contribute to the 
development of Kosovo.390 Throughout the status negotiations process, Turkey’s 
policy towards Kosovo has been one which supported independence while also 
trying not to strain relations with Serbia and Russia. At first sight, Turkey’s efforts 
not to upset relations with Russia and Serbia might have implied that Turkey 
followed a neutral policy concerning the issue. However, as already mentioned, 
Turkey expressly supported a new opening which could replace UN Resolution 1244 
to establish permanent stability in Kosovo and the region, which indicated its non-
pro status quo position. According to Turkey, the case of Kosovo and its 
independence process is unique. Nevertheless, it can hypothetically be argued that 
temporal and spatial conditions can also change in the ensuing years, which may - or 
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again, may not - bring to pass similar cases. In this connection, Russia’s relevant 
statements about the recognition of TRNC, and about Abkhazia for that matter, do 
not seem to have parallelism in Ankara’s relevant policies. In the short- and medium-
term of this new conjuncture, Turkey’s policy towards Kosovo is likely to be based 
on preserving its participation in the international military existence in the country, 
trying to improve economic ties by participating more in bids, and strengthening 
political and diplomatic relations which primarily concerns the preservation of the 
rights of the Turks in Kosovo. Turkey upgraded its diplomatic mission in Kosovo to 
an embassy. After the Constitution of Kosovo enters into force on 15 June 2008 and 
the UN leaves, Turkey is expected to bolster bilateral relations with Kosovo through 
new openings in political, economic, and cultural spheres. An example in this respect 
is the prospective establishment of the a Middle East Technical University campus in 
Kosovo. 
Turning back to the bilateral relations between Turkey and Albania since the 
end of the Kosovo crisis, they continued particularly with a view to ensuring 
economic and military cooperation. President Demirel paid an official visit to 
Albania and Macedonia in April 1999. Central to the agenda of this visit were 
Kosovo problem, stability in Albania, and the situation of the refugees.391 In 2000, 
Turkish and Albanian presidents and prime ministers along with other regional states 
participated in the Southeast European Cooperation Process (SEECP) Heads of State 
and Government Summit. In early 2000, Prime Minister Ecevit paid an official visit 
to Albania. This visit was the first of its kind, that is, by a Turkish Prime Minister to 
Albania, after eight years by then. Shortly afterwards, President Demirel went to 
Albania for an official visit to discuss issues on Kosovo and other regional and 
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international issues of mutual concern. The third high-level visit in the same year 
took place by Albanian Prime Minister Ilir Meta’s visit which was primarily on 
economic field.392 In September 2005, Turkey and Albania signed an agreement on 
Turkish Armed Forces’ assistance to the Albanian Army concerning the allocation of 
military equipment totaling $ 2,5 million to contribute to the restructuring of the 
Albanian military and integration into NATO. Turkey also assists Albania in the field 
of logistics and police training.393 Albania takes efforts to integrate into Euro-
Atlantic structures; to combat organized crime and corruption; to accelerate justice 
and police reforms; and to improve public administration. The coalition government 
formed by Sali Berisha secured the highest number of votes in the July 2005 
elections and received the vote of confidence in early September 2005. Both Turkey 
and Albania are cognizant of friendly bilateral relations. What remains to be done on 
the part of Turkey is to increase investment and continue to extend military 
assistance. This is imperative in respect of Turkey’s overall Balkan policies as it 
implies taking efforts not to see Albania being distanced from Turkey and in close 
relations with Greece in political, economic and military fields. 
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4.7. TURKISH FOREIGN POLICY TOWARDS BULGARIA 
 
Contemporary writings on Turkish – Bulgarian relations are replete with the 
argumentation that bilateral relations between Turkey and Bulgaria currently display 
an exemplary nature and this dissertation shall be no exception in this sense. Since 
the creation of Bulgaria as an independent state, Turkish – Bulgarian relations have 
been both cordial and strained, and sometimes even confrontational. Being two 
neighbors in a volatile region as the Balkans, two countries improved their relations 
exclusive of the assimilation period against Turkish minority. In the post-Cold War 
era, central to the improvement in relations was the reciprocation of the two states by 
reconciling the memory of the assimilation period, which was brought to pass 
initially in the diplomatic – political field, backed by military and economic fields: a 
process not so common in international relations. 
 After almost 500 years of Ottoman rule, following the Turco – Russian War 
(1877 – 1878), and the Treaty of San Stefano (1878), an autonomous Bulgaria was 
proclaimed, to be replaced by the Treaty of Berlin in the same year. The treaty 
prepared the ground for independent Bulgaria which was to materialize in 1908.394 In 
the Balkan Wars (1912 and 1913), the Ottomans fought against Bulgaria, Serbia, 
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Greece and Montenegro, and lost Rumelia with the Treaty of London (1913). In 
World War I, Bulgaria allied with Germany, Austria – Hungary, and the Ottoman 
Empire. After the defeat, Bulgaria’s anti-monarchist politician Alexander 
Stamboliski’s Bulgarian Agrarian Nationalist Union (BANU) took power in the 
country. As the major support for the agrarians came from the peasants, among 
whom were also Turkish peasants, they were granted certain cultural rights and the 
number of Turkish members of parliament increased in the assembly. When 
Alexander Stamboliski was assassinated in 1923, a coalition of BANU opponents, 
namely IMRO (a pro-autonomy Macedonian armed organization), the National 
Alliance, army factions, and social democrats, took control in the country under the 
leadership of right wing politician Alexander Tsankov who would set up a fascist 
party in 1932. Following this, a rightist coup took place in 1934, Bulgaria allied with 
the Axis powers during World War II, and the authoritarian regime in Bulgaria 
administered a stricter control towards Turkish schools.395  
Although many of the problems in bilateral relations were apparently 
resolved in the 1920s, Bulgaria’s revisionist attitude in the Balkans in the 1930s due 
to emerging as a landlocked country after World War I said otherwise as the country 
increasingly became closer to Italy and Germany; prompting Turkey, Greece, 
Yugoslavia and Romania to sign the Balkan Entente against Bulgaria in 1934. Yet 
still, Bulgaria’s relations with Turkey were relatively friendlier compared to those 
with its other neighbors.396 However, the agreements proved short-lived as other 
treaties of nonaggression and friendship of the 1920s came to be labeled as a period 
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of pactomania. When World War II broke out, the only state in the Balkan peninsula 
which remained out of war proved to be Turkey.397 At the end of World War II, 
Bulgaria came under Soviet invasion and occupation which resulted in the 
establishment of the Communist regime in the country in 1947. From then onwards, 
bilateral relations between Ankara and Sofia would take a new turn for the worse as 
Bulgaria would become a member of the Warsaw Pact and Turkey would seek 
admission to NATO. From the end of World War II, to the inception of the Cold 
War, the threatening attitude of the Soviet Union towards Turkey as well as Greece, 
and the Greek Civil War, fostered and supported by the Soviet Union, strained the 
relations between Ankara and Sofia. Meanwhile, the Korean War broke out, which 
would have an indirect impact on Balkan developments. This war impelled 
Yugoslavia to cooperate with the West as well as Turkey and Greece, and drove 
Turkey and Greece to seriously ponder entering NATO. At such a conjuncture, 
Bulgaria forced around 250,000 Turks to migrate to Turkey after one month had 
passed since the end of the Korean War, which Turkey interpreted as a Soviet 
move.398  
When the Communists came to power in Bulgaria, particularly the Stalinists 
in 1949, an iron curtain divided the two states in addition to the geographical 
borders.399 The minority issue which had been out of the agenda in Albania, 
Hungary, Romania and Bulgaria reappeared as a political tool to be used by the 
Soviet Union after Yugoslavia was excluded from Cominform. In the process of 
decision-making concerning deportation, Bulgaria’s domestic politics and the 
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Turkish minority proved to be influential. In 1950, the Bulgarian Ministry of 
Agriculture decided to establish collective farms in south Dobruja, which it had taken 
from Romania back in 1940, where around 150,000 Turks lived. Moreover, the 
process of mechanization in agriculture launched by the Bulgarian government in 
1944 had been accelerated in this region, which implied that the land owned by the 
Turkish minority did not belong to them any more, creating unemployment, and thus 
constituting the main reason for forcing the Turkish minority to emigrate in 1950.400 
The relations between Turkey and Bulgaria had already started to deteriorate by 1947 
and became even more strained in 1948 when two Turkish aircraft were shot down in 
Bulgarian airspace. Following this, Turkey demanded withdrawal of the Bulgarian 
attaché to Ankara and Bulgarian soldiers attacked a border police station close to 
Lalapaşa. The repercussions of this event on the part of the Turkish government 
proved strong. The Bulgarian media launched a strong anti-Turkish campaign. While 
tension was still in the air, Turkey’s consulate – general in Plovdiv was attacked. On 
10 August 1950, Bulgaria sent a note to Turkey stating that around 250,000 Turks 
would be sent to Turkey in three months. Until early November 1951, around 
150,000 Turks were deported to Turkey. Due to being on opposite camps, bilateral 
relations remained cold and became even more strained in 1961 when Turkey sent a 
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note to Bulgaria again on minority rights violations.  Turkish – Bulgarian relations 
entered a new period with the thaw in the Cold War after the Cuban missile crisis 
(1962), when peaceful coexistence approach was in the air. Bilateral visits resumed 
in 1966.401 The 1970s has been described as a “goodneighborliness decade” in 
relations - especially in the economic venue - started with Prime Minister Süleyman 
Demirel’s visit to Bulgaria in 1970 and followed with two agreements on energy and 
tourism the same year.402 However, improvement in relations came to an abrupt end 
again in 1984 due to Bulgarian President Todor Zhivkov’s forced assimilation 
campaign towards the Turkish minority, a policy which would be implemented by 
Sofia until 1989, causing another mass exodus to Turkey.  
Against this background came the Bulgarian coup in November 1989 with the 
collapse of the communist regime in Sofia led by the Bulgarian Communist Party 
(BKP). From then on, Turkish – Bulgarian relations entered a transition period. 
Bulgaria accepted that the assimilation process of 1984 – 1989 had been a grave 
mistake which was contrary to Bulgarian domestic law and international 
obligations.403 The first election in the new multiparty system took place in 1991 
from which the Movement of Rights and Freedoms (MRF) of Turks in Bulgaria 
emerged as a key party. Immediately thereafter, President Zheliu Zhelev and his 
party, Union of Democratic Forces (UDF), announced their resolve to improve ties 
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with Turkey.404 In the wider international context, the disappearance of blocs, 
emergence of a multipolar system, loosening in extreme ideologies, emergence of 
sub-systems, and the rise in integration trends certainly helped shape the future 
context of post-Cold War Turkish – Bulgarian relations.405 Bulgarian foreign policy 
agenda was now directed by Europeanization efforts, efforts to overcome economic 
problems, the unrest concerning the newly emerged Macedonia, and the attempt to 
restore the deteriorated relations with Turkey due to past assimilation campaigns on 
the Turkish minority in Bulgaria. The focal points in foreign policy for Turkey in the 
same period were the PKK problem, the rise of fundamentalist Islam, problems in the 
Middle East and the Caucasus, EU membership, and problems with Greece.406 
 As former Bulgarian Foreign Minister, Stanislav Daskalov, stated, the post-
Cold War Bulgarian foreign policy was formulated on the basis of protecting 
national interests as well as acting in compliance with the internationally accepted 
standards which would be achieved through integration with European structures and 
by expanding relations with neighbors.407 Within this framework, Bulgarian decision 
makers tried to become flexible in their relations, to establish equidistant ties with 
regional states, to conclude confidence building measures with Turkey and Greece, 
to improve relations with either the U.S.A. or Russia and Ukraine, and to foster 
relations with Germany which was considered to be the economic motor of 
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Europe.408 Bulgaria concluded many bilateral and multilateral agreements with its 
neighbors, including Turkey between 1990 and 2007. In this new period, primary 
issues in Turkish – Bulgarian political relations included the Turkish minority, 
geopolitical concerns, Bulgaria’s integration into Euro-Atlantic structures, and the 
PKK problem.  
 Since Bulgarian nationalism was built on an anti-Turkish basis, Turkish 
minority in Bulgaria stood as a problem for Bulgarian intellectuals and policymakers. 
This problem had been exacerbated by the anti-Turkish policies of the Soviet Union 
during the Cold War and gradually became acute because the Bulgarian official 
viewpoint labeled the Turkish minority a fifth column. Given that the most important 
issue in Turkish – Bulgarian bilateral political relations was the Turkish minority, the 
reasons of the 1989 campaign against the Turkish minority in Bulgaria are in order 
here. Bulgaria was concerned about the high birth rates among the Turkish 
community and the possible future penetration of this community in large numbers 
into the Bulgarian political life at a time when Bulgaria had the lowest birth rate 
among all communist countries of Eastern Europe. Bulgaria also revisited the Cyprus 
problem in 1974 and feared that Turkey would use the Turkish minority in Bulgaria 
as a political tool to demand territorial concessions from Bulgaria and saw the 
Turkish community as the fifth column of Turkey.409 The assimilation campaign 
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which started in 1984 ended with the decree issued on 19 December 1989. At the 
turn of two major developments, i.e. collapse of Communism and the end of the 
assimilation campaign, Bulgarian officials stated that they were inclined to reverse 
the strained relations with Turkey but did not have a definitive answer as to how to 
attain this. Consequently, this transitional period did not prove easy for either state. 
With the memory of the recent assimilation practices against the Turkish minority as 
a former Warsaw Pact member, now Bulgaria saw a somewhat different picture 
when it revisited its relations with Turkey. Bulgarian officials now faced a decadent 
Warsaw Pact which would no longer fuel anti-Turkish Soviet policies. In the absence 
of the Cold War and the protection of the Soviet Union, they realized that they had to 
formulate new policies towards a rapidly developing Turkey under Özal 
administration with a population of almost 60 million.410 Although the new 
Bulgarian government stated that Bulgaria would re-grant the rights of the Turkish 
minority, this problem persisted in Turkish – Bulgarian relations after the 1990 
elections, from which the Bulgarian Socialist Party (BSP) emerged victorious.  
 The emergence of BSP, which was a reformed version of the Communists, 
was something particular at the time in the Balkans as it was the only example of its 
kind, while liberal governments were taking power one by one in other regional 
states.411 The MRF412, which consisted mainly of Turks, won 23 seats in the 
Parliament and ranked third after the reformed BSP and the UDF. Following this, 
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cases were lodged against the MRF in the Bulgarian Constitutional Court in 1991 on 
the grounds that it was a political body directed from Turkey. This triggered negative 
responses in Turkey and Prime Minister Mesut Yılmaz sent a letter to his counterpart 
Dimitr Popov stating that such an attitude would hinder participation of the Turkish 
community in Bulgarian politics and lead to their isolation from social life and, in 
return, impede improving relations.413 Yalçın Oral, Turkish Ambassador to Sofia, 
stated that “the MRF is a Bulgarian political organization and its members are 
Bulgarian. As known, the majority of its members … are of Turkish origin. 
However, this does not change what has taken place. The MRF is a Bulgarian 
organization. In our opinion, it is a part of Bulgarian political process … Turkey’s 
support for MRF is moral …”414 This official statement was indicative of Turkey’s 
conciliatory policy at the time. Mutual visits began after the collapse of communism 
in Bulgaria. Bulgarian officials also paid visits to Greece in pursuit of conducting a 
policy of equidistance towards Turkey and Greece. Even before such contacts, 
Turkey had provided oil and electricity and a $ 75 million credit as the first country 
to extend fuel oil and electricity aid to Bulgaria during the 1990 Gulf Crisis, 
following the crop failure in Bulgaria, when the memory of the assimilation 
campaign was still fresh.415 Mutual visits gained acceleration and bilateral contacts 
became intensified with the East-West Highway Project initiated in 1993.416  
 However, although the transitional period in bilateral relations was geared up 
by political initiatives, it was thanks to Turkey’s gestures in the military field which 
helped normalize bilateral relations in this period. Turkish officials were cognizant of 
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the fact that cooperation in the military sphere would inspire confidence which 
lacked in bilateral relations at the time. Therefore, in view of the memory of recent 
assimilation campaign towards the Turks in Bulgaria, Turkey’s gestures in the 
military field were remarkable at the turn of the 1990s.  
 This coincided a time when Bulgaria was inclined to modify its military 
policy by advocating all regional states to conclude bilateral military agreements. It 
was also ready to support confidence-building measures proposed by other regional 
states. Bulgaria tried to develop good relations with Turkish (and Greek) military 
establishments, and Turkish Chief of Staff Doğan Güreş’s visit to Bulgaria in 
December 1991 was seen as a major breakthrough by Bulgaria in this respect. Yet, 
the Bulgarian military and government still had serious concerns about regional 
security, which partly stemmed from the Conventional Forces in Europe (CFE) 
Treaty inked in November 1990 in Paris. The Bulgarian official view saw the CFE as 
taking into consideration only the quantitative dimension of the regional military 
balance. Bulgaria had a considerable amount of military hardware and personnel yet 
at the same time it was disadvantaged in terms of the quality of its military 
equipment because Turkey (and Greece) had access to NATO technology. Moreover, 
as the Western European states transferred weapons systems to the Balkans to 
strengthen NATO’s southern flank against threats in the Mediterranean and the 
Middle East, the Bulgarians thought that this would destabilize the region, 
particularly pinpointing Turkish military existence on border areas.417 Turkey made 
efforts for the normalization and institutionalization of relations, by for instance 
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proposing joint exercises on border areas and supported Bulgaria’s entrance to 
NATO right from the beginning in the transitional period.  
 Bilateral relations went through further stages as events unfolded in the 
Balkans. The foreign policy of Turkey and Bulgaria in relation to the developments 
in Yugoslavia was active neutrality. At the outset of the crisis, the two states 
supported an intact Yugoslavia. When Slovenia and Croatia declared their 
independence, Özal and Zhelev stated that they did not intend to interfere with the 
internal affairs of Yugoslavia but were against armed conflict. Soon after, the two 
states recognized Slovenia, Croatia, Macedonia and Bosnia – Herzegovina. Although 
Bulgaria’s official stance was in conformity with the international community 
regarding the Bosnian War, some pro-Serbian voices in the leftist wing of the 
parliament emerged, however they did not escalate.418 
 With respect to Bulgaria’s integration with Euro-Atlantic structures and 
Zheliu Zhelev’s request for support from Turkey to advocate Bulgaria’s membership 
in NATO, Ankara assured Bulgaria of its full support since the beginning. Bulgaria 
also received Greek support for NATO membership.419  
The most significant regional cooperation platform in which Turkey and 
Bulgaria take part is the Black Sea Economic Cooperation (BSEC), with a 
declaration signed by Turkey, Bulgaria, Georgia, Romania, Russia, Ukraine, 
Albania, Armenia, Azerbaijan, Greece and Moldova in Đstanbul on 25 June 1992. 
Zheliu Zhelev attended the signature of the declaration, emphasizing the importance 
Bulgaria attached to the agreement. Bulgaria’s initial response to the BSEC was not 
very enthusiastic; for fear that the BSEC would harm its relations with the EC and 
put its membership prospect at risk. When the EC stated that it would not admit 
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Bulgaria to full membership in the near future, Bulgaria began to look more 
favorably upon the BSEC. On the other hand, another reason put forward by Bulgaria 
along with its hesitations was the fear that Turkey would gradually bring the Central 
Asian states into the BSEC and loosen its attention on the original members of the 
BSEC. It also insisted that the Black Sea Bank be established in Sofia. In due course, 
Bulgaria participated actively in the BSEC facilities, but did hesitate to do so in the 
parliamentary institutions. During the armed conflicts in Karabagh and Chechnya; 
Ukraine, Georgia and Turkey tried to improve political cooperation among member 
states, but Bulgaria rejected the idea.420 
 Regarding the PKK problem, Bulgaria declared its support for Turkey in its 
struggle with terrorism. However, some maps showing Diyarbakır as the capital city 
were distributed as maps of the so-called “Kurdistan” in April 1994 in Bulgaria and 
the Kurdish Cultural Education Association held a conference on “Kurdish 
problems” in September the same year. The Kurdish University Students 
Organization assembled in front of the Turkish Embassy in Sofia protesting Turkey’s 
military operations in Northern Iraq by burning the Turkish flag in May 1995. The 
position of the BSP and UDF was different on the issue, and the former reportedly 
hosted a pro-PKK attitude.421  
 The 2005 elections displayed the existence of extreme nationalism in certain 
political factions in Bulgaria. After the elections held on 25 June 2005, the Coalition 
for Bulgaria, a coalition of parties dominated by the BSP, (CfB) emerged as the first 
party with 30.95 % and gained 82 of 240 seats in the parliament. Prime Minister 
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Simeon Saxe-Coburg’s party, National Movement for Simeon II (NMS2), emerged 
second with 19.88 % and won 53 seats. The MRF reached the highest level in 15 
years with 12.81 % and won 34 seats.422 When the CfB signed a coalition agreement 
with the MRF led by Ahmed Doğan, the extreme nationalist ATAKA Union’s 
response proved fierce. Volen Siderov, the leader of the ATAKA Union, stated that a 
meeting would be held before the vote of confidence on 26 July 2005 and called on 
the public to attend. After the election results were announced, Siderov stated that the 
Turkish broadcasts on Bulgarian television should not be aired any more and that 
Turkish names be modified with Bulgarian suffixes, reminding the past practices, 
and yet, not receiving due support.423 
It is known that Prime Minister Saxe-Coburg had stated that Bulgaria was 
open to cooperation with Turkey on issues regarding terrorism while he was still in 
power in 2004, during Prime Minister Recep Tayyip Erdoğan’s visit to Sofia. During 
this visit, Erdoğan touched upon the PKK problem and the transformation of two old 
Ottoman mosques into restaurants in Plovdiv. Pointing out the “Bulgarian 
Information Center for Kurdistan”, the Prime Minister stated that PKK carried out 
terrorist acts in Turkey and that this required cooperation to combat with the 
extensions of this organization. The Bulgarian Prime Minister stated that they had 
included PKK in the terrorist organizations list. Erdoğan also emphasized that the 
Bulgarian churches in Đstanbul and Edirne had been restored and that Turkey 
expected due reciprocity regarding the Ottoman architecture in Bulgaria which was 
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received positively by Sofia.424 It can be argued that the future of Turkish – 
Bulgarian relations are likely to be shaped by the future relations of Turkey and 
Bulgaria with European institutions to a great extent.425 
 
 
4.8. TURKISH FOREIGN POLICY TOWARDS GREECE IN THE BALKAN 
CONTEXT 
 
With the end of the Cold War and the outbreak of new conflicts in the Balkans, 
Turkey and Greece embarked into a political and economic competition as the most 
powerful two regional states in economic and military terms. This competition was 
conducted overtly by Greece and not too straightforwardly by Turkey.426 In this new 
unstable environment, the main pillars of Greece’s Balkan policy after mid-1990s 
were outlined as: seeking ways of economic cooperation via confidence, friendship 
and equal cooperation package and transforming that duly into an agreement between 
Balkan states in establishing and maintaining democracy; forming an economic 
cooperation zone in the region; building goodneighborly relations with Albania and 
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Macedonia, and ensuring the expansion of NATO’s peace umbrella in a way to cover 
the Balkans.427 Nevertheless, Greece’s most valuable asset was its EU card by which 
it used the political and economic advantages of its EU membership.428 
 The competition which emerged in the early 1990s brought about a 
fragmentation in the region. Albania, Bosnia-Herzegovina, Macedonia, partly 
Bulgaria and Turkey on the one hand, and Greece and Yugoslavia on the other were 
viewed as pursuing harmonious foreign policies. At the beginning of the 1990s, 
Greece had strained relations with Albania due to issues concerning the Greek 
minority in South Albania429 while Turkey established friendly relations with the 
country. Due to the alleged encirclement by the “Islamic axis” in the Balkans, 
Turkey and Albania were seen in the same camp from the official Greek viewpoint. 
That was why Greece reciprocated in a parallel way by trying to encircle Turkey in 
the Balkans. Former Foreign Minister Karolas Papulias’ visit to all Balkan states 
except for Turkey and Macedonia in November 1993, the friendly relations Greece 
tried to establish with Bulgaria and Russia, and its insistence on not banning the PKK 
activities in Greece were seen as indicators of the said policy.430 On the other hand, 
the Greek policy aimed at encircling Turkey was broad-based as it reflected a global 
vision which included the Middle-East and the Caucasus at the material time, 
although the emphasis was put on the Balkans.431 
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Another important issue for Greece was the independence of Macedonia. 
Greece objected to the name, the constitution and the flag of Macedonia while 
Turkey, as the country which recognized Macedonia after Bulgaria, had friendly 
relations with this new state.432  Furthermore, Serbia, supported by Greece, was 
declared as the aggressor by the international community. Although Greece 
presented its pro-Serbian approach until 1990s, it had to put aside this policy in face 
of increasing American and European pressure. The offensive nature of Greece’s 
Balkan policy brought new interpretations that Greece acted as the bully of the 
Balkans. Yet, Greece began to conduct a more conciliatory foreign policy after 1995 
with a view to breaking free from its isolation in the EU and regaining its credibility 
in the international community; surpassing Turkey’s activism in the Balkans; and 
enabling Greek businessmen to invest in the Balkans which was hampered by the 
incumbent government policies.433 The latter proved to be the most decisive factor 
for Greece. However, more noteworthy was the election of Costas Simitis (1996) 
government which would seek ways to seize economic opportunities in the Balkan 
states which had embarked into a transition period.434 Upon seeing that the 
supposedly Islamic and neo-Ottomanist encirclement by Albania, Bosnia – 
Herzegovina, Sandjak, Kosovo, Macedonia, and Bulgaria, allegedly directed from 
Turkey, was an illusion, Greece restored relations with Bulgaria, Macedonia, and 
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Albania. It put aside its bankrupt pro-Serbian policy to formulate novel ones.435 
These novel policies were to show themselves in the economic field mostly. After 
Milosevic was ousted, it was expected that a positive era awaited Greece in the 
Balkans with regard to asserting its influence. In line with such a policy, Georgos 
Papandreu happened to be the first politician to pay an official visit to Belgrade after 
Kostunica came to power. The aim was simple and well-worked: to make 
Thessaloniki the capital of economic and cultural integration in the Balkans.436 The 
new policies of Greece towards the Balkans yielded positive outcomes to particularly 
the economic performance of Greece. Turkey has increasing bilateral ties with the 
Balkan states. However, it ranks after Greece in foreign trade records with exception 
of Romania and Bosnia – Herzegovina.437 
 Turkey and Greece began to take part in regional forum meetings together as 
of 2005. Turkey was invited to the Regional Forum on Cultural Corridors in 
Southeast Europe organized in Bulgaria. It was announced that triple forum meetings 
including Turkey, Romania, Bulgaria, and Greece, Romania, Bulgaria were held 
separately, however a single forum meeting would be held with the four states in the 
ensuing years.438 Still, the almost inherent and chronic problems between the two 
states which project themselves on the relations between Greece and Turkey do 
remain in an array of issues. This includes the Balkans. Greece’s giant steps in the 
Balkans in the economic venue are nothing to be underestimated. The recent 
purchase of shares of certain Turkish banks by Greece, as well as its overall 
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economic activity in the Balkans render imperative the need for Turkey to define a 
strategy endowed with expedient investment-based policies. 
 
 
4.9. TURKISH FOREIGN POLICY TOWARDS ROMANIA 
 
Among formerly communist Balkan states, Romania is remarkable for being the state 
with which Turkey improved its relations on a stable basis and had almost no 
problems. Turkey and Romania improved their ties mostly through economic 
activities.439 The main foreign policy guidelines promoted by Romania in view of 
ensuring national security and regional stability have been described as linked to the 
promotion of partnership relations for entering NATO and European institutions; 
participating in regional and subregional projects; establishing bilateral relations; and 
avoiding military adventures.440 Within this framework, Turkish – Romanian 
relations continued to improve although the two states had been on different sides 
during the Bosnian War. The “Ottoman heritage” in Romania had less impact 
compared to other Balkan states and the Turkish minority in Romania is one of the 
most integrated and well-treated minorities in the Balkans.441 Bilateral relations were 
stepped up with the Good Neighborliness, Friendship, and Cooperation Agreement in 
September 1991. High level visits were paid with annually regular meetings. During 
these visits, the most important agreements concluded were Agreement on Social 
Security (1999), Protocol on Joint Cooperation on Social Security (1999), Agreement 
on Consulates (1999), Agreement on Cooperation Science and Technology (1999), 
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and Protocol on Cooperation in Justice. Turkey and Bulgaria signed a trilateral 
agreement on a joint fight against illegal operations in respect of which Romania 
gave full support to put an end to the presence of the PKK in Romania. In this 
connection, Romania stepped up its efforts to track PKK activities and its members 
in the context of which it also extradited a number of PKK members to Turkey.442  
 The improving relations were noted by Mircea Neata, the Romanian Consul 
General in Đstanbul when he said that there were many things that favor the 
strengthening of these relations for the benefit of both states. One of them was 
geographical proximity that both countries engaged at the crossroads of Europe and 
Asia. Romania opened a new consulate general in Đzmir in the Aegean region in 
January 2005 while some countries chose to reduce or even close their missions. 
Romania’s bid for NATO and the EU fostered bilateral relations.443 Turkey from the 
beginning has supported Romania’s entry into NATO and welcomes the full 
membership of Romania in 2007.444  
 However, Turkey has certain expectations from Romania, which remain to be 
fulfilled in the ensuing years. First and foremost, Article 120 of the law regarding the 
regime to be applied to foreigners in Romania which facilitates conditions for EU 
citizens and other citizens in the EU zone should be enlarged to include Turkish 
businessmen and investors in Romania. Second, Turkey expects Romania to declare 
the PKK as a terrorist organization although Romanian authorities treat the said 
organization as one in practice. As is the case in other countries of Europe, the 
extentions of the PKK continue their activities under the guise of “cultural 
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association” in Romania. The activities of the PKK in Romania are reported to 
include meetings and demonstrations to manufacture public opinion and also to 
extract money from businessmen who are inclined to do so. In 2004, Romanian 
authorities deported some militants reported to have worked for the PKK. The legal 
ground at the outset was the lack of residence permit. However, Romanian 
authorities lately argue that such persons constitute a threat to domestic security and 
issue due decisions that prohibit re-entry by those persons into Romania for such 
periods as 15 years.445 Further, it was observed that the Armenian diaspora in 
Romania stepped up lobby activities for the recognition by the Romanian parliament 
of the so-called Armenian genocide on the occasion of its alleged 90th anniversary. In 
January 2005, it was learnt that Senator Varujan Vasganian, president of the budget 
commission, prepared a draft resolution addressing genocide claims. However, the 
attempt proved futile by the diplomatic efforts of Turkish officials and also that of 
Romanian Prime Minister and Foreign Minister. The issue was voiced also by 
Varujan Pamukciyan, the representative of the Armenian minority in Romania, in the 
session at the parliament on 26 April 2005. The members of parliament representing 
the Turkish minority also addressed the parliament regarding the Armenian 
allegations.446  
 As an EU member, Romania is known to back Turkey’s efforts to join the 
EU. Romanian Prime Minister Popescu Tariceanu stated during his visit in February 
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2006 that Romania could offer guidance concerning preparations.447 Soon after 
Brussels put off by 5 months a recommendation on whether to let Romania and 
Bulgaria join in 2007 or 2008, the EU Enlargement Commissioner Olli Rehn visited 
Bucharest and Sofia. Linking Turkey’s accession with the enlargement process in 
general, Rehn stated that the EU’s decision could also be perceived as a signal for 
Ankara to redouble its efforts. Regarding the issue, Romanian press commented that 
since Romania thought it was close to having a clear answer from the EU regarding 
its own bid and that it did not get any positive answer, this showed that the EU stance 
towards enlargement was not clear, and that included Turkey as well.448 While one 
may argue that Romania sees Turkey’s membership in the EU as prospective, one 
may also maintain that Romania’s support for Turkey’s bid is yet to be convincing. 
Although the official statements by the Romanian Prime Minister in June 2006 
reflected optimism and support when the Prime Minister said Turkey and the bloc 
have had a common future during an official visit to Spain, over the opening of 
Turkey’s entry negotiations with the EU,449 President Basescu’s interview of July 
2005 in a German newspaper did say otherwise. Basescu stated he believed that the 
recommendation of privileged partnership put forward by CDU/CSU was a good 
compromise for both Turkey and the Ukraine at the material time; that it could be 
accepted that the EU should have a pause after the accession of Romania and 
Bulgaria due to its enlargement that included 10 states; and that priority in 
enlargement should be given to western Balkans to keep peace in Europe. These 
statements prompted Turkey to convey its regrets of Turkey to President Basescu 
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during the UN World Summit 2005 in New York.450 One may argue that Turkey 
should acknowledge that there can be fluctuations in the support given by Romania 
to Turkey with the change of governments and the conjuncture. Yet, given that the 
accession reforms in Romania are likely to translate themselves rather negatively 
onto the relations of Romania and Turkey after the accession of the former into the 
EU, Turkey should be wary of possible consequences. To illustrate with one recent 
example, this was seen most clearly when Romania introduced the visa requirement 
concerning Turkish citizens in the framework of internalizing the EU acquis. In this 
respect, Turkey expects Romania to implement the April 2004 visa agreement in a 
way that would not prejudice Turkey’s economic and humanitarian contacts in the 
country. To conclude, Turkey would also welcome a stance with respect to the 
Cyprus issue which would reflect a supportive attitude regarding the isolation of the 
TRNC. 
 
 
 
4.10. AN EVALUATION OF TURKEY’S POLICIES TOWARDS THE 
BALKANS 
 
It can be argued that a number of factors have played important roles in the 
formulation and implementation of Turkey’s Balkan policies, which can be 
summarized as follows: (i)minority issues and Turkey’s Balkan legacy, (ii)instability 
and conflicts in the region, (iii)the geostrategic importance of the Balkans for 
Turkey, (iv)the commonly observed misinterpretations of Western politicians of the 
realities of the region, especially in crises, and (v) the need to incorporate the Balkan 
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states into Euro – Atlantic structures. In general, Cognizant of the possibility of   
population influx to Turkey particularly at times of crises, Ankara’s Balkan policy in 
respect of the minority question is based on preserving the acquired rights and status 
of Turkish minorities in the region as well as promoting their integration into 
political and economic life in the countries they live in, and hence the importance of 
averting instability and conflicts in the region arises. Furthermore, the region is of 
geostrategic importance for Ankara due to the increased importance to handle 
relations with abundant number of states after the regime changes in the region and 
the wars in former Yugoslavia. With a view to establishing and bolstering ties, 
Ankara, in the first place, tried to put the relations on track with the dissolution of 
Yugoslavia and to normalize its relations with the newly emerged states. In this 
regard, it also paid due attention by opting for multilateral initiatives, bilateral 
contacts, as well as regional cooperation platforms. On the other hand, Ankara’s 
policies towards the region also have to do with its cognizance of the region. Due to 
its historical legacy and geographical and cultural proximity to the Balkans, Turkey 
has always had pre-cognizance of the region which the Western states lacked. his 
very cognizance has in due course enabled Turkey formulate policies which were 
more well-worked than those of its Western counterparts, one example of which was 
the Ankara’s proposed Action Plan as early as in August 1992 submitted to the UN 
Security Council. The final NATO policy through the end of the war in 1995 was 
this Turkish Action Plan in essence. Finally, Ankara also acknowledges the 
importance of assisting the regional states in their efforts of integration into Euro – 
Atlantic structures. It self being a NATO member, Turkey can make significant 
contributions in this regard. In such a framework, Ankara has been influential in 
establishment of security and stability which came forth as a vital issue after the war 
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in Bosnia. Its policies were also based preventing any regional state to become a 
hegemonic power in the Balkans. Moreover, it refused any rhetoric that suggested 
Ankara was a part of the Muslim – Christian polarization by trying to play a 
constructive role between the West and Islamic countries. As such, Ankara was 
influential in the efforts of providing security and stability in the region in the 
political venue after the Cold War.451 
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CHAPTER V 
 
TURKEY’S ECONOMIC RELATIONS WITH THE BALKAN 
STATES IN THE POST-COLD WAR ERA 
 
 
Stability in the Balkans poses utmost importance for Turkey as any possible conflict 
in the region has high potential to constitute direct threats for Turkey’s overall 
economic relations with the region. Therefore, the need to bring regional economic 
ties to desired levels arises. The activities in the economic venue are one of the tools 
that could serve to bolster political, cultural, and social relations. However, relevant 
data is indicative of the observation that in spite of Turkey’s continuous efforts, 
bilateral economic relations with the region still remain below desired levels.1 
Nevertheless, on the whole, Turkish private sector invested and participated in 
privatization projects in the region since 1990s. Further, Turkey provided credit to 
Balkan states in pursuit of contributing to the establishment of stability after 
handicapped relations with the region during the Cold War period. However, Turkey 
provided aid as much as its own economic standing allowed. The region ranked after 
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other regions such as Central Asia with respect to the aid provided.2 In this 
framework, this chapter shall argue that treating economic relations hierarchically, 
below political and military relations, is not likely to yield bolstered economic 
outcomes for Turkey’s part since it should be acknowledged that increased economic 
activities with the region are nascent but they are likely to function as facilitators of 
increased political and military relations. 
 
 
5.1. ECONOMIC RELATIONS BETWEEN TURKEY AND BOSNIA - 
HERZEGOVINA 
 
Turkey’s trade and economic relations with Bosnia – Herzegovina was put into a 
legal framework with the 1995 Agreement on Trade and Economic Cooperation, the 
1998 Agreement on Mutual Promotion and Protection of Investment and the 2003 
Agreement on the Prevention of Double Taxation. The two states signed a Free 
Trade Agreement in 2002 which was put into effect in 2003.3 There are around 250 
Turkish companies in Bosnia – Herzegovina, fifty of which are active. The overall 
investment of these Turkish companies, which include Altın Company, Kent Elit, 
Efes Pilsen, Zorlu Holding and Nobel, is 40 million Euros. Ziraat Bank opened a 
branch in Sarajevo in 1997 and two branches in Tuzla and Zenica in 2004. Other 
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branches include Mostar, Bihaç, Ilıca, Strossmayerova, Ferhadija, Pehlivanusa and 
Butmir.4 Turkish construction companies doing business in Bosnia – Herzegovina 
are ENKA, NUROL Holding, Tefken, Borova, ER-BU (which completed the 
reconstruction of the Mostar Bridge) and Şa-Ra Energy. There are eight Bosnian 
companies in Turkey with a total capital of 6.2 thousand YTL.  
 Turkish – Bosnian Business Council was established during former Prime 
Minister Tansu Çiller’s visit to Bosnia – Herzegovina in 1995. The Council has been 
instrumental in the development and enhancement of bilateral economic relations. 
Viewed in general terms, Turkey’s trade with Bosnia – Herzegovina is yet to reach 
satisfactory levels and present remarkable figures. The Turkish companies do not 
take place in privatization and large-scale projects, which paves the way for 
Slovenian and Croatian companies to move ahead although there are facilities that 
might draw the attention of Turkish companies concerning energy, transportation, 
and forestry.5 When the general framework in which trade between Bosnia – 
Herzegovina and Turkey takes place is taken into consideration, it is observed that 
Turkey had been applying a unilateral adjustment trade regime vis-a-vis Bosnia – 
Herzegovina since 30 June 1999 with a view to preventing trade movements which 
may stem from preferred trade regimes applied to Bosnia – Herzegovina by third 
parties. In this connection, industrial items from Bosnia – Herzegovina were 
imported to Turkey exempt from customs duty and quota. Other products were 
subject to tariffs. With the Free Trade Agreement which was put into effect in 2003, 
Turkey will lift all customs duties on all types of industrial and agricultural products 
vis-a-vis Bosnia – Herzegovina. The Free Trade Agreement also envisages Bosnia – 
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Herzegovina to gradually lift all customs duties and other duties of equal effect with 
respect to all products by 2007. In the recent years, Turkey’s trade with Bosnia – 
Herzegovina indicated an increase.6 However, there are a number of deficiencies in 
bilateral economic relations. First and foremost, in the immediate aftermath of the 
war, due partly to the low purchasing power of the population, mostly low quality 
and cheap products entered Bosnia – Herzegovina market, which created a negative 
image of Turkish products. Furthermore, the fact that there is no singlehandedly 
governed customs and no single trade area causes reluctance on the part of Turkish 
businessmen to do business. This is only exacerbated by complicated bureaucracy 
which is open to abuse. The second notable deficiency is associated with the fact that 
Bosnian banks do not have credibility in Turkey creating a weak banking system 
image; a handicap for all economic activities in the country. Therefore, Turkish 
businessmen prefer to do business with the countries offering more elastic and 
appealing opportunities. Third, speaking the same language and having shared a 
common history, the neighboring countries, Croatia, Slovenia, and Serbia are more 
advantageous compared to Turkey. Moreover, the Croats in Bosnia – Herzegovina 
prefer to do business with Croatia and the Serbs in Bosnia – Herzegovina, with 
Serbia. Given the fact that the customs system is open to abuse and that native 
importers tend to do off-the-record trade, it would be acknowledged that small-scale 
Turkish companies, which do not recognize the market well, should cooperate with 
accredited companies which have distribution opportunities in Bosnia – 
Herzegovina.  
 It can be argued that Turkey can increase its export capacity through trade in 
food industry, automotive industry, wood processing and construction. Turkish fresh 
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fruit and vegetables can compete in quality and are advantageous due to similar food 
and taste culture. In addition, it is known that since Bosnia – Herzegovina is not a 
producer in automotive industry, import of automobiles of at most seven-years-old is 
allowed. Therefore, most of the automobiles are second hand and pose a need for 
spare parts in remarkable quantities. Seventy five % of the passenger cars are 
Volkswagen and the rest is made up of mostly Opel and Skoda. Turkey has the 
opportunities to compete in this field however the spare part business is under the 
control of Croatian businessmen. The related items enter the country mostly through 
illegal ways. Turkey can establish large-scale depots and offer payment in 
installments by way of which the products can reach large number of consumers. 
Moreover, Bosnian businessmen are willing to establish their own business facilities 
which were destroyed during the war. They also demand investment items such as 
machinery for wood processing and construction sectors. It is possible for Turkish 
companies to take part in the renovation of these machineries.7  
Turkish business circles have entered a new entrepreneurial process in 2006 
with the signing of the Joint Action Plan by the Turkish Union of Chambers and 
Stock Exchanges and Bosnian Foreign Trade Chamber in April 2006. The plan 
envisages training Bosnian personnel within the framework of Chamber 
Development Program. Another project of note concerns entrepreneurship training to 
be given to Bosnian businessmen in collaboration with Turkish Business World 
Development Agency. The third project which is also under way concerns 
introduction of Turkish economy, business and investment to the members of the 
Bosnian financial press.  
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Despite Turkey’s overall entrepreneurship activities abroad, those in Bosnia – 
Herzegovina are at low levels, an example of which is the $ 143 million bilateral 
trade volume in 2005. Given the strategic central position of Bosnia – Herzegovina 
in the heart of Europe, Turkish business circles have recently acknowledged that 
Bosnia – Herzegovina can offer Turkey advantages and in return receive more 
Turkish investment. The $ 20 million worth renovation work regarding hospitals, 
buildings and bridges can be enhanced. Finally, Turkey has a firm stance to support 
the observer membership of Bosnia – Herzegovina in the World Trade Organization 
(WTO) to become permanent as well as the country’s EU bid.8 Following this visit 
by the Turkish Union of Chambers and Stock Exchanges and the signing of the Joint 
Action Plan, the Serbian government announced that a group of 300 businessmen 
under the leadership of the Minister of Economy would visit Republika Srpska. 
Dragan Cavic, president of Republika Srpska, stated that a parallel agreement would 
be concluded between Serbia and Republika Srpska.9 It is necessary for Turkey to 
acknowledge the fact that just as Republika Srpska turns its face to Serbia and just as 
the Croats living in Bosnian - Croat Federation look to Croatia on economic as well 
as political matters, Bosnia – Herzegovia sees Turkey in a similar way. While the 
Croats and the Serbs in Bosnian – Croat Federation and Republika Srpska have close 
relations with their kin countries, Turkey’s economic relations with Bosnia – 
Herzegovina present a weak picture. It would be erroneous to assert that the weak 
ties could be strengthened by the Bosnians alone. On the part of the Bosnians, the 
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primary objective is to preserve the territorial integrity of Bosnia – Herzegovina.10 It 
is high time for Turkey to put aside the the view that has come to label Bosnia – 
Herzegovina as a war-torn country in official statements and do more, especially in 
the economic venue. It has taken a step toward that direction by the April 2006 visit. 
The rest will depend on to what extent Bosnia – Herzegovina and, more importantly, 
Turkey will be successful at operationalizing their economic forces. 
 
 
5.2 .ECONOMIC RELATIONS BETWEEN TURKEY AND SERBIA11 
 
Turkey had sound economic relations with Yugoslavia even on the eve of the 
Bosnian war. Indeed, the criticism that Turkey did not take active stance in the initial 
phases of the Bosnian war harbored this economic fact in it. Turkey had good 
economic relations with Yugoslavia as the country was situated on Turkey’s trade 
routes to the West. Economic cooperation between the two states was still on track 
shortly before the war in 1990 when State Minister Cemil Çiçek went to Belgrade to 
attend a relevant meeting.12 The bilateral economic cooperation at the time was 
advanced so much so that it included possibilities concerning joint investment to sell 
products to third parties.13 However, economic relations were heralded with the 
coming of the war. Some of the agreements signed between the two states were 
Agreement on the Prevention of Double Taxation (2003), Agreement on Mutual 
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Assistance between Customs Administrations (2003), Agreement on Scientific and 
Technical Cooperation (2003) and Agreement on Cooperation in Tourism (2004).14 
 Following the resumption of trade activities in 1996 with the lifting of the 
U.N. embargo on Yugoslavia, the Kosovo crisis came to fore as a second episode in 
the recession of trade relations. Although there is no such crisis or violence to cause 
an impediment, current bilateral economic relations still do not reflect satisfactory 
levels. For instance, Turkish exports to Serbia were $ 256 million while Serbian 
imports were $ 96 million in 2005. The main trade items between Turkey and Serbia 
are iron-steel products, machinery, rubber and products, copper, automotive and 
components, cotton, fresh fruit and vegetables, and carpets. Upon growing demand 
by Turkish companies doing business with Serbia, Serbia was included in the 
Eximbank Short-Term Import Credit Insurance Program. Moreover, Turkish 
companies have participated in the Belgrade International Construction Fair from 
2002 onwards. The number of companies of Serbian origin is 22, which makes up 
one per thousand in the overall foreign capital in Turkey. To give few examples of 
Turkish investment, Efes Pilsen bought Pancevo brewery for 6 million Euros in 2003 
and Zajecar brewery for 12 million Euros in 2004. Uzel Makine opened a liason 
office to coordinate the disposal of tractors and agricultural equipments. Gintaş 
concluded an agreement with the Montenegrin government to build a trade center in 
Podgorica worth $ 30 million.15 
 The representatives of the economic venue, both from the business world and 
state institutions, have come to acknowledge that they are important and sound 
economic partners and that the two states should speed up the promotion of 
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economic cooperation in various bilateral meetings, particularly between 2000 – 
2005. The unsatisfactory range of bilateral trade volume was spelled out by Serbia – 
Montenegro International Economic Relations Minister Branko Lukovac during the 
meeting held in the Serbian Chamber of Commerce in Belgrade. Faruk Cengiç, the 
representative of the Turkish part of the Business Council of Serbia (and 
Montenegro) and Turkey, conveyed the same message by stating that the existing 
trade volume did not reflect real possibilities of economic cooperation.16 Despite the 
improving trend in economic relations, the firms labelled as phantom seem to 
constitute a substantial problem by way of dodging taxes and trading outside the 
legal financial flow framework. Serbia has 157 such firms with non-existent 
addresses and unknown owners according to the Serbian tax administration and 
customs administration, 50 % of which are registered in Belgrade. The reason why 
this comes to fore as a concern for Turkey is because they allegedly import goods 
mostly from Turkey as well as from China. Therefore, it would not be wrong to 
argue that the significant problem of off-the-recod trade still awaits solution.17 
Another problem is the means considered by the Serbian autorities as part of the 
measures to reduce the deficit in foreign trade. In order to reduce the deficit in 
foreign trade, the export incentives and the measures that the government had taken 
to legalize a portion of hard currency revenue of Serbian construction firms, led to a 
narrowing tendency in the trade deficit through the end of 2005. However, the 
measure that is of concern for Turkey are the restrictions regarding non-tariff 
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protection measures applied on textiles from Turkey, which may create problems for 
Turkey in the upcoming years.18 
By and large, Serbia’s credit rating floated around the ratings of Turkey, 
Brazil, Ukraine, and Indonesia until 2006. The Fitch international ratings agency 
assigned the (BB-) credit rating to Serbia, which is one degree better than the one 
assigned by the Standard and Poor’s in 2004.19 It is known that Turkey is interested 
in taking part in the building of infrastructure in Serbia in this improvement period 
which was most recently been demonstrated by one of the eminent Turkish 
businessmen, Şarık Tara.20 Turkish companies have shown interest in the 
privatization of large-scale textile companies in Serbia. Serbia’s state-owned capital 
in the entire textile sector was planned to be sold by the end of 2006. The attendence 
by Turkish companies in the Textiles Fair and Leather and Footwear Fair in Belgrade 
in October 2006 made up half of the participating 45 states. 21 However, fields of 
cooperation are to be developed given the fact that export possibilities of Serbia are 
appealing for Turkey’s import possibilities. In addition to textiles, they include white 
goods, automotive and components, electronical items, and chemical products. 
Regarding the latter, it is known that there are large medicine factories in Serbia. 
Future projects can be launched for medicine production for Turkey in Serbia, which 
                                                 
18
 “Growing Demand For Domestic Goods”, 
http://www.srbija.sr.gov.yu/vesti/vest.php?id=8741&g=serbia+turkey  
19
 “Serbia Receives Another Improved International Credit Rating”, 
http://www.srbija.sr.gov.yu/vesti/vest-php?id=12259&q=serbia+turkey; and “Foreign Investtors 
Recognize Advantages of Investing in Serbia”, http://www.srbija.sr.gov.yu/vesti/vest-
php?pf=1&id=12513&q=serbia+turkey  
20
 “Improving Economic Cooperation of Serbia – Montenegro and Turkey” 
http://www.srbija.sr.gov.yu/vesti.php?id=9122&q=serbia+turkey  
21
 “Textile Companies to be Privatized”, Beta News (BE92), 13 October 2006, 
http://www.b92.net/eng.news/economy-article.php?nav-id=37308&fs=version=print  
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would decrease costs. Finally, the hotels privatized in Montenegro may offer 
significant opportunities for Turkish tourism companies, if they are explored duly. 22 
 
 
5.3. ECONOMIC RELATIONS BETWEEN TURKEY AND CROATIA 
 
As the other countries originating from former Yugoslavia such as Bosnia – 
Herzegovina and Serbia went through a period of delay in their economic transition 
due to the experience of war, Croatia also had to overcome a hard economic 
transition. Although Slovenia and Croatia were better-off among the other former 
Yugoslav Federal republics in economic terms, Croatia’s transition proved to be 
more painstaking as it had to fight a three-year war unlike Slovenia which fought a 
brief 10-day war of independence that did not bring any major destruction. As a 
country that posed somewhat a stronger economic portrait along with Slovenia when 
compared to Bosnia – Herzegovina and Serbia, Croatia’s economic transition can be 
seen through four different stages from the political perspective. The first stage 
began with the war of independence. This stage started with the split of the Yugoslav 
Communist Party in early 1990. Following the unilateral isolation of Croatian 
economy from the larger Yugoslav economy, the ethnic tension augmented until the 
summer of 1991 when armed conflict began. In this period, Serbia and Montenegro 
imposed unilateral sanctions on trade with Croatia and Slovenia. The second stage 
began after the UN supported armistice in 1992. This stage is characterized by the 
occupation of one third of the country, which would last until 1995 when most of the 
occupied regions were liberated. In the course of the second stage, the stabilization 
                                                 
22
 “Sırbistan – Karadağ Ülke Bülteni”, May 2006, 
http://www.deik.org.tr/bultenler/200662810157Bul06may.pdf 
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program which set the foundations for economic transition took place in 1993. 
Through this program, inflation was curbed from 1250 % in 1993 to 3 % deflation in 
1994. The third stage reflected an unofficial political as well as economic isolation of 
Croatia due to the tension between the international community and Croatian 
nationalist-oriented government. During the third stage, a banking crisis took place in 
1998 and was followed by a recession in 1999. In the last phase of the transition, a 
new central-left coalition government led by reformed communists came to power in 
2000, after which the international isolation would come to an end. During this stage, 
Croatia became a member of the WTO in 2000 and signed the Stabilization and 
Association Agreement (SAA) with the EU in late 2001. The substantial economic 
challenges in the last stage were traced in the area of ficsal policy as public 
expenditures were unsustainable. Furthermore, as there are strong interest groups 
who would be worse-off if reforms take place, necessary expenditure cuts are not 
favored.23 
 Turkey’s economic relations with Croatia in the post-Cold War era are based 
on a number of agreements all of which were signed after 1993: Agreement on 
Maritime Transport (1994), Agreement on Trade and Economic Cooperation (1996), 
Agreement on Mutual Promotion and Protection of Investments (1996), Agreement 
on Military Training, Technical and Scientific Cooperation (1996), Agreement on 
Cooperation in Tourism (1996), TĐKA Cooperation Protocol (1996), Agreement on 
Education and Culture (1996), Agreement on Prevention of Double taxation (1997), 
Agreement on International Land Transportation (1994), Agreement on 
                                                 
23
 These groups include pensioners and well-organized war veterans. For a comprehensive account of 
Croatia’s post–1990 economic transition, see Boris Vujcic and Maroje Lang “GDN Project Country 
Study – Croatia”, Riga Workshop, 19 June 2002. The total damage in Croatia amounted to $ 25 billion 
along with the plummeting off-industrial output and earnings from tourism. With the introduction of a 
comprehensive economic stabilization program in 1993, Croatia received positive evaluation by the 
world’s financial institutions as IMF, World Bank, EBRD, Union Bank of Switzerland, Dresdner 
Bank, and Standard and Poor’s. 
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Standardization (1998), Agreement on Customs (1999) and Free Trade Agreement 
(2002). Turkey and Croatia founded a Joint Commission for Economic Cooperation, 
the First Session of which was scheduled for 1997. Croatia’s offering plans included 
energy equipment and civil engineering services in joint ventures in Turkey, Croatia 
and third countries, cooperation of oil companies in joint research for crude oil in 
Turkey and Central Asia, cooperation in building oil pipelines, gas pipelines, 
underground gas storage, and tankers for oil and gas delivery and also cooperation in 
agriculture and health services.24 In 2005, the trade volume between Croatia and 
Turkey amounted to $ 251 million with a $ 167 million export and $ 84 million 
import. Major items in bilateral trade include mineral fuels, iron-steel products, 
machinery, apparel and clothing accessories, edible fruits, etc. Furthermore, the two 
states signed a memorandum of understanding regarding the provision of a $ 100 
million credit. However, the credit has not been rendered operational yet. Investment 
and cooperation areas include mainly civil engineering. The Croatian companies are 
known to have the capacity to undertake highway construction projects. However, 
they do not have adequate financial resources. In this respect, it could be important to 
take into consideration the framework agreement concluded in 2005 by Turkish 
Eximbank and Croatian Reconstruction and Development Bank. It is considered that 
Turkish companies could be interested in the construction of hotels along the 
Adriatic shores. With respect to naval construction, in the Joint Commission’s First 
Period Protocol, it was decided that the two states would exchange information 
concerning shipyards, relevant organizations and companies with a view to exploring 
opportunities regarding ship building, maintenance and repair. However, this sector 
still awaits to see cooperation activities. Moreover, there is no regular cruising 
                                                 
24
 Ivica Tomic, Former Ambassador of Croatia to Turkey, “Exemplary Relations between Croatia and 
Turkey”, 30 May 1997, Turkish Daily News; and idem, “Continued Development of Excellent 
Relations between Croatia and Turkey” 27 May 1998, Turkish Daily News. 
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between Turkey and Croatia, except for rare transport by Turkish ships. The Rijeka 
Port is considered as a new route for transport to Europe as an alternative for Trieste 
Port recently. 
 As regards the activities of Turkish companies in Croatia, ENKA Holding, 
together with Bechtel, completed the Zagreb – Belgrad highway construction worth $ 
1 billion. Uzel Tourism opened the boutique hotel, “The Pucic Palace”, in Dubrovnik 
in 2002. Rixos Hotels made an investment in Libertas Hotel in the same city. The 
construction of the hotel is proceeding rapidly. The Croatian companies have 
attended Đzmir International Fair since 1996. Turkey attended the Zagreb Fair for the 
first time in 1999 with 22 companies. Turkish companies also participated in the 
International Fashion Fair in Zagreb in 2003. As in other former Yugoslav republics, 
the problems in bilateral economic relations include financing problems, inadequate 
transportation facilities and bureaucratic problems. Turkish companies mostly 
complain about the difficulties encountered whilst receiving required national 
certificates in the provision of infrastructure and construction project equipments.25 
Perhaps more significant is the transportation problem which may be eliminated by 
the introduction of the Balkans Cargo Super Corridor. The new Transportation 
Project named as such by Damir Perincic, the Consul General of Croatia to Đstanbul, 
is likely to allow both states to use their geopolitical positions to the highest extent 
possible.  
 As Turkey is inclined to facilitate its exportation to the EU member states, 
transportation companies from Turkey could go directly to Croatia and then to the 
EU members. Conversely, as for the exportation from the EU to Turkey, this could 
                                                 
25
 For more information, see “Türkiye – Hırvatistan Ticari ve Ekonomik Đlişkileri”, on 
http://www.deik.org.tr/ikili/200412212234Hirvatistan-ikili-kasim2004.pdf  
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become much easier via Croatia. If carried out with fair prices and duly, a 
nonnegligable business flow can be created.26 
 
 
5.4. ECONOMIC RELATIONS BETWEEN TURKEY AND MACEDONIA 
 
As a state that had just declared its independence in September 1991, Macedonia had 
to face an amalgam of economic deficiencies which were coupled with political and 
military weakness. It could not receive aid and credit as it was not officially 
recognized. Its trade with Bosnia – Herzegovina was cut off while Greece added to 
the picture by occasionally closing the Thessaloniki Port to Macedonia, thus 
blocking oil transfer to the country. Therefore, Turkey’s provision of oil and 
humanitarian aid in this period proved vital for Macedonia.27 Former Foreign 
Minister Hikmet Çetin’s visit to Macedonia in late 1993 was substantial in bringing 
into life certain projects such as the East-West Motorway passing through Albania, 
Macedonia, Bulgaria, and Turkey.28 Following this visit, a number of agreements 
were signed between the two states: Agreement on Trade and Economic Cooperation 
(1995), Agreement on the Prevention of Double Taxation (1995), Agreement on 
Mutual Promotion and Protection of Investments (1995), Agreement on Mutual 
Promotion and Protection of Investments (1995), Free Trade Agreement (1999) and 
Memorandum of Understanding (2003). 
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 Can Karpat, “Croatia Still Aspires To Join The EU”, 29 September 2005, 
http://www.axisglobe.com/print-article.asp?article=398 as retrieved on 28 October 2006, 02:47:47 
GMT. 
27
 Şule Kut, “Yugoslav Bunalımı ve Türkiye’nin Bosna – Hersek ve Makedonya Politikası: 1990-
1993”, in Faruk Sönmezoğlu (ed.) Türk Dış Politikasının Analizi (Đstanbul: DER, 1998), p. 337; and 
Mehmet Turna, “Makedonya – Türk Đlişkileri ve Makedonya’nın Geleceğine Bakış”, Avrasya 
Dosyası, 1996, 3(3), pp. 75–76. 
28
 Şule Kut, “Yugoslav Bunalımı ve Türkiye’nin Bosna – Hersek ve Makedonya Politikası: 1990–
1993”, p. 338. 
 215 
  
  
 
 In 1998, President Demirel signed an agreement on agriculture to ensure the 
inclusion of Turkey in the Vardar Valley Project which is perceived as the equivalent 
of GAP (Güneydoğu Anadolu Projesi/Southeast Anatolian Project) in Macedonia. 
This project envisages development and reconstruction along the 200 km long 
Vardar River line including Kumanova, Skopje, Titov, Veles, and Georgia as well as 
building dams, power plants, and railways. The Macedonian officials asked the GAP 
administrators in Turkey to carry out the feasibility works of the project.29 With the 
dams and irrigation facilities, the country is likely to become an important exporter 
of food, textiles and energy. Turkish companies are interested in the project which is 
supposed to include 16 hydroelectric power plants and investments for irrigation, 
motorway, railway and tourism, worth $ 3 million.30 
 Although Turkish Eximbank is ready to assess credit proposals based on state 
guarantee or a respectable bank, it has not offered Macedonia any credit to date. Any 
possible credit would be important for the reconstruction of the airport, mass 
housing, energy construction and motorways. Bilateral trade volume between the two 
states reached $ 213 million with an export of $ 162 million and an import of $ 51 
million in 2004. Main export items include cotton, fresh fruits, machinery, rubber, 
carpets, iron-steel products, furniture, and wood products. Import items include iron-
steel, food, cotton, electrical equipment, railway components, zinc and related 
products, salt, cement, sulfur, glassware, and woven items. As regards direct 
investment in Macedonia, the number of Turkish businessmen in Macedonia 
outweighs their Macedonian counterparts in Turkey. There are 200 companies 
registered in Macedonia while the official figure provided by the Turkish Embassy in 
                                                 
29
 “Türkiye – Makedonya Đşbirliği Đle Vardar Vadisi Projesi”, on 
http://www.gap.gov.tr/Turkish/Dergi/D7121999/vardar.html; and Makedonya Dışişleri Bakanı 
Mitreva TOBB’u Ziyaret Etti”, 21 July 2005, on 
http://www.tobb.org.tr/haberler/MAKEDONYA%20ZĐYARETĐ.pdf  
30
 Taha Akyol, “Makedonya Notları”, 30 October 1998, Milliyet. 
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Skopje is approximately 40. A branch of Ziraat Bank opened in Skopje in 1998 with 
an investment of approximately $ 10.4 million. Netaş established 10 rural telephone 
switchboards and sold a thousand pay phones. Turkish companies are also interested 
in the privatization process. Brick producer Dolomite Vardar was bought by 
Haznedar Refrakter. Other Turkish investments include accumulator factory in 
Probistip, sunflower oil production in Ustunca, brewery in Manastır and agricultural 
complex in Dubrova. Koç Holding opened Ramstore in Skopje in June 2005 with an 
investment of $ 30 million. Total Turkish investment reached $ 50 million with the 
investments of Ramstore, Haznedar Tuğla and Universal Hospital Group in 2004 and 
is estimated to reach $ 100 million with the completion of ongoing investments.31 
 Although there are no political problems between Turkey and Macedonia, 
there are problems awaiting solution in the economic venue. The Turkish companies 
often face difficulties stemming from inadequate highway infrastructure. The 
bureaucratic problems encountered at the Bulgarian and Macedonian border gates are 
no less substantial. In this respect, the construction of the highway corridor to pass 
through Albania, Macedonia, Bulgaria, and Turkey is of utmost importance for the 
activities of the Turkish companies to gain momentum. Furthermore, inadequate 
links between the banks of the two countries lead to inefficieny in transactions. The 
main problem in the banking sector originates from the fact that in accordance with 
the banking legislation in Macedonia, letters of credit of the exported goods from 
Turkey are discharged only after the customs procedures at the Macedonian border 
concerning a certain commodity are completed. The release of the letters of credit is 
delayed due to the delay in customs procedures, causing a slowdown in overall trade 
activities. Owing to the moderate market size of Macedonia, mostly small- and 
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 http://www.deik.org/bultenler/2006628101840MakedonyaHaziran2006.pdf; and “New Ramstore 
Opens In Macedonia” 13 June 2005, Turkish Daily News. 
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medium-size Turkish companies have shown interest to do business in Macedonia.32 
Indeed, this was voiced as a concern by Turkey on the eve of Macedonian Prime 
Minister Vlado Bukovski’s visit to Ankara in March 2005, which was aimed at 
building stronger commercial ties after the opening of Ramstore in Skopje by Koç 
Holding. The Macedonians await for Turkish investment, yet large Turkish 
companies complain about the lack of confidence to help these companies believe 
there is safe background to do business in Macedonia and look to Macedonian 
officials to offer a political framework and to eliminate concerns regarding bribery.33 
In this connection, the two states signed an economic cooperation agreement 
concerning banking, standardization, energy, tourism, health, and environmental 
protection in April 2005.34  
 The new government established in 2004 in Macedonia is said to take efforts 
to create a secure business environment, including efforts to combat bribery. The 
country also has programs to establish free trade and industry zones. Given that 
Greece is the country that leads the head in terms of foreign investment in 
Macedonia, it would be Turkey’s advantage to seek to enhance economic ties with 
Macedonia, not only with small- and medium-scale companies but also the large 
ones which would make a substantial difference in improving bilateral relations. The 
opening of Ramstore by Koç sets a telling example in that respect and there are 
enough resources on the part of Turkish business world to follow suit. 
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 http://www.deik.org/bultenler/2006628101840MakedonyaHaziran2006.pdf  
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 Ferai Tınç and Tufan Türenç, “Size Minnettarız”, 15 March 2005, Hürriyet. 
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 “Makedonya ile Türkiye Ekonomik Đşbirliği Anlaşması Đmzaladılar”, 
http://www.setimes.com/cocoon/setimes/xhtml/tr/features/setimes/newsbriefs/2005/04/28/nb-04 as 
retrieved on 28 October 2006, 02:49:26 GMT; “Devlet Bakanı Güldal Akşit Makedonya Temaslarını 
Tamamladı”, 28 April 2005, 
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5.5. ECONOMIC RELATIONS BETWEEN TURKEY AND ALBANIA 
 
Turkey’s bilateral economic relations with Albania began with the Agreement on 
Trade and the Agreement on Economic, Commercial, Industrial and Technical 
Cooperation through the end of the Cold War, as late as 1988, since the country was 
isolated politically and economically for a long time during the years of Cold War 
under Enver Hoxha’s regime. The legal framework of economic relations between 
Albania and Turkey in the post-Cold War era was based on the Agreement on 
Mutual Promotion and Protection of Investments (1996) and the Agreement for the 
Prevention of Double Taxation (1998). The first round of talks concerning Free 
Trade Agreement was held in 2003. The continuation of talks is scheduled to take 
place after the finalization of Stability and Partnership Agreement going on between 
the EU and Albania. Turkey’s exports to Albania were $ 160 million in 2004 while 
its imports were $ 15.528 million. Main items in Turkish exports include iron – steel, 
aluminum, cereal, flour, electrical items, salt, sulfur, cement, rubber, cacao, and iron 
– steel products while its imports include the same items.35  
                                                 
35
 “Türkiye – Arnavutluk Ticari ve Ekonomik Đlişkileri” 
http://www.deik.org.tr/bultenler/2005627175124Arnavutluk_Subat2005.pdf. Albania went through a 
50-year period of isolation and political pressure which created a closed economy. Following this 
period, Albania embarked into a new era in which it would try to align its policies with the EU and the 
U.S.A. in every venue. While the new policies of Albania aimed at building multilateral relations in 
foreign policy, they were also intended to protect and develop the political and national rights of the 
Albanians spread across the region. Economy also had its share from the said transformation. Serious 
reforms were introduced, privatization programs were launched, and the overall single-handedly run 
economy was replaced with free trade. Throughout 1990s, the economic reforms in Albania were 
viewed as a model by the Balkan states. With the support of the IMF and the World Bank, the Berisha 
government took giant steps in privatization and banking which brought about considerable growth. 
Nevertheless, except for the increase in agricultural productivity after privatization, the remaining 
reforms proved superficial. The finance sector could not develop as desired. The increase in the cost 
of daily needs, the resources obtained through workers abroad, smuggling, money laundering, and 
benefits derived from moneylenders only added to the unpleasant picture, which was to be followed 
by the crisis in 1997. After this crisis, the new government introduced a new stability and reform 
package with international support in the framework of which it was granted credits in 1998 and 1999. 
However, macroeconomic stability cannot be achieved due to extreme poverty in the country. It is 
also worth noting that many people sold their houses to benefit from high interest rates, creating a 
problem of housing. A new project was also implemented to combat unemployment. In 2000, the EU 
signed a Preferential Trade Agreement with the western Balkan states which included Albania. The 
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 In accordance with Law no. 7638 adopted in 1992, foreign companies in 
Albania were granted the rights given to Albanian companies, in the scope of which 
they can rent facilities and properties for 99 years. Yet, Turkey’s bilateral economic 
relations with Albania remain limited on trade mainly. Trade with Albania is mainly 
composed of Turkish exports. In the end of 2005, Turkish firms in Albania have 
made $ 35 million investment. Among the investments of Turkish businessmen are 
shoe factory, many shops, restaurants, and dental clinics. Kürüm Iron – Steel Joint 
Stock Company rent the iron – steel enterprises in Elbasan Valley for a 20-year 
period and started production. The company also explores possibilities to build a 
shipyard in Durres Port. In the mining sector, Ber-Öner has received the right to 
explore and operate mine reserves in copper-dense regions in Albania. Everest has 
made an investment of $ 2 million for polyethylene packing production. Apart from 
these investments, there are two main sectors of Turkish investment; construction 
and banking. The companies operating in the construction sector are Tepe 
Construction Joint Stock Company, Be-Ha-Şe, Enka, Tümaş Joint Stock Company, 
GĐNTAŞ, Mak-Yol, MNG, which have undertaken projects on highway construction, 
building restoration, military facility construction, and mass housing. As for banking, 
a Ziraat Bank branch was planned to open in Tirana with an investment of $ 3 
million. However, the project had to be suspended due to the crisis in 1997 and the 
political instability it brought. Kentbank bought shares of the privatized Albanian 
National Commercial Bank in 2000. The Albanian Central Bank and BDDK 
concluded the Bilateral Cooperation Agreement with a view to reaching accurate 
information regarding the transaction of the banks and finance institutions in their 
country, to build an institutional framework which would facilitate cooperation in 
                                                                                                                                          
country became a member of the WTO in the same year. See “Arnavutluk’ta Ekonomik Gelişmeler” 
http://www.gebzegazetesi.com/iskahraman/?i=detay&id32 as retrieved on 24 November 2006, 
06:32:08 GMT. 
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cross-border supervision, and to share institutional experience and technological 
training. Other possibilities of investment include telecommunication, medicine, 
energy, oil, natural gas, tobacco, tourism, mining, chemical industry, food 
processing, packaging, cement industry, insurance, and transportation.36  
 Nevertheless, continuation and improvement of such bilateral trade 
necessitate certain activities which need to be done more frequently. Both sides 
should acknowledge the importance of regular mutual visits by public and private 
sector representatives to be informed duly regarding the existing market potentials, 
standing laws, and regulations. The two states concur on the fact that relevant trade 
and industry chambers must be encouraged in order to be able to proceed with 
improved contacts. Equally importantly, the two sides endorse the importance of 
attending fairs and exhibitions more efficiently.  
Turkey and Albania cooperate also in the fields of standardization, customs, 
credits, and free trade. The sectors that the two states explore more possibilities are 
energy, industry, transportation, tourism, agriculture and communication, and postal 
services. Concerning energy, Turkey and Albania confirmed their consensus 
regarding the return of 83.9 kWh worth electrical energy, exported from Turkey to 
Albania for $ 3.2 million in 1990 via Greece and Bulgaria. The two states are also 
supportive of possible power plant constructions. The Albanians welcome the 
participation of Turkish companies in the reconstruction, rehabilitation and 
construction of small- and medium-size hydroelectric power plants. Second, the two 
states acknowledge the significance of increased cooperation in industry sector, 
particularly, copper, cromium, iron – steel, leather, textiles, and paper. The two states 
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 “Türkiye – Arnavutluk Ticari ve Ekonomik Đlişkileri” 
http://www.deik.org.tr/bultenler/2005627175124Arnavutluk_Subat2005.pdf; and “Türkiye – 
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have signed an Agreement on International Transportation in 2000. The Albanian 
officials have also submitted a draft agreement on air services to their Turkish 
counterparts. In order to improve transportation, they have reached a consensus to 
explore facilities concerning containers and ferries in the context of which mutual 
port authorities are planned to have contacts. Furthermore, the two states are willing 
to cooperate in agriculture and have determined the following areas as appropriate 
for cooperation in this field: technology transfer to Albania with a view to supporting 
Turkish investments and processing agricultural products; information exchange 
regarding laws on agriculture and food; and promotion of cooperation between 
scientific research institutes. As for communication and postal services, Turkey and 
Albania cooperate in the provision of telephone services in rural areas and to enhance 
cooperation to research the efficiency of Trans Balkan Line.37 
By and large, economic relations with Albania displayed an improving trend 
until 1997. After 1997, however, Albania turned its face more to Greece when the 
Socialist Party intensified relations with the country.38 Most recently, Albanian 
authorities decided to sell 76 % of Albanian state phone company Albtelecom Sh.A 
to the Turkish consortium made up of Türk Telekom and Çalık Enerji 
Telekomünikasyon A.Ş.39 As is the case with other Balkan states, there are certain 
problems in bilateral economic relations with Albania. To start with, letter of credit 
procedures are delayed due to lack of cash in local banks, problems in money 
transfer between cities, and the complications in the state-owned bank procedures. 
Second, Turkish companies expect the existing customs legislation to be amended as 
soon as possible. Third, Turkish companies which export goods by land 
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 Hasan Ünal, “Arnavutluk Đyice Yunanistan’a Kayıyor” 9 January 1998, Zaman. 
39
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transportation reach Albania only after four to ten days and thus lose price 
advantages, due to lack of infrastructure in Bulgaria, Macedonia, and Albania. 
Fourth, lack of electricity has negative impact upon foreign investors. Fifth, as a 
result of domestic turmoil after 1997, off-the-record import increased due to weak 
border controls. However, foreign companies are obliged to pay customs duties. This 
creates unjust competition and makes the marketing of Turkish products more 
difficult. Finally, the lack of any efforts to compensate for the loss of Turkish 
companies resulting from the domestic turmoil in 1997 is yet another factor that 
hinders improvement in economic cooperation.40 
 
 
5.6. ECONOMIC RELATIONS BETWEEN TURKEY AND KOSOVO 
 
As the poorest region due to past turmoils and ongoing uncertainty concerning status, 
Kosovo presents a slow-pace economy. Security concerns and unclear status until 
February 2008 heralded investment in the province. Inflation is low and the budget 
displayed a deficit for the first time in 2004. Kosovo also has external deficits. 
Unemployment, which fluctuates around 50%, is another major problem. Most 
economic development after 1999 was observed in trade, retail, and construction 
sectors. The private sector which emerged since 1999 is small-scale. Since there are 
small farms, limited capital stock and lack of technical expertise, agricultural 
productivity is low. Under the auspices of the Stability Pact, UNMIK signed a 
bilateral free trade agreement on behalf of Kosovo with Albania in 2003. In 2005, 
UNMIK Kosovo and Macedonia concluded a free trade agreement. UNMIK and 
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Bosnia – Herzegovina signed a free trade agreement in early 2006. In the same year, 
Kosovo joined enlarged Central European Free Trade Agreement. In the new 
enlarged Central European Free Trade Agreement (CEFTA) signed in December 
2006 at the Southeast European Summit of Prime Ministers in Bucharest, UNMIK 
and Kosovar officials participated in the signing on behalf of Kosovo. The parties 
who signed CEFTA are Albania, Bosnian – Herzegovina, Bulgaria, Croatia, 
Macedonia, Moldova, Montenegro, Romania and Serbia.41 
 As regards Turkey’s economic relations with Kosovo, it is known that Turkey 
signed the Agreement on Mutual Promotion and Protection of Investments in April 
2006. With the signing of a free trade agreement, the trade volume which was $ 73 
million in 2006 is expected to increase. This trade volume includes individual efforts 
of businessmen as well as shuttle trade. Kosovo meets 90% of its foodstuffs need 
from Turkey. In this respect, Turkey ranks third after Serbia and Macedonia in food 
import. Two large-scale investment companies in Kosovo are Kürüm Iron and Steel 
Company with an investment of 10 million Euros and Tepe Defense and Security 
Systems Inc. In addition, Özer Konveyor Bant opened the largest scotch tape factory 
in Kosovo in 2006. Frequent flights of Turkish Airlines, which are three or four 
times a week, facilitate trade activities which could be further improved if a Turkish 
bank is opened in Kosovo. There are also possibilities of cooperation in construction 
(particularly in highway construction and enlargement) infrastructure, mining, 
energy, and tourism. This cooperation can increase if Turkish companies make use of 
credits to be provided in the framework of European Bank for Reconstruction and 
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Development and European Investment Bank, and if they participate more in 
primarily mining and energy privatization bids. In general, cooperation between 
Kosovo Chamber of Commerce and Turkish Union of Chambers and Stock 
Exchanges continue, yet in limited circumstances.42 
 It would be acknowledged that if Kosovo’s status is not altered to the 
satisfaction of the groups living in the province, the existing and rather gloomy 
picture in economy is likely to prevail in the upcoming years. The experience gained 
in the economic venue in other regional states point out the importance of regional 
integration. Moreover, as Kosovo’s market is quite small, the investors tend to view 
it as an integral part of a larger trade area. This picture may be perceived more 
unfavorable taking into account the low higher education rates and Kosovo’s bad 
reputation regarding bribery. This means that even if the entrepreneurs achieve the 
possibility of financial markets in Kosovo, they will still need to be persuaded taking 
into account security concerns and the limited size of Kosovo’s market. Thinking 
positively, successful entrepreneurship stories will have to be publicized in order to 
attract more investment.43 
 Most recently, Bulgaria’s entrance in the EU heralded traffic between Turkey 
and Kosovo in Janury 2007. Kosovar economist Saffet Gırcaliu stated that Kosovo’s 
raw material and goods import were primarily from Turkey via Bulgaria, which was 
negatively effected when Bulgaria started implementing EU’s visa regimes.44 
Another development concerning trade came to fore when it was declared that 
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Turkey would initiate free trade accords with Kosovo in January 2007. 
Undersecretariat of Foreign Trade plans to initiate free trade agreement talks with 
Kosovo in the first half of 2007. The free trade agreement is expected to enable the 
countries to export or import goods without customs taxes.45 
 
 
5.7. ECONOMIC RELATIONS BETWEEN TURKEY AND BULGARIA 
 
Taking into account the decade of transition (1990 – 2000) in Bulgaria, it can be said 
that this period was a critical one in the development of foreign economic relations 
of the country. Viewed through the economic lens, the chronological account of 
foreign economic relations of Bulgaria, particularly with respect to trade balance, 
falls into four major periods: 
 
1) 1990 – 1991: a continuation of 1980s, decreasing surpluses, 
2) 1992 – 1994: moderate deficits, 
3) 1995 – 1997: moderate surpluses, 
4) 1998 – 2000: substantial and growing deficits.46   
 
The seeds of economic relations with Bulgaria after 1990 were sown when 
Turkish aid, products, and capital entered Bulgaria in 1990 and 1991. Subsequently, 
Bulgarian entrepreneurs learned economic entrepreneurship experiences from their 
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small-scaled Turkish counterparts, which increased economic contacts between 1992 
and 1993. In these years, Turkish – Bulgarian economic relations were weak due to 
off-the-record trade; the fact that Turkish products could not compete with those of 
the EU; and the Balkans were more important for Turkey in strategic terms than in 
the economic sense.47  
The legal framework of bilateral economic relations between Turkey and 
Bulgaria includes the following agreements: Agreement on Trade, Economic 
Industrial and Technical Cooperation (1994), Mutual Promotion and Protection of 
Investments (1994), Prevention of Double Taxation (1994), Agreement on Tourism 
Cooperation (1997), Free Trade Agreement (1998), Agreement on Cooperation in 
Energy and Infrastructure (1998), Bilateral Air Transportation Agreement (2004) and 
Sea Trade Transportation Agreement (2004). Turkish exports to Bulgaria were 
$1,176.7 million while its imports from Bulgaria were $1,186.2 million in 2005. 
Main export items include machinery, iron and steel, electrical machines, automotive 
and related industry, rubber, cotton, and woven items. Main import items include 
iron and steel, copper and copper products, fruits, zinc and zinc products, rubber, 
inorganic and organic chemicals, wood, lead and lead products, and machinery. 
According to the Foreign Investment Agency of Bulgaria, Turkey is the 17th country 
in the list of foreign investors with a total investment of $110 million in Bulgaria. 
This figure reaches $250 million when Turkey’s joint investments with foreign 
investors are included. 95 Bulgarian companies have been registered in Turkey by 
June 2005, 67 of which were established after 2003. The investment of Pristo Oil is 
significant as it is among the largest Bulgarian private enterprises abroad. Turkish 
companies in Bulgaria are interested in the privatization of paper mills, military 
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industrial facilities, machine production facilities, and hotels. In this framework, 
Şişecam and Işıklar Holding bought two large facilities in Bulgaria. Trakya Cam, the 
shareholder of Şişecam, announced that it would establish a glasshouse in 
Turgovıshte. At the outset, the investment was planned to be $160 million. In 2005, 
it was increased to $220 million. Another large scale Turkish investment is the SUN 
Hotel in Sofia. Özkan Group has bought Novotel – Evropa Hotel in the same city. 
The Princess Hotels which belong to this group opened in Filibe as well. Süzer 
Holding is the shareholder of 87.5 % of the cardboard factory ZMK Nikopol. In 
1998, a parquet factory opened in Kızanlık with a production capacity of 15.000 tons 
per month. Turkish companies are particularly assertive in the textile sector in 
Bulgaria. These include Maser Holding, Zorlu and Şahinler.48 There is an electricity 
transfer line of 500 mW capacity ready to operate between Turkey and Bulgaria. The 
seeds of this project were sown during Đsmail Cem’s visit to Bulgaria in May 1998. 
Cem conveyed the message of Turkish businessmen that Turkish companies can 
construct and renovate highways and get electricity in return instead of money.49 The 
project took shape in October 1999 with an estimate that Turkey would receive 234 
billion kWh worth electricity from Bulgaria until 2008. The first concrete step of 
cooperation in the project was taken by National Electricity Company of Bulgaria 
(NEC) and Ceylan Holding on River Arda.50 However, following the 2001 economic 
crisis and the bankruptcy of Bank Kapital of Ceylan Holding, Bulgarian Prime 
Minister Ivan Kostov wrote a letter to his Turkish counterpart Bülent Ecevit asking 
for another Turkish company to undertake the projects of Ceylan Holding which are 
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worth $600 million.51 Owing to the fact that the project could not be materialized 
after three years had passed since its signing, the Bulgarian periodical Capital wrote 
that Bulgarian officials picked Ceylan Holding’s failure to implement the project as 
the most important problem in bilateral economic relations. It was also stated that the 
Bulgarian government applied to international construction companies since the 
Turkish government did not propose another Turkish company. The interpretation of 
the issue by Bulgarian press was that Deputy Prime Minister Mesut Yılmaz 
conveyed the message that bilateral economic relations would not develop if the 
project were to be given to foreign companies.52 In 2002, although Bulgarian 
officials stated that it was decided that the construction of Gorna – Arda 
Hydroelectric Power Plant would be undertaken by an Italian company, they did not 
expressly say so due to the contract signed between the two states which stipulated 
that Turkey would buy electricity and construct dams and highways in return. This 
meant that the Bulgarians’ direct respondent would be the Turkish state in 
accordance with the terms of contract. Turkish diplomatic sources stated that 
Bulgarians and Ceylan Holding had agreed to the provisions of the contract in the 
framework of private law and that any problems to arise would be settled between 
these two parties.53 However, Gorna – Arda project and the 150 km long Plovdiv – 
Kapıkule Highway project have been on a standstill for seven years. The difficulties 
faced by Ceylan Holding in the 2001 crisis and Bulgaria’s rejection to grant state 
guarantee have made the $400 million project idle since 1998.54 
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Through mid-2003, another crisis unfolded in the economic relations between 
Turkey and Bulgaria regarding electricity purchase. Stemming from the energy 
agreements concluded between Turkey and its neighbors such as Iran and Russia, 
Turkey’s commitment to buy electricity also from Bulgaria turned into an issue 
during the Justice and Development Party (AKP) government after 2002. It appeared 
that while putting its signature in related agreements, BOTAŞ seemed to miss one 
point: the shrinking economy in Turkey. As production levels fell down, Turkey’s 
need for energy diminished accordingly. It followed that Bulgarian electricity 
suddenly became unnecessary and expensive in face of the 2001 crisis in Turkey. 
Having committed to buy one kilowatt/hour of electricity for 3 cents from Bulgaria, 
Turkey was bound by the agreement until 2008. The agreement provided that Turkey 
pay for the electricity, whether or not it bought it from Bulgaria.55 When Turkey 
stopped electricity import from Bulgaria, eminent Bulgarian dailies such as Standard 
and Trud wrote that in face of such a decision by Turkey, Bulgarian officials were 
left puzzled and could not take immediate action; there were also news that argued 
Turkish officials had done what was right for Turkey. The anti-Turkish daily Monitor 
wrote that Turkey stopped electricity import in order to put pressure on Bulgarian 
Telecom (BTC) to pave the way for Koç Holding and make it possible for it to buy 
the former.56  
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The first Turkish bank in Bulgaria is Ziraat Bank Sofia which opened in July 
1998. Demirbank Bulgaria opened in 1999. After the proposal given by HSBC for 
Demirbank Turkey was accepted, BDDK accepted the proposal given by Doğan – 
Cıngıllıoğlu in 2002 for Demir – Halkbank (Holland) which held 70% of Demirbank 
Bulgaria’s shares. The bank has branches in Varna, Burgaz, Filibe, and Sofia, and is 
expected to open new branches.57 However, in general terms, Germany has a say 
over the banking sector and economy and Greece has four banks in the country.58  
The problems awaiting solution in bilateral economic relations include 
residence permit and work permit procedures as well as transport problems and 
customs procedures. The visa fees for short business trips are higher than those 
required by other regional states and the issuance of visas takes long. The Bulgarian 
officials have accepted the proposal that the visa procedures of Turkish businessmen 
holding Schengen visa be finalized promptly and that they are not required to submit 
letters of invitation in their applications. Moreover, the new procedures which oblige 
businessmen to spend six months of the year in Bulgaria have negative consequences 
in view of the intensive programs of businessmen. Likewise, the work permit cost 
per person is around $550 which must be renewed each year. Finally, several 
counters on the Bulgarian side at Kapıkule customs are kept closed at the same time 
and the autoroute entrance fees are high.59 
By and large, it can be argued that improving relations with the country are 
on track despite problems. The problems between Turkey and Bulgaria are no longer 
observed in the political realm but in the economic venue, although bilateral 
economic relations have developed remarkably since 1990. It is known that 
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geographical proximity can facilitate transport and keep costs at low levels and that 
the legal framework of relations has been provided throughout 1990s. As in the case 
of other regional states, except for Romania, it can be said that Turkey’s bilateral 
relations with Bulgaria are on track yet require further attention from both sides. 
 
 
5.8. ECONOMIC RELATIONS BETWEEN TURKEY AND GREECE 
 
The recent history of Turkish – Greek economic relations shows that the two states 
have not been able to overcome strained relations and develop economic cooperation 
in the past despite attempts to that end. The first cogent platform for Turkish – Greek 
cooperation was seen when Turkish – Greek Business Council was established as a 
by-product of the Davos process of 1988. After the Customs Union Agreement was 
signed with the EU in 1995, Turkey’s foreign trade with Greece indicated a 
continuous increase. However, the desired trade potential between the two states has 
not been seized.60 Notwithstanding, Greek exports to Turkey increased by $ 200 
million in the 1995 – 1997 period and bilateral trade volume reached $ 585 million in 
total in 1996. This cooperative process, which is quite uncommon when bilateral 
relations between the two states are taken into account, was hampered seriously 
when the Öcalan crisis unfolded in February 1999. Shortly afterwards, Rahmi Koç, 
Chairman of the Turkish – Greek Business Council, did not balk at announcing that 
the activities of the Council would not be continued. To make the situation worse, 
this was to be coupled with a boycott against the Greek products in Turkey.61 Later, 
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upon the dialogue process launched by former Foreign Minister Đsmail Cem and his 
counterpart George Papandreu, and the background this process introduced, the 
Council resumed activities in September 1999 with new acceleration. This included a 
visit by TÜSĐAD in Athens in the same year. Further, Turkish – Greek Business 
Council Meeting in Đstanbul brought together almost 200 businessmen from both 
states in respect of which working groups on banking, stock exchange, tourism, and 
insurance were founded. Another cooperative step was taken with the Turco-Greek 
Friendship and Cooperation Fair in Athens in April 2000 and with increased growing 
ties between local chambers of commerce.62  
 The first Turkish – Greek joint enterprise materizalized by the Greek 
Marinopoulos Company and Turkish Fiba Holding in Romania’s Marks and Spencer 
Shopping Center in 2000 with an investment of $ 500 thousand. In the same year, the 
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Commercial Bank of Greece bought 12.5 % of the shares of Işıklar Package 
Company while Finansbank began to cooperate with Alpha Credit Bank and National 
Bank of Greece (NBG/Etniki Trapeza tis Elladas).63 Turkish exports to Greece in 
2005 reached $ 396 million, while Greek imports to Turkey reached $ 209 million. 
The trade volume between the two countries is approximately $ 600 million for the 
same period. Automotive industry, related subsidiary industries, and iron-steel 
industry constitute almost 30 % of Turkish exports while cotton constitutes almost 
one third of Turkish imports with 30%. According to the data provided by the 
Undersecretariat of Treasure, the number of companies with Greek capital was 76 in 
June 2003 and their overall share was 0.40 % among other foreign investors in 
Turkey. The number of Greek companies in Turkey reached 110 in 2004. Further, 
there are 10 Turkish companies in Greece, serving in tourism, transportation, food, 
furniture, foreign trade and communication. The two states concluded agreements on 
mutual promotion and protection of investment tourism, shipping, and cooperation 
mutual assistance between customs authorities. After lengthy discussions, the two 
states signed the Agreement on the Prevention of Double Taxation in 2003 in Ankara 
which was put into effect in 2005. A Joint Economic Commission was established as 
envisaged by the 2001 Agreement on Economic Cooperation. Certain cooperation 
opportunities proposed are long-term cooperation schemes in the field of industry 
which target production of high quality and low cost items; opening liason offices of 
banks in two countries to provide capital for private sector infrastructure financing 
and to give credits; creation of mechanisms to ensure that Turkish and Greek 
companies operate in respective stock exchanges simultaneously; and establishment 
of facilities in the Aegean and third party countries in the framework of joint package 
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tours which can serve to create the concept of an eastern Mediterranean tourism upon 
which Eastern – Mediterranean Travel Agencies Association was founded by 
Turkey, Greece, Egypt and Israel. In the future, new partnership can help introduce 
ferry cruiser and Ro-Ro navigation in the Black Sea, the Sea of Marmara and the 
Aegean.64  
It is argued that Turkey’s accession to the EU in the future may affect 
bilateral relations between Greece and Turkey. On the Greek side, there are prospects 
in the products which are imported by Turkey and which are also produced in Greece 
such as machinery, iron and steel, electrical appliances, fertilizers, synthetic fibers, 
rubber, aluminum, tractors, cigarettes, vegetables, etc. Good prospects include also 
Greek cotton, used ships, leather, oil and cement, tomato juice, wheat and rice. 
Moreover, Greece may increase export of medicine to Turkey as Turkey shall be 
obliged to comply with relevant European standards in the future.65  In addition to 
trade, cooperation between the two states may be enhanced to cover tourism, 
pisciculture, sea fishing, industrial cooperation, local administrations and 
universities.66 Still, another field is the banking sector in which particularly Greek 
banks seem to be active unlike Turkish banks. This area of cooperation concerns 
mostly investment of banking and capital markets. The first bank to open a liason 
office in Turkey is NBG which is the biggest Greek bank.  
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5.8.1. GREEK BANKS GAINING FOOTHOLD IN TURKEY: WHAT DO 
THE BUYS SAY? 
 
In April 2006, the NBG won the bid for Finansbank and acquired a controlling stake 
of 46 %.67 It is argued that the purchase of shares in Turkish banks was beyond 
private sector entrepreneurship in Greece and was done with state support. However, 
the event was praised by most of the media in Turkey who alleged that the Turks did 
not have any objections regarding the matter putting forward the argument that 
Turkey should take its part in the globalization process. The results of a simultaneous 
public opinion survey in Turkey and Greece said otherwise upon which it was 
revealed that the Greeks found it a positive step that their companies bought shares in 
Turkish banks, yet they did not want Turks to even open a market in Greece, letting 
alone purchase of banks.68 It is important to note that there are currently no Turkish 
banks to buy stakes in a Greek bank.  
 Almost a month later, EFG Eurobank Engasias SA (Eurobank EFG) and 
Tefken Holding agreed to join forces in the Turkish financial services market. 
According to the agreement, Eurobank EFG will acquire 70 % of Tefken Group’s 
holding in Tekfenbank together with its wholly-owned subsidiary, Tefken Leasing. 
Eurobank EFG is the second largest Greek bank with presence in Romania, Bulgaria, 
Serbia, Poland, Turkey, Luxembourg, and the UK. It is listed on the Athens 
Exchange in which it ranks second with a market capitalization of nearly $ 13 
billion.69 Furthermore, Alphabank of Greece also revealed almost simultaneously 
                                                 
67
 http://www.finanznachrichten.de/nachrichten-2006-04/artikel-6226423.asp as retrieved on 15 
September 2006, 01:01:24 GMT.  
68
 Hasan Ünal, “Yunanistan Türkiye’ye Çifte Operasyon mu?”, 28 April 2006, Yeniçağ; and idem, 
“Yunanistan Adına ‘Pozitif Milliyetçilik’ Propagandası”, 14 April 2006, Yeniçağ. 
69
 “Eurobank EFG To Acquire 70 % in Tekfenbank”, http://www.invgr.com/invgt.htm as retrieved on 
13 August 2006, 04:35:44 GMT. 
 236 
  
  
 
that it targeted extensive growth in Southeast Europe and confirmed interest in 
acquisitions in Turkish banks. Yiannis Costopoulos, Chairman of the bank, stated 
that although Alphabank followed the footsteps of NBG, any acquisition in Turkey 
would not be the size of the latter’s acquisition of Finansbank. It has been argued that 
Alpha’s soft approach was politically fitting because there was a visible nationalist 
sentiment in Turkey which was expressed by OYAK’s chief executive officer 
Yıldırım Türker, for instance. Türker stated that OYAK would not sell out to Greek 
banks.70 However, later OYAK Bank also sold out.  
It is clear that, with state support in Greece, there is an inclination and 
ambition to take foothold in at least a part of financial system in Turkey. The Greek 
public opinion is also supportive of this inclination. To reiterate, Greek public 
opinion does not approve of any Turkish acquisition of anything in Greece. For 
instance, given that there is a possibility that NBG’s ownership of Finansbank could 
act as a trigger to transform the NBG structure, Greek press wrote that “clearly NBG 
is not quite ready for a Turkish shareholder yet” although Fiba Holding Chairman 
Hüsnü Özyeğin said he would like to take a stake in NBG if one had been available 
as part of the deal.71 It is noteworthy that Greek Deputy Foreign Minister Euripidis 
Stylianidis stated on a TV program that “Greece became very influential on the 
financial system in Turkey and even if the latter distanced itself from the EU process, 
Turkey would not be able to ignore Greek demands” when he was asked whether the 
government had a “Plan B” if Turkey distanced itself from the EU process after 
Autumn 2006.72 It seems that analysts supportive of Greek acquisitions in Turkish 
banks tend to see the deal as an endorsement of Turkey’s efforts to join the EU and a 
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sign of greater cooperation between the two states.73 Yet, they seem to miss the point 
made by the Greek press that although the NBG buy has seemingly opened the way 
for further deals, as one banker remarked “timing is everything and the Turkish 
market could probably not stomach another Greek buy of a Turkish bank within the 
next few months.”74 This is indicative of possible future purchases by Greek banks. 
The fact that NBG plans to bring in 50 Greek companies to Turkey, such as 
Intracom, Mailis, and Akkas, operating in technology packaging and textile 
respectively, only reinforces the possibility of future projects.75 Such banking 
operations seem to prove right what Charles Dallara, Managing Director of the 
Washington based Institute of International Finance (IIF), said back in 2005: “If you 
had ten years ago said a Greek bank would have operations in Turkey, no one would 
have believed it, including myself.”76  
Most recently, the application by Ziraat Bank to open two branches in Athens 
and Komitini was approved in July 2007, which means that for the first time a 
Turkish bank will open branches in Greece. The branches are expected to open in 
2008.77 Conversely, BDDK did not approve the sale of 50% of Alternatifbank to 
Greek Alphabank on 7 August 2007. While the reason for not permitting the sale was 
not explained, it was reportedly said that BDDK concluded that founding partners of 
Alphabank did not meet the terms provided in Article 8 of Banking Law, which 
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arranges judicial and commercial record, financial power, prestige, honesty and 
adequacy, all of which are required for the conduct of banking. 78 
 
 
5.9. ECONOMIC RELATIONS BETWEEN TURKEY AND ROMANIA 
 
With the end of the Cold War, Turkish – Romanian economic relations witnessed a 
steady development leading to an important increase in the commercial exchanges, 
particularly following the signing of the Free Trade Agreement in 1997. The 
economic relations between the two states after 1990 was put into a legal framework 
with the Mutual Protection and Promotion of Investments (1991), Free Trade 
Agreement (1997), Protocol On Energy and Infrastructure (2001), and Agreement on 
Cooperation in Tourism (2002), Memorandum of Understanding and Cooperation in 
the Field of Small- and Medium-Sized Enterprises (2004), Agreement of 
Cooperation between Eximbank SA Romania and Turk Eximbank AS (2004); and 
Memorandum of Understanding concerning the Cooperation in the Field of Defense 
and Research and Technology (2004). The main export items in bilateral trade 
include automotive, rubber, iron – steel, electrical items, cotton, woven items, edible 
fruits, while the import items include iron – steel, mineral fuel, organic chemicals, 
rubber fertilizers, automotive and related industry, wood, electrical items, vegetal oil 
and ships.79 The dynamism in bilateral trade placed Turkey in the summer of 2004 at 
the fourth place among Romania’s commercial partners after Italy, Germany, and 
France, from the sixth place in 2003 after Italy, Germany, France, UK and the 
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Russian Federation.80 Romania is currently Turkey’s first trading partner in the 
Balkans and the Black Sea region after the Russian Federation, while Turkey is the 
first trade partner of Romania in the Black Sea region.81  
The dynamism in bilateral relations developed out of exploring the resources 
in the country in the immediate aftermath of Cold War. In the early 1990s, a 
considerable number of Turkish companies entered the Romanian market which was 
appealing for Turkish investors for three reasons: people were faced with a new 
system in which there were insufficient resources to obtain basic goods, even food 
and clothing, which meant that the investors could exploit the market easily; one 
only had to pay a thousand dollars as a guarantee to enter the Romanian market and 
open a liaison office; and foreign investors had been exempted from tax for two 
years.82 Upon such bacground, Turkish companies began to do business in Romania 
in the fields of transportation, tourism, banking, insurance, food processing, and 
restaurants and so on, while they later engaged in cooperation in implementing 
strategic projects particularly in the energy field such as laying an undersea electric 
cable between Constanta and Đstanbul, the Nabucco gas pipeline.83 Current 
advantages that make Romanian market appealing are cheap labor and the obligation 
to pay 16 % tax to the state regardless of income level. However, the fact that 
Romania’s membership in the EU in 2007 means that investment in Romania will be 
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investment in the EU, which the Turkish businessmen should explore duly.84 Overall 
capital of Turkish companies in Romania was estimated to be around $ 391 million 
in May 2005. Some of the direct investors from Turkey are Efes Pilsen, Pak Holding, 
FĐBA Holding, Bayındır Holding, ENKA, Hayat Holding, Kombassan, Yaşar 
Holding, Escort Computer, Arçelik, and Erdemir. There are three actively operating 
Turkish banks in Romania which are Finansbank, Libra Bank, and Garanti Bank 
International. However, unlike Turkish investment in Romania, Romanian 
investment in Turkey remains limited. There were only 33 Romanian companies in 
Turkey in June 2005, 29 of which operate in services sector and four in production 
industry.  
 As for the problems faced in bilateral economic relations, one deficiency to 
be noted is the frequent change of laws put into force in the process of promotion of 
foreign investments and privatization in Romania. Second, the freight limits, the one-
day waiting period, and the heavy fines in transportation are other concerns for 
Turkish investors. It is also known that high freight rates at Constanta – Bucharest 
railway make export conditions unfavorable and bring an extra amount on 
transportation costs. Third, the settlement of commercial disputes takes time and 
mostly results in unfavorable decisions due to the sluggish legal system. Fourth, the 
attitude of the Romanian government and public toward Banco Turco – Romana 
(BTR) in Romania when the Bank faced liquidity problems in November 200085 and 
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subsequently the Romanian Central Bank froze its transactions worsened when the 
Central Bank of Turkey laid hands on Demirbank only to add to the impression that 
they were too risky to do business with. These problems also prevented the Turkish 
companies to smoothly carry out their financial transactions. Fifth and related with 
the fourth, money transfers between the two states take one or two days in the 
Romanian banking system. Finally, businessmen and workers are granted visa and 
work permit for only one year at most which has negative effects upon overall 
productivity. Long-term and multiple visas would at least bring a short-term solution 
to the problem.86 
 However, the benefits of prospective investments outweigh the problems in 
economic activities. The sectors of prospective cooperation are energy, construction, 
defence industry and infromation technologies. Moreover, there are regions in 
Romania with a 30 % unemployment rate, underdeveloped and isolated, for which 
the companies are provided incentives. These regions include Altan Hill mine field in 
Tulcea, Alba, Apuseni mine field, Cugir region, Bacau, Comanesti mine field, Bihor, 
and so on. The investment fields in these regions are agriculture, stockbreeding, 
services, production, trade, environmental protection, and technology. The goods 
imported for the purpose of investment in these regions are exempt from value added 
tax and customs duties. The raw material imported for production in the region is 
also exempt from customs duties.87  
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 Despite the large state-owned and subsidized enterprises, the Romanian 
government is gradually realizing the goal of foreign direct investment in economic 
development. It is increasingly opening itself to attract foreign direct investment 
including privatization programs through improving its regulatory framework 
regarding taxation and foreign exchange systems. In such an improving environment, 
Turkish investment has gained such a sound foothold in the country that companies 
from third countries interested in investing in Romania are recommended to consider 
Turkish partners due to their long experience and direct transportation links, which 
affirms the present as well as the prospective established nature of Turkish trade with 
Romania.  
 
 
5.10. TURKISH – BALKAN ECONOMIC RELATIONS: AN EVALUATION  
 
It can be argued that there are domestic and external factors which shape Turkey’s 
economic policies towards the region. In general, these include inadequate economic 
infrastructure such as incentives, trade and investment agreements; the tendency of 
investing in Central Asia and Caucasia which are rich in natural sources and work 
power; restrictions in newly evolving economic orders in the regional states; 
unfavorable tariff arrangements; incompatible legislations; sluggish banking systems; 
limited market opportunities in the region; political instability and nonstrategic 
natural resources.88 Upon such background, it is observed that Turkey’s share in the 
region’s $174 million worth overall foreign trade was $6,7 million in 2006, which 
constituted only 4% in the overall figure. While Turkey’s trade with regional states is 
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8%, it was 30 % with close and neighboring states in 2006.89 Turkey’s trade with the 
region have focused mostly on Romania, with low but increasing trade relations with 
other states due to relatively more stable and larger markets compared to other 
regional states. It would be acknowledged that there is need to formulate long-term 
and well-devised economic policies towards the region, and that there is no need to 
reiterate that this applies to political and military fields as well. When the prospective 
EU membership of the regional states is duly considered, one is compelled to think 
that countries such as key countries of the EU as Germany, France, Italy, and also 
Russia, would not be likely to view Turkey’s efforts to take its regional activities 
further positively. That is why it would have been better if Turkey could take such 
efforts in the immediate aftermath of the Cold War, if, of course, there was no war in 
Bosnia and economic crises in Turkey. Among others, it is the lack of domestic 
economic stability and abundance of economic problems that Turkey could not 
compete with the other rival powers in the last 15 years, because the production 
which gets more costly due to inflationary effects, and thus Turkish products cannot 
compete with EU price indices as it should. That was why it was important for 
Turkey to conclude free trade agreements with the regional states. On the other hand, 
one expectation on the part of the Turkish communities living in the Balkan states 
has been to form their own group of entrepreneurs with the support of Turkey and 
relevant efforts were launched in the early 2000s. It should also be noted that the 
absence of economic reports and plans which serve to inform and direct economic 
activities have caused the entrepreneurs to make do with their own capabilities which 
in turn constituted a barrier on the road to success by slowing down the flow of 
Turkish capital. Organizations such as DEĐK, TĐKA, ĐTO, ĐSO and Undersecretariat 
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of Foreign Trade launched activities to remedy the deficiencies in this respect. 
Turkish Balkan Business Councils, Rumeli Businessmen Association, TÜSĐAD, 
TURKTRADE, and fair commissions are no less significant. Furthermore, it is 
necessary to establish a prospective “Balkan States Institute” to enhance economic 
relations and coordination.90 
 It can be maintained that Turkish entrepreneurs have invested in Balkan 
markets; however, this was confined to certain limits as Turkey could not develop 
long-term policies in face of domestic and external events, which turned out to be 
haphazard, if not on the spur of the moment. However, there is no ground to argue 
about a change to the worse as Turkey’s trade volume with the regional states 
indicate increasing figures. Economic relations are likely to be taken further provided 
that the region is not underrated by Turkish investors. It could even be argued that 
better results could be recorded if underrating is eliminated on the part of Turkish 
investors, along with negligence, and lack of interest, and information towards the 
region. 
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CHAPTER VI 
 
TURKEY’S MILITARY RELATIONS WITH THE BALKAN 
STATES IN THE POST-COLD WAR ERA 
 
 
6.1. TURKEY’S SECURITY AND DEFENSE POLICIES THROUGH AND 
AFTER THE END OF THE COLD WAR 
 
Turkey’s security considerations through the end of the Cold War was framed 
around the consideration that Turkey was located on a fragile and strategic point 
taking into account the balance of power and general international conjuncture at the 
material time. The fundamentals of national defense policy were based on “peace at 
home, peace in the world” principle as well as peaceful solution of conflicts, 
noninterference in internal affairs of countries, goodneighborliness, and pacta sund 
servanda principle, as stated in 1987 White Paper of the Ministry of Defense. In this 
framework, it was considered that it was necessary to maintain the existing balance 
for world peace and to support the solution of conflicts under the UN umbrella. 
Given the bipolar structure of the world at the time, Turkey secured its defense by 
its NATO membership. The security and defense policies of Turkey also rested on 
support for elimination of tension between two blocs and for armament. Another 
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consideration in this regard was the acknowledgment of the fact that Turkey was 
located in conflict-ridden region and that it constituted NATO’s important southern 
flank in that respect. Therefore, Turkey maintained its national defense capabilities 
and its armed forces at the highest levels possible.1  
 When the irreversible and rapid wind of change became visible in 1990s, 
Turkey’s security and defense considerations became replete with due emphasis on 
two peculiarities of the time: uncertainty and instability. It was stated that Iraq, 
which emerged as the stronger side from war with Iran, acted contrary to the efforts 
to establish peace and stability in the Middle East as was seen in its invasion of 
Kuwait. The other issue of note was international terrorism which also had impact 
on Turkey.  The fundamentals of defense policy in 1987 White Paper were 
preserved in their entirety. It was maintained that following Iraq’s invasion of 
Kuwait, Turkey had shown due sensitivity and responsibility for the establishment 
of peace and stability in the Middle East by way of acting in line with UN 
sanctions.2  
 The White Paper of 1993 referred to ethnic conflicts, instability and 
uncertainty in the regional context for the first time. The book posited that the 
disintegration of the Warsaw Pact and the Soviet Union, arms control, and 
introduction of new measures in the security field brought about a new security 
understanding based on mutual trust and dialogue and cooperation in problem-
solving. It was stressed that the disappearance of a large scale military threat on the 
West produced parallel transformation in threat perceptions and therefore the classic 
perceptions were now replaced with multidimensional risks and threats against 
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security. The new threats and risks were identified in a way to cover not only 
individual military power of states but also political, economic and social 
instabilities, class conflicts, religious, national and ethnic conflicts, attempts for 
gaining authority in certain regions in a country, religious fundamentalism and 
terrorism. In this context, specific reference was made to the Balkans, the Caucasus 
and the Middle East. In this new security environment, the defense policy defined in 
1993 White Paper was summarized as follows: (1) to take all measures necessary to 
build and maintain peace at home and in the world, (2) to contribute to the 
elimination of all types of international tension and to build a just and sustainable 
peace, (3) to protect the independence and integrity of the country, (4) to take all 
measures to prevent war, and (5) to participate in collective security systems and 
share responsibilities.3 
 The 1996 White Paper drew attention to regional problems, just as the 1993 
White Paper, this time with special emphasis on Bosnia – Herzegovina arguing that 
the peace plans which were negotiated before Dayton Peace Accord rewarded the 
aggressor and gave concessions to encourage the Serbs to spread clashes throughout 
the Balkans. It is seen that Turkey’s international relations were based on two 
principles: peaceful relations and cooperation with all states. For the first time since 
1987, it is also observed that Turkish security policies and doctrines were defined as 
defensive in nature.4 
 The 1998 White Paper pointed out that the abovementioned pillar of defense 
and defense policy were reinforced with a military strategy which consisted of four 
components: deterrence, collective security, forward defense and military 
contribution, crisis management and intervention at times of crises. It was stressed 
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that as Turkey was subject to multidimensional internal and external threats due to 
its geopolitical and geostrategic location, the achievement of a military strength 
capable of maintaining the national defense security policy as well as the 
maintenance and development of this capability as circumstances may demand 
constituted the milestones of the policy of Turkey in preparing for the 2000s.5 While 
the four components of Turkey’s military strategy were reiterated, the targets of 
defense policy were stated as (1) to contribute to peace and security in the region 
and to spread it to larger areas, (2) to become a country producing strategy and 
security that can influence all the strategies concerning its geography and beyond, 
(3) to become an element of power and balance in its region, (4) to make use of 
every opportunity and take initiatives for cooperation, (5) to contribute to reducing 
international tension and maintenance of just and lasting peace, (6) to preserve and 
protect independence, territorial integrity and the republic, (7) to take all measures 
to prevent crises and conflicts, and (8) to take an active part in collective defense 
systems and to fulfill its responsibilities.6 
 Turning back to the military relations between Turkey and the Balkans, the 
efforts taken by Turkey regarding security in the Balkans have been and are in the 
context of multilateral and bilateral activism since 1990. Turkey’s participation in 
peace operations in the region has taken place in the context of international 
organizations. While Turkey developed its military relations with regional states on 
a bilateral basis since the end of the Cold War, it also took due efforts to launch new 
regional initiatives such as Multinational Peace Force in Southeast Europe and 
BLACKSEAFOR.  
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6.1.1. MULTINATIONAL PEACE FORCE IN SOUTHEAST EUROPE  
 
The origins of Multinational Peace Force in Southeast Europe (MNPFSEE) lies in 
the efforts of the Defense Ministries of Southeast European states and the U.S.A. 
who launched the Southeast Europe Defense Ministerial (SEDM) process in 1996 to 
serve as a regional cooperation mechanism bringing together NATO states and PfP 
states. The seeds of the MNPFSEE were sown in the meeting of Defense Ministries 
of Southeast European states and the U.S.A. in Bulgaria two years after the war in 
Bosnia had ended. The participating states reached a compromise to enhance 
cooperation between Albania, Bulgaria, Macedonia, Romania, Slovenia, Croatia, 
Turkey, the U.S.A., Italy and Greece. The second meeting was held in Romania in 
1998. It was observed during this meeting that Greece refused to participate in a 
force established with the initiative of Turkey, yet it eventually agreed to participate 
in principle. Within this force, an on-call brigade (SEEBRIG) operates. The brigade 
headquarter was activated in Bulgaria in 1999 for four-year rotating periods 
following Bulgaria, Romania, Turkey and Greece. The deployment of SEEBRIG is 
not restricted to the region; it may be deployed in different geographical locations as 
well. The SEEBRIG is composed of ground elements and tactical air control parties. 
It consists of a headquarter of multinational staff, headquarter company, a signal 
company to be provided by the host nation, maneuver units, combat support units 
and multinational combat service support battalion. Turkey contributes to the peace 
force with a mechanized infantry battalion, one reconnaissance company, one 
artillery battery, one engineering company, combat support and combat service 
support units. Turkey will provide headquarters to the SEEBRIG between 2007 and 
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2011. Albania contributes with one company, Bulgaria with one battalion, Italy with 
one regiment, Macedonia with one battalion, and Greece with one battalion.7 
 
 
6.1.2. THE BLACK SEA FORCE – BLACKSEAFOR 
 
The second regional security initiative spearheaded by Turkey was inked in Đstanbul 
in April 2001 with a view to pulling the naval forces to form a joint force to emerge 
as the Black Sea Naval Cooperation Task Group, in other words BLACKSEAFOR. 
It is known that the initiative was put forward in the first half of 1998,8 despite 
Kiev’s insistence that the process was put forth by Ukraine originally. The 
agreement includes all littoral states, and although it consists of naval forces, it is 
not a purely military formation, nor is it directed against any state or group of states, 
or intended to emerge as a military alliance. The BLACKSEAFOR is assigned with 
search and rescue, humanitarian assistance, mine counter measures, environmental 
protection, goodwill visits, and other tasks as deemed appropriate by the parties. 
Although BLACKSEAFOR is a regional formation, it may also be entrusted with 
operations under UN or OSCE. It consists of four to six ships from every state 
(Turkey, Bulgaria, Romania, Russian Federation, Ukraine, Georgia). Warships to be 
assigned to the force are frigate/destroyer, corvette, patrol boat, mine counter 
measures ship, amphibious ship and auxiliary ship and vessel.9  
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 It can be argued that the BLACKSEAFOR bears significance viewed from 
three aspects. First and foremost, it has brought together the once archrival littoral 
states of the Cold War years into common platform and thus helped take a giant step 
to transform the Black Sea into an area of cooperation. Second, and linked with the 
first, by joining naval forces, it has provided a military cooperation example 
between all littoral states. Finally, as its tasks would suggest, it also has a 
humanitarian aspect since it covers humanitarian assistance as well as search and 
rescue.10  
 
 
6.2. TURKEY’S BILATERAL MILITARY RELATIONS WITH THE 
BALKAN STATES IN THE POST-COLD WAR ERA 
 
6.2.1. MILITARY RELATIONS BETWEEN TURKEY AND BOSNIA – 
HERZEGOVINA  
 
A multinational peace force, United Nations Protection Force (UNPROFOR) was 
assigned in the Balkans between February 1992 and December 1995. The 
Implementation Force (IFOR) under NATO command took over the military duty 
after December 1995, which was renamed as Stabilization Force (SFOR) a year 
later. The duties and tasks of SFOR were taken over by the EU in December 2004 
by a decision taken in the NATO Summit in Đstanbul. Turkey sent a mechanized 
task force of 1400 soldiers to Zenica in August 1994. After NATO took over 
commandership, this force was turned into a brigade in December 1994 under IFOR. 
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Turkish troops were included in SFOR and later EUFOR. The EUFOR is also a 
multinational force which consists of approximately 7000 troops.11 A total of 33 
nations including 22 EU member states and 11 non-EU Troop Contributing Nations 
provide the necessary capabilities to carry out EUFOR’s tasks. The EUFOR 
multinational task forces are British, Austrian and Spanish officers and report to 
EUFOR Headquarters in Sarajevo.12 
 Turning back to the bilateral military relations between Turkey and Bosnia – 
Herzegovina, it is seen the two states signed the military cooperation accord in 
Ankara in August 1995. The accord envisaged cooperation between Turkey and 
Bosnia – Herzegovina in the field of military training, defense industry 
infrastructure, military technology, scientific research and development, and 
medicine. As the arms embargo still continued at the time, diplomatic sources stated 
the military cooperation accord with the Sarajevo government would not mean the 
violation of arms embargo against former Yugoslavia.13 A year later, Turkey and 
Bosnia – Herzegovina signed another agreement on military training cooperation 
aimed at bringing the Bosnian Army to NATO standards. This agreement envisaged 
regular visits by high-level officials and delegations, participation in exercises as 
observer, training of military personnel, and contributing to the Train and Equip 
Program. The aim of the agreement was to bring the Muslim – Croat Federation 
Forces up to a par with the Bosnian Serb Army by the time IFOR left the country. 
Within this framework, Bosnian military personnel was trained in military staff 
colleges, Army War Academy, Air War Academy, Gülhane Military Medical 
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Academy, Language School, Military High Schools, branch schools of Land, Air 
and Gendarmerie Command and technical schools of Air Forces.14 Approximately 
after six months the agreement was signed, Turkish Deputy Chief of Staff General 
Çevik Bir expressed his firm position against the influence of what he labeled 
“fanatics”, i.e. the Iranian fundamentalists, in Bosnia – Herzegovina. General Bir 
was quoted in Washington Post story on training of Bosnian military personnel in 
Turkey as stating that it was Turkey’s mission to convince the Bosnian government 
not to follow the fanatics. General Bir noted that 190 Bosnian soldiers were trained 
in Polatlı and Etimesgut near Ankara as well as said that there had been no discord 
between the U.S.A. and Turkey over the training of the Bosnian Army. The State 
Department, on the other hand, emphasized that Turkey was training Bosnians with 
its own funds. The former Chief of General Staff Doğan Güreş, a deputy in TPP at 
the time, also held that Turkey should export its secular model to other states. The 
Bosnian troops were trained near Ankara with American M60 tanks, a part of $98,4 
million worth of U.S. military hardware which were supposed to be shipped to 
Bosnia once all Iranian fighters left Bosnia. The Bosnian President Đzzetbegovic also 
assured the Acting Assistant Secretary of State John Kornblum that all foreign 
fighters, that is, the Iranians, would leave Bosnia shortly.15  
 Turkish Armed Forces’ massive efforts for Bosnia – Herzegovina were often 
expressly appreciated by top ranking officials from the Muslim – Croat Army. Jovan 
Divjak, Deputy Chief of General Staff of the Bosnian Army and its sole general of 
Serbian origin, praised the sensitive approach of the Turkish General Staff towards 
the Bosnian Army. At the time, Turkey had one of the largest IFOR military 
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presences in Bosnia – Herzegovina with a 1500-brigade consisting of artillery units, 
a mechanized infantry company, armored operation vehicles, a tank company, a 
bomb disposal team, a logistical support company, and a medical unit including 
dentists and doctors.16 
 The Turkish Brigade sent to Bosnia – Herzegovina within UN framework in 
1994 was decreased in number to form a battalion task force in 2000. The main duty 
of the Turkish battalion in Bosnia – Herzegovina17 is to monitor preservation of 
peace under NATO umbrella. The battalion consists of 350 personnel and 
contributes to preservation of peace, provides food for the poor, as well as 
contributing to infrastructure construction of bridges, highways and schools. The 
Land Forces Command opened a Turkish language school course and laboratory in 
1999 to offer language courses to the Bosnian – Croat Federation Army. The second 
Turkish language course was opened by Bosnian Air Forces Command in 2001. As 
Bosnia – Herzegovina cannot participate in the exercises conducted under the PfP 
program for not being a PfP country, Turkey invited Bosnia – Herzegovina only to 
national exercises as an observer. Bosnia- Herzegovina participated as an observer 
in Joint Battalion Task Force 2000, 2001, 2002, Winter 2000, 2002 and Mehmetçik 
2000, 2002.18 
 Apart from its military tasks, Turkish Armed Forces are also engaged in 
providing social, educational and health services. The management of the displaced 
people’s camp is the duty of the Turkish Armed Forces. The camp was established 
by Norway in 1994 and hosts families whose accommodation, education and health 
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services are met. Turkish Armed Forces also collaborates with Zenica University 
and built a park in Zenica. Furthermore, it took pivotal action in the adoption of 
Liaison Observation Team (LOT) system and in the establishment of LOT houses. 
Turkish Armed Forces actively participate in LOT houses activities. The aim of the 
system is to conduct visits to villages and towns in person as soldiers, to gather 
information and monitor the general situation, to take necessary measures with 
advance information on possible ethnic clashes and to take efforts to prevent them, 
rather than acting as an intelligence agency trying to collect information as 
undercover agents. The LOT house personnel are provided standard housing, they 
visit neighboring villages and towns, submit their observations to the officer at the 
headquarters. The LOT houses in Zenica, Zadovici, Visoko and Kladenj are 
occupied by Turkish Armed Forces.19  
 In August 2006, Turkey and Bosnia – Herzegovina signed another 
cooperation accord aimed at enabling Bosnia – Herzegovina to use a NATO anti-
terror training base and to benefit from free access to the NATO-run base.20 
 
 
6.2.2. MILITARY RELATIONS BETWEEN TURKEY AND SERBIA  
 
The agreement that provided the legal framework for bilateral military cooperation 
was signed in July 2004 in Serbia. This Agreement was the first of its kind that 
Serbia (and Montenegro) reached with a NATO member. In accordance with the 
agreement, Serbia (and Montenegro) will receive military equipment supply support 
from Turkey. The defense ministers of two countries, Vecdi Gönül and Prvoslav 
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Davinic, agreed on future mutual visits by military representatives of each country. 
The deal is expected to provide opportunities for the Serbian military industry which 
does not find market for its products.21 The same year, President Sezer voiced 
support for plans to include Serbia (and Montenegro) in NATO’s PfP program. 
NATO officials said Serbia (and Montenegro) could be invited to join NATO’s 
program on the condition that it cooperates in the hunt for war crimes suspects, 
defense reforms and dropping the complaint at the international court over NATO’s 
raid during the 1999 Kosovo War. However, it was also noted that Turkey’s support 
over the PfP was encouraging as it offered political and military cooperation with 
NATO but did not necessarily lead to NATO membership.22  
 Through mid-2005, the agreement on cooperation in military scientific and 
military technical field was put into effect. The agreement envisages cooperation in 
the following fields: military training, military cooperation between armed forces, 
organization of armed forces, equipment and structure of armed forces, personnel 
management, environmental issues, military observer exchange for exercises, 
logistics and its management, cooperation in defense industry, military medical 
services, military topography and mappings, military history and military museums, 
military publication and archives, social, sport, cultural activities between armed 
forces, cooperation in undertaking scientific research and projects to develop new 
defense-military equipment, cooperation in exporting them to third countries.23 
 As known, Turkey had backed NATO’s 1999 air war to halt Serb forces’ 
offense on ethnic Albanians in Kosovo. However, relations have been improving 
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since Milosevic was ousted in 2000. Turkey has repeatedly announced that Serbia’s 
participation in NATO’s PfP program would help bring stability to the Balkans. In 
similar vein, enhanced military relations are expected to serve the same end, and as 
the agreement itself suggests, to the betterment of military relations.  
 
 
6.2.3. MILITARY RELATIONS BETWEEN TURKEY AND CROATIA  
 
During the war in Bosnia, Croatia wanted to have close relations with Turkey. 
However, due to international arms embargo and the need to balance relations with 
Bosnia accordingly, Turkey’s approach to Croatia’s appeal appeared to be 
cautious.24 After the war officially ended with the Dayton Peace Accord, Croatian 
Foreign Minister Mate Granic came to Turkey for a meeting between Turkish, 
Bosnian and Croatian foreign ministers. Granic stated that Croatia was inclined to 
sign a military cooperation and training agreement with Turkey. Pointing out 
Croatia had signed a similar agreement with Hungary, Granic said they were ready 
to sign such agreements with all friendly countries. The Croatian Foreign Minister 
discussed the signing of military, cultural, scientific, tourism and technical 
cooperation agreements with his Turkish counterpart Emre Gönensay.25 Croatia 
considered a military agreement with Turkey very important for its goal of 
becoming a member of NATO, particularly because Turkey has a lot of experience 
as a NATO member. It was argued that the cooperation agreement could pave the 
way for other cooperation agreements between Croatia and Turkey in the defense 
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industry field.26 Eventually, Deputy Chief of General Staff General Çevik Bir went 
to Croatia in August 1996 for the signing of the agreement. The agreement 
envisaged an exchange of staff between the armed forces of the two states and 
training of officers at Turkish and Croatian military training institutions. With this 
agreement, Turkey had signed military agreements with all the Balkan countries 
except Greece and new Yugoslavia by then.27 Earlier in the same month, Turkey had 
already planned to sell 3 Spanish-designed CASA CN-235 light transport aircraft, 
produced by Turkish Aerospace Industries (TAI), to Croatia. During the first phases 
of negotiations between the Croat and Turkish delegations, the Croats had difficulty 
finding a way to meet the cost of the three CASA aircraft but later the problem was 
solved in a way to allow Croatia not to pay for three aircraft until the last 52nd 
CASA had been delivered to the Turkish Air Force (TUAF), i.e. in the end of 1998. 
The three CASA aircraft would be paid for with the credit opened by main producer 
Spain to be used by Turkey. The aircraft was intended for civil transportation.28 
Within the framework of the 1996 agreement, Turkey and Croatia began military 
training cooperation. 593 Croatian military personnel completed their training in 
branch schools of Land Forces and Air Forces Commands, Army Staff College, 
Gülhane Military Medical Academy and language schools by the end of 2003. The 
short-term courses offered by Turkey to Croatian military personnel are command 
of infantry battalion, command of artillery battery, and command of Infantry 
Company. Croatian military personnel participate also in the courses and seminars 
conducted by the Turkish PfP Center. The military cooperation includes exercises as 
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well. Turkey and Croatia invite each other to the exercises conducted in the 
framework of national and PfP program as observers. Croatia participated in 
Mehmetçik – 2000 military exercise. Moreover, Croatian Chief of General Staff 
together with force commanders visited Turkey in 2000 and negotiated the purchase 
of F-16s and deepening cooperation.29 In the 2003 IDEF International Military Fair, 
Turkey showed particular interest for the first Croatian-made tank “Degman” and 
the two sides expressed views on enhanced military cooperation.30 By and large, as 
Croatia’s military needs and defense budget plummeted after the war, military 
relations with the country remained limited to training activities, which was coupled 
with the fact that Tudjman’s rigid stance towards Bosnia – Herzegovina contributed 
to the limited nature of military relations at his time.31 
 
 
6.2.4. MILITARY RELATIONS BETWEEN TURKEY AND MACEDONIA  
 
As the country which was the first to open an embassy in Macedonia after the 
declarations of independence, Turkey built strong ties with the country in various 
domains including the military field. In the immediate aftermath of the declaration 
of independence, Macedonia was an isolated weak country with no international 
recognition, suffering ethnic problem and poor economy. It also faced security 
threat from Greece. 
 The first military visit between the two states took place when Macedonian 
Chief of Staff came to Turkey in June 1993. The military training and cooperation 
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activities started in 1994 as per the related agreement on military training concluded 
by the two parties in March 1994. In the ensuing years, high level bilateral visits 
continued by the Macedonian Chief of General Staff, Deputy Chief of General Staff, 
the Defense Minister, and delegations from the General Staff and Army War 
Academy. In terms of training, Turkey offers training courses to Macedonian 
military personnel in Armed Forces College, Army Staff College, Language School, 
and School of Air Forces.32 In 1995, the Chiefs of General Staff from Turkey and 
Macedonia signed the Skopje Document on Confidence and Security Building 
Measures (CSBMs).33 A year later, Turkey and Macedonia signed an agreement 
envisaging cooperation between air forces as Macedonia had no air force at the time. 
Turkey trained Macedonian pilots and also offered to sell twenty F-5 war planes in 
excess which was welcomed by Macedonia. Talks with the U.S.A. which holds the 
license of these planes started, however the project was later shelved.34 
 The military cooperation activities included “special forces” training in both 
countries. Macedonian Special Forces were given commando training in Turkey. 
Similarly, Special Forces under the command of Turkish Naval Forces offered 
relevant courses to Macedonian military personnel in 1998.35  
 By the following year, Turkey had sent approximately $2 million worth 
military aid to Macedonia, which included military equipment and ammunition 
worth $1.9 million. The aid was handed over at a military facility near Skopje in the 
presence of Turkey Ambassador Mustafa Fazlı Kesmir and Macedonian Defense 
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Minister Nikola Klusev.36 Subsequently, a team of six personnel from Turkish 
Armed Forces began to train Macedonian Special Forces in Macedonia in 2000. 
After the forces were deployed around the border region against separatist groups, 
Turkish forces returned to Turkey in 2001.37 When the clashes on Macedonian – 
Kosovo border region escalated in March 2001, Macedonian Foreign Minister 
Sırcan Kerim came to Ankara for a meeting with Prime Minister Ecevit and Foreign 
Minister Cem. The two sides reaffirmed their compromise for the continuation of 
defense aid by Turkey and stated that sending troops to Macedonia was not an issue 
in their agenda. In this respect, Kerim did not ask for military support from Turkey 
but requested a more active stance from NATO.38 Furthermore, military exercises 
have been a significant means to enhance military relations. The first of these 
exercises was carried out in Macedonia with the participation of a Turkish team of 
70 troops. These are Cooperative Dragon (Albania, June 2000), Cooperative Key 
(Romania, September 2000), Cooperative Best Effort (Romania, September 2000), 
Seven Stars (Bulgaria, September 2000), SEEBRIG CAX (Bulgaria, March 2001), 
Cornerstone (Albania, April – July 2001), Cooperative Best Effort (Australia, 
September 2001), Rescuer (Bulgaria, September 2001). Macedonia was also invited 
to the following exercises conducted by Turkish Armed Forces in 2000: Joint 
Battalion Task Force (BNTF), Peaceful Star, and Mehmetçik.39  
 In July 2006, the Macedonian Information Agency (MIA) reported that 
Turkey made a new military grant of $750.000 to the Macedonian Army and that a 
total of $15 million worth military equipment was donated by Turkey since 1994. 
The deal was signed by Macedonian Deputy Chief of General Staff and the Chief of 
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the Department for Defense Planning in the presence of Turkish Ambassador to 
Macedonia Taner Karakaş who stated that the donation aimed at support to 
Macedonia’s efforts for integration in the Euro-Atlantic structures. The donation 
involved motorized military vehicles and means for connection produced in Turkey 
and compatible with NATO standards.40 Most recently, Macedonian Chief of 
General Staff Miroslav Stojanovski visited his counterpart Yaşar Büyükanıt in early 
March 2007.41 
 
 
6.2.5. MILITARY RELATIONS BETWEEN TURKEY AND ALBANIA  
 
Bilateral military relations between Turkey and Albania began in early 1990s. 
Albania started defense cooperation almost simultaneously with Turkey as well as 
with the U.S.A. The first meeting of significance at the ministerial level between the 
two states took place in Ankara in late July 1992 during which the parties signed a 
Defense Cooperation Pact. The then Minister of Defense Nevzat Ayaz stated that 
the agreement focused on broadening cooperation in the field of military education 
and technology. During his visit to Turkey, Albanian Defense Minister Safet Zhulali 
was allowed to visit Turkish military facilities such as factories, command centers 
and bases, to which at the time only NATO members were allowed top secret 
access. In return, Turkish naval vessel, Fevzi Çakmak visited the Albanian Port of 
Drac in late August 1992, the first such visit of a Turkish naval vessel to Albania 
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since the days of the Ottoman Empire. Turkish officers visited Albanian Defense 
Ministry in mid-November the same year.42 The two states concluded the Defense 
Technology and Military Training Cooperation during this visit43 and Albania also 
asked for arms aid October 1993.44  
 In mid-July 1996, Turkish contingent of 40 soldiers left for Albania to take 
part in the Peaceful Eagle 96 military exercise conducted under the auspices of 
NATO’s PfP program. Along with the Turkish contingent, headed by Lieutenant 
Colonel Đhsan Balabanlı, troops from Albania, the U.S.A., Italy, Macedonia, 
Bulgaria and Romania took part in the military exercise. During the exercise, the use 
of light weapons, first aid training, mine sweeping, reconnaissance and security 
drills were practiced.45 A month later, a delegation of Albanian military offices 
headed by Major General Armando Vincani, the Deputy Chief of General Staff, 
came to Turkey for a meeting with their Turkish counterparts for an exchange of 
views on military issues.46 After the meeting it was stated that Turkey and Albania 
would hold a joint military exercise in the Adriatic Sea off the coast of Albania in 
late August. The office of the chief of General Staff stated that three Albanian 
warships including a minesweeper and two torpedo ship and Turkish Turgut Reis, 
one of the best frigates in the Turkish Navy, were scheduled to participate in the 
exercise. It was also stated that Turkey would provide military aid and assistance to 
Albania. The training included naval operations, on board fire fighting techniques 
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and rescue operations, which were monitored by foreign attachés in Albania and 
officers from NATO.47 
 In early 1997, unrest broke out in the country when a series of fraudulent 
investment schemes collapsed resulting in thousands of citizens’ loss of their lives’ 
savings. In early April 1997, Turkish parliament approved sending troops to Albania 
while Albanian Deputy Foreign Minister Albert Rakipi was engaged in talks during 
his two-day visit in Ankara. During the unrest, militants armed with weapons looted 
from military barracks, estimated at some 200,000 guns, seized control of much of 
southern Albania. Turkey feared that as the rebels refused to hand over the guns, the 
weaponry could be carried over to Macedonia and Bulgaria and made its voice 
heard since the outbreak of clashes and followed intensive diplomacy in cooperation 
with Italy.48 After the Turkish troops’ duration of 3-month stay ended in late July, 
781 soldiers returned to Turkey.49 
 During Albanian Defense Minister Luan Haydarağa’s visit to Ankara, 
Defense Minister Đsmet Sezgin assued that Turkey was opposed to any kind of 
activity that would undermine peace and stability in the Balkans and two sides 
signed an agreement for a $5 million Turkish grant to Albania.50 For the second 
time, two weeks after the Albanian Defense Minister’s visit, Turkish parliament 
unanimously authorized the deployment of Turkish troops to Albania when the 
conflict in Kosovo escalated. The authorization left it up to the Cabinet to decide the 
needs, size, place and time of the deployment. The move would also allow the 
deployment of soldiers for possible international peacekeeping missions in Albania. 
A small group of soldiers went to the southern Albanian town of Vlora to protect a 
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Turkish technical team engaged in repairing a military shipyard, port and army 
barracks. There were also voices in the Parliament suggesting Turkey should also 
send Red Crescent aid for Kosovar Albanian refugees.51 
 In August 1998, an amphibious Turkish division was scheduled to set out for 
Albania to take part in a NATO exercise which would also be participated by the 
members of the PfP. General Staff’s related statement said that eleven NATO states, 
Belgium, Canada, France, Germany, Greece, Italy, the Netherlands, Spain, Turkey, 
the U.S.A. and Britain and three PfP countries, Albania, Russia, Lithuania in the 
Cooperative Assembly 98 exercises. The other PfP countries took part as observers. 
The maneuvers were carried out in Albanian and Macedonian territories, and were 
based on a scenario to end regional conflicts peacefully. The land, air, and naval 
forces of the participating countries were involved in search-and-rescue (SAR) 
missions, medical evacuation (MEDEVAC), and airdrop operations. Apart from the 
amphibious division, Turkey sent four F-16s, a transport plane, a frigate and logistic 
support.52 The following year, part of a 126-strong Turkish military unit left for 
Tirana, along with a number of vehicles and assorted equipment, in mid-May to join 
a special NATO force deployed in Albania to take part in the distribution of 
humanitarian aid to the Kosovar refugees who escaped from Yugoslavia.53 
 In 2002, National Defense Minister Sabahattin Çakmakoğlu met his 
Albanian counterpart Luan Rama in Tirana. Çakmakoğlu stated that the latest 
developments between the two states were discussed and added that Turkey would 
contribute to the modernization of Albania in the military field.54 The harvest of this 
visit was reaped during the visit of Chief of General Staff General Hüseyin 
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Kıvrıkoğlu to Albania where he met several dignitaries and officials, both political 
and military. During the visit, Kıvrıkoğlu was received by Albanian president Recep 
Meydani who said relations between the two states fostered stability and peace in 
the region and drew attention to the rebuilding Kucova airport. Kıvrıkoğlu signed a 
logistic application protocol with Rama. The protocol establishes the provision of 
$2,5 million worth of assistance to help the Albanian Army reach NATO standards. 
Kıvrıkoğlu also met with Albanian Chief of General Staff Pillumb Kazimi and 
discussed military relations and Kazimi stated that Albania would send units to 
assist the Turkish Army’s mission in Afghanistan.55  
 Turkish Armed Forces offer Albanian military personnel education and 
training activities in military colleges, Gülhane Military Medical Academy, military 
academies, military high schools, branch schools, and language schools. The 
number of Albanian military personnel to have attended the PfP training activities is 
468.56 In Albania, Turkey contributed to the reorganization and training of certain 
units and modernization of some military institutions. Turkish military personnel 
offered courses to Albanian military personnel concerning the establishment of a 
commando battalion. The training group, Turkish Organization and Training Team 
also engaged in the Training of Albanian Commando Brigade since 1997. The 
training of the unit of Republic Guards by Turkey also started under the command 
of General Staff Special Forces in 1999. Turkey also trained Albanian Special 
Forces Battalion. Furthermore, Turkey also contributed to the reconstruction of 
Albanian military institutions. For instance, Turkey reconstructed and modernized 
Albanian Naval War Academy and Pashaliman Naval Base. While the former 
opened in 2000, the Pashaliman Port was submitted to Albania in 2001. Turkish 
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ammunition company Mechanical and Chemical Industry Corporation (Makina ve 
Kimya Endüstrisi Kurumu) bought out and modernized the biggest ammunition 
plant in Albania. Turkey also supplied radar systems for the surveillance of the 
Albanian air space and of telecommunication equipment.57 
 
 
6.2.6. MILITARY RELATIONS BETWEEN TURKEY AND KOSOVO  
 
A short travel in the chronology of key events in Kosovo’s history manifests a 
miniature portrait of post-Cold War history of the Balkans. Frequent power shifts, 
mixture of different groups not getting along well, and consequent ethnic strife. Due 
to the unfixed characteristic of the Serbian province, which is in fact Serbian only 
officially, it would be helpful to scan the timeline of events that took place in the 
history of Kosovo since 1987, a key moment in the history in Slobodan Milosevic’s 
rise to power when he rallied a crowd of Kosovo Serbs who protested against 
alleged harassment by the majority Albanian community. Two years later, Milosevic 
revoked Kosovo’s autonomy under 1974 amendments to the Serbian Constitution, 
thus bringing the province under Belgrade’s direct control. In 1990, ethnic Albanian 
leaders declared independence from Serbia and Belgrade dissolved Kosovo 
government. More than 100,000 Kosovo Albanian employees in stately-owned 
companies were sacked. In 1991, Albania recognized the self-proclaimed Republic 
of Kosovo. In 1992, an academic, Đbrahim Rugova, was elected president and in the 
ensuing years, ethnic tension escalated. For instance, Serbian court sentenced 68 
Kosovo Albanians, charged with setting up a parallel police force to up to eight 
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years in prison. In 1996, a separatist rebel group, calling itself the Kosovo 
Liberation Army (KLA) emerged claiming responsibility for a series of bombings 
and attacks against Serbian police and state officials. In 1997, KLA staged attacks 
on Serbian leaders, police and Kosovo Albanians who collaborated with the Serbs. 
Open conflict between Serb police and the KLA took place for the first time in 1998 
upon which NATO gave an ultimatum to Milosevic to halt the crackdown on 
Kosovo Albanians.58 In face of escalating events, Kosovo’s self-declared leader 
Rugova began to seek support in Turkey in 1998. Kosovo’s representative in 
Turkey, Enver Tali, stated that Turkey had special meaning for them and they 
expected more support from Turkey than any other NATO country.59 
 When Belgrade rejected an internationally-brokered peace deal, which had 
been signed by the Kosovo Albanians, international peace monitors evacuated 
Kosovo. Thereafter, NATO prepared for imminent air attack. At the time, although 
analysts did not expect Turkey to take an active part in the operations, Ankara 
prepared its air, naval, and land forces. Air Force Commander General Đlhan Kılıç 
confirmed that Turkey had 11 F-16s at NATO bases in Italy. Defense Minister 
Hikmet Sami Türk also stated that Turkey carried out preparations for possible 
involvement in a NATO strike saying that Turkish Air Force was on duty, one of the 
warships was in the Adriatic and the army prepared a battalion although a land 
operation was out of question. At the time, it was stressed that Turkey was in favor 
of an enhanced autonomy for Kosovo, within Yugoslavia’s territorial integrity.60 
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 After NATO launched air strikes in March 1999, Turkey as an alliance 
member had to face the heavy task of countering the enemy resistance. This war was 
the first war beyond Turkey’s borders since 1974 intervention in Cyprus. The 
military officials stated that Turkey’s role in the region should not be 
underestimated and that Turkish jets were assigned to protect NATO’s bomber 
planes that bombarded targets in Yugoslavia.61 In the midst of the air strikes in 
April, General Staff announced that Turkish Armed Forces F-16s stationed at Ghedi 
Air Base in Italy had flown almost 650 hours as part of their Combat Air Patrol – 
CAP mission. Turkey did not participate in the bombardment for the risks involved 
for Turkey as a Balkan country as Ecevit put it, as well as, reportedly, due to lack of 
sophisticated bombing equipment with pinpoint target systems.62 Before the air 
strikes were called off, there were interpretations that the outcome of NATO’s 
Kosovo intervention would determine the course of several problems waiting to take 
place around Turkey. While Turkey was busy trying to carve a space with the then 
evolving European Security and Defense Identity (ESDI), it was argued that it 
should on this occasion have made its priority to support the leadership of NATO 
and try to urge NATO not to leave Kosovo with a vagueness. A possible NATO 
failure in Kosovo would signal a clear risk for Turkey’s security.63 At the time, 
Turkey had made arrangements to receive more than 20,000 refugees in Turkey and 
established camps for another 20,000 in Macedonia and Albania which was a 
decision as part of the NATO effort to help frontline countries to handle the burdens 
of the flow of refugees.64 In late May 1999, the Pentagon said that 54 American F-
15 and F-16 fighter jets would be deployed in June 1999 at three Western Anatolian 
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air bases that Turkey opened for use by NATO. Although Turkish officials 
preserved their silence about direct Turkish participation in the NATO air strikes, 
Pentagon spokesman Kenneth Bacon expressly stated that 18 Turkish jets would 
also take part in the air strikes, announcing that out of 72 fighter jets to be deployed 
in the air bases in Bandırma, Balıkesir, and Çorlu, 54 planes would be American F-
15s and F-16s, and the rest would be Turkish aircraft.65 In June 1999, President 
Milosevic agreed to withdraw troops from Kosovo and NATO called off air strikes. 
UN Security Council passed Resolution 1244, welcoming Yugoslavia’s acceptance 
of a political deal, including an immediate end to violence and a rapid withdrawal of 
its military, police and paramilitary forces. Placing Kosovo under UN 
administration, the Resolution also authorized the establishment of UNMIK and the 
deployment of NATO-led KFOR. NATO forces arrived in the province and the 
KLA agreed to disarm. By defining the Kosovo events as half-war, the critics 
alleged that what was brought to Kosovo was half-peace in the new era, and as 
regards the turnout of events in Turkey, their criticism hinged on the argument that 
letting alone establishing a Turkish zone in Kosovo beside the Germans, Italians, 
British, Americans, French and Russians, Turkey could not even transport its troops 
to Kosovo.66 
 Seeking to take on an active role in post-war Kosovo, Turkey expanded 
efforts to secure a solid Turkish participation both in the peacekeeping mission and 
the reconstruction plans in the region. Ankara had a growing frustration over its 
apparent alienation from the decision-making process in Kosovo since the air strikes 
were called off, which was voiced by Foreign Minister Cem and Prime Minister 
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Ecevit in June 1999. Turkey engaged in a controversy about deployment under 
KFOR as well as NATO’s delay in discussing its passage through Bulgaria. The 
relevant accord was inked by NATO and Sofia and was opened to what was called 
the “silence procedure” which meant that if no member state objected in 48 hours, 
the accord would automatically be considered accepted by NATO and then would 
be submitted to the Bulgarian parliament for approval. Yet, the accord faced the 
objection of France and accustomed objection of Greece. However, the obstacles 
were eliminated eventually and preparations to send 987-strong Turkish unit began. 
Meanwhile, regarding the location of Turkish KFOR troops, Prime Minister 
announced that the troops would be stationed in the German-controlled sector, in 
Prizren as opposed to former arrangements envisaging deployment in U.S.-
controlled sector in the town of Kosovska Kamenica. In fact the decision was 
welcomed by Ankara as it corresponded to the initial Turkish proposal for Prizren 
where a majority of Turkish population lives.67 By 26 June, the Bulgarian 
parliament had still not approved the passage of the Turkish unit through Bulgaria. 
General Staff Plans and Action Department Chief General Ethem Erdağı said that 
the talks over the exact location of Turkish unit still continued. The equipment 
would be transported by railway, and the heavy armored vehicles would go by road 
while most of the personnel would go by plane.68 Finally, Turkish Battalion Force 
set off for Kosovo from Mamak in Ankara in early July 1999. The first contingent 
made up of approximate 130 soldiers was scheduled to travel through Bulgaria and 
Macedonia to Kosovo. The rest were assigned to contribute to the NATO-led KFOR 
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were planned to be dispatched in 7 July and travel by rail and plane.69 The first 
group of the Turkish unit in KFOR entered Prizren in 4 July consisting of 133 troops 
and 52 vehicles.70  
 The mandate of Turkish unit is to ensure the implementation of the military-
technical agreement inked by NATO and the Republic of Federal Yugoslavia, as 
well as the obligations undertaken by Serbian forces and KLA; to deter Serbia from 
engaging in an offensive act towards Kosovo; to ensure security of the borders of 
Kosovo within its area of responsibility and to perform military exercises. This 
mandate includes operational and humanitarian tasks. While the former is based on 
border control, patrol and checkpoint conducting, search operation, monitoring 
Dragas and Tuzsuz quarters in Prizren, and CIMIC (Civil-Military Cooperation) 
activities, the latter includes limited school repair work, cooperation with UNICEF, 
and medical care by military doctors of the unit. As regards the composition and 
deployment, Turkish unit comprises of 1081 personnel and the figure includes 
Azerbaijani and Georgian platoon in accordance with bilateral agreements.71 
Turkish unit is deployed in five different camps. The majority of the unit is in Camp 
Sultan Murad in Prizren, one mechanized infantry company in the Dragas area, 
another mechanized infantry company in the Mamusa area. Some units are deployed 
in Pristina at KFOR Headquarters Main and a platoon is in Skopje at KFOR 
Headquarters Rear.72 On 29 May 2007, Turkey took over the leadership of Southern 
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Task Force for May 2007 - May 2008 period to leave the duty to Australia in May 
2008.73 
 The timeline of events since the end of 1999 clashes in Kosovo do not seem 
to display a conclusive portrait, either. In February 2002, Đbrahim Rugova was 
elected president by the Kosova parliament after ethnic Albanian parties reached a 
power-sharing deal and Bayram Rexhepi became Prime Minister. In October 2003, 
first direct talks between Serbian and Kosovo Albanian leaders took place since 
1999 and then UN set out conditions for the final status talks in 2005. In March 
2004, 19 people were killed in the worst clashes between Serbs and ethnic 
Albanians since 1999. In October 2004, Rugova’s pro-independence Democratic 
League won 47 seats in the 120-seat parliament, which was boycotted by Serbs. In 
December the same year, the parliament re-elected Rugova and elected former rebel 
commander Ramush Haradinaj as Prime Minister. In February 2005, Serbian 
President Boris Tadic visited Kosovo and promised to defend the rights of Serbs in 
the province. In the following month, Haradinaj was indicted to face UN war crimes 
tribunal in The Hague and resigned as Prime Minister to be succeeded by Bayram 
Kosumi. In July 2005, simultaneous blasts took place near UN, OSCE and Kosovo 
parliament buildings in Pristina and fortunately with no casualty or injury. In 
February 2006, Rugova died in Pristina and was succeeded by Fatmir Sejdiu and the 
following month, UN-sponsored talks on Kosovo’s final status began. In March 
2006, Kosumi resigned and was succeeded by former KLA commander Agim Ceku. 
The first direct talks since 1999 between Serbia and Kosovar leaders took place in 
Vienna. In October 2006, Serbs in Serbia proper approved a new constitution which 
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declared Kosovo as an integral part of the country upon which the Albanian 
majority in Kosovo boycotted the referendum. In February 2007, UN envoy Martti 
Ahtisaari announced a plan to set Kosovo to the road to independence, which 
unsurprisingly was welcomed by Kosovo Albanians and refused by Serbia.74 The 
UN Report proposing a controlled independence for Kosovo was submitted to UN 
Security Council on 26 March 2007. The report, penned by UN Special Envoy for 
Kosovo Martti Ahtisaari, fully supported by Secretary – General Ban Ki – Mun 
envisaged independence as the only choice for Kosovo. The plan proposed an 
internationally monitored independence for Kosovo and an assignment of an 
international civil representative in Kosovo, whose duration of stay in Kosovo is not 
defined in the plan. The plan stated that the international administration in Kosovo 
was unsustainable and autonomous Kosovo within Serbia was not supported. 
Ahtisaari also maintained that a possible return to Serbian governance in Kosovo 
would be unacceptable for the majority of Kosovar population. In fact, the plan gave 
extensive rights to Serbian minority in Kosovo. However, Kosovar Albanians 
wanted full independence, while the Serbs rejected it. The plan was scheduled to be 
opened for vote in April or May 2007. Russia refused both the Ahtisaari Plan and to 
recognize Kosovo’s independence. The U.S.A. and the EU were supportive of the 
plan.75 It was expected that the possible refusal of the plan by the Serbs could trigger 
untoward violent acts in Kosovo when one is reminded of the still fresh unpleasant 
history in the province. This compels one to think that Turkey with its military 
presence is likely stay in Kosovo at least in the short- and medium-term. 
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6.2.7. MILITARY RELATIONS BETWEEN TURKEY AND BULGARIA  
 
In the immediate aftermath of the change of regime in Bulgaria, the rapprochement 
observed in political relations did not easily translate itself to bilateral military 
relations. Although Bulgarian officials expressly stated that the recent assimilation 
campaign on Turks in Bulgaria had been a grave mistake in Bulgaria’s history and 
said they were ready to open a new page in bilateral relations, it seemed the military 
side of the story said otherwise, at least for the material time. This was mot evident 
in Bulgarian Chief of Staff General Raudniu Mincev’s remark when he said “We 
fear Turkey’s (military) presence in Thrace”76 which was affirmed by Bulgarian 
Prime Minister Andrei Lukanov’ by way of saying that there was threat from 
Turkey even though in theory and that Bulgaria looked to OSCE for provision of 
security.77 Such remarks were interpreted by President Özal as an obvious fear on 
the part of Bulgarians and that was why they wanted to conclude a nonaggression 
pact with Turkey.78 The following year, Bulgarian Prime Minister and Foreign 
Minister Stojan Ganev maintained that it was necessary to conclude an agreement 
on defense in December 199179 which was in fact produced as Sofia Document two 
weeks later, launching an era of cooperation between the armed forces of the two 
states and signed by the chiefs of General Staffs of Turkey and Bulgaria.80 The first 
contact in the military sphere was established in the General Staff level the same 
year by General Mehmet Önder.81 
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 In 1992, Bulgarian Defense Minister Dimitr Lucev came to Ankara for an 
official visit which was first of its kind since 191782, which was to be followed by 
the Edirne Document on friendship, goodneighborliness, cooperation and security.83 
The first concrete implementation as per Edirne Document was observed when part 
of the Turkish forces close to Turkish - Bulgarian border was moved from Edirne to 
Lüleburgaz and from Kırklareli to Đstanbul with a ceremony attended by Bulgarian 
Chief of Staff Lyuben Petrov. The improvement in military relations produced a 
positive atmosphere in relations so much so that former President Zheliu Zhelev was 
prompted to state in 1995 that the only state which did not attack Bulgaria since 
1885 was Turkey.84 
 In early 1996, Turkey and Bulgaria signed a military agreement in Sofia. The 
cooperation agreement was signed by Deputy Chief of the Bulgarian General Staff 
General Petko Prokopiev and Deputy Chief of the Turkish General Staff General 
Çevik Bir. The agreement envisaged Turkey and Bulgaria to participate in joint 
military exercises in 1996 and exchange of military advisors.85 This agreement was 
followed by another cooperation agreement in July 1997 concluded during 
Stojanov’s three-day visit to Turkey. The agreement covered defense, security, 
training, medicine, public relations and sports activities. Chief of General Staff 
General Đsmail Hakkı Karadayı said that the agreement would improve relations 
between the two states and would contribute to peace in Europe. Bulgarian Chief of 
General Staff Miho Mihov said that the agreement was a first step towards 
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sustaining good relations along with Turkey’s support for Bulgaria’s bid for NATO 
membership.86 
 The development of closer ties between defense sectors of Turkey and 
Bulgaria was seen once more during Turkish Chief of General Staff Hüseyin 
Kıvrıkoğlu’s visit to Bulgaria in 1999 to discuss Sofia’s bid to join NATO and 
cooperation between the two states’ militaries within the framework of SEEBRIG. 
Turkey’s interest in exploring prospects for participation in the privatization of 
Bulgarian defense industry was re-expressed during the visit, reaffirming the 
remarks of Defense Minister Đsmet Sezgin in Sofia that Ankara was inclined to 
contribute to the modernization of the Bulgarian Army to bring it to a par with 
NATO standards.87 
 As part of the process Turkey initiated with some of the neighboring states 
aimed at cleaning common borders from anti-personnel mines (APMs), the first 
positive results were obtained by way of an agreement regarding the prevention of 
APMs use and their removal from border areas. Signed in 1999, the agreement was 
put into effect in May 2002.88 In addition to high level visit, mutual group visits 
have also been conducted between the states. Groups from Bulgarian Naval War 
Academy and the Shooting Team of Bulgarian Armed Forces came to Turkey while 
Turkish military groups from Military Staff Colleges and Naval War Academy 
visited Bulgaria. Bulgarian Armed Forces personnel also receive training in Turkish 
military institutions such as Armed Forces College, Army War Academy, medicine 
courses, and the Turkish PfP Center. Likewise, Turkish Armed Forces personnel 
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also participate in training and education activities carried out in Bulgaria such as 
Bulgarian language course and the seminar of CHARALITZA-2000 concerning 
simulation systems and models. In 2001, military cooperation between Turkey and 
Bulgaria moved to a higher level with an exchange of soldiers stationed at border 
regions to allow them to engage in the field exercises and weaponry demonstrations. 
Within the framework of the abovementioned 1992 agreement to increase border 
security, twenty Bulgarian soldiers and twenty Turkish soldiers carried out the two-
day exercises simultaneously at the Bulgarian base at Harmanlı and the Turkish base 
at Kırklareli.89 The previous exercises also aimed at enhancing bilateral military 
relations, although not as comprehensive and frequent as those after 2001. These 
include Poyraz 1- 94 which was carried out by Turkish and Bulgarian Naval Forces 
in the Black Sea. The Cooperative Communication 96 was conducted with the 
Turkish and Bulgarian tactical signal units deployed near Kapitan Andreevo (in 
southern Bulgaria) and Kapıkule border checkpoints. As an activity under the PfP 
program, the aim of the exercise was to test the technical compatibility of signal 
means.90 
 Turkey participated in Seven Stars – 2001 carried out by SEEBRIG with 
mechanized infantry battalion. Turkish Defense Minister and Operational Chief of 
General Staff attended the exercise. In the same year, Turkish and Bulgarian land 
forces organized a Mutual Border Unit Training and Maneuver Program. The 
exercise carried out in the same year include Efes - 2001, Deniz Kurdu – 2001, Joint 
BnTf- 01, Deniz Yıldızı – 01, Karadeniz Ortaklık – 2001, Peaceful Star – 2001. In 
2002, following exercises were carried out: Mutual Border Unit Exercises, Mutual 
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Unit Exchange Exercise, Seven Stars – 2002, Deniz Kurdu 2002, Corner Stone, 
Breeze – 2002, Karadeniz Ortaklık – 2002.91 In 2003, the two states conducted 
another unit exchange exercise. Forty five personnel belonging to Kırklareli 33rd 
Mechanized Infantry Brigade Command went to the province of Stara Zagora in 
Bulgaria, where the exercise would be carried out 92 and a similar exercise was 
carried out in 2004 in Turkey.93 In 2005, Turkey and Bulgaria participated in Black 
Sea Partnership and Blackseafor – 2005 exercises which were based on joint 
maneuvering communication, search and rescue operations, cooperation in 
counterterrorism, antiboat, antisubmarine and air defense exercises.94 In 2006, 
Bulgaria and Turkey were involved in the exercise named Breeze 2006. A total of 
25 combat and auxiliary ships and a helicopter, from the Bulgarian Navy as well as 
two Su-25s of Bulgarian Air Force joined the exercise. Turkey, Greece and France 
joined with warships and the U.S.A. with a patrol aircraft and coast guard ship.95 
 
 
6.2.8. MILITARY RELATIONS BETWEEN TURKEY AND ROMANIA  
 
 Romanian Armed Forces started a comprehensive reform process in 1990 including 
the concept of defense, organization, training and procurement. After the fall of 
Communism in the country, Romania repeatedly expressed its inclination to become 
a NATO member. Accordingly, it began to participate in the PfP program which 
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brought it close to Turkey. The first military contacts were achieved in 1992 when 
Romanian Defense Minister visited Turkey during which the two states signed an 
outline military cooperation agreement. When Turkish Chief of General Staff 
returned the visit after a short a time and signed the agreement on training, 
technique and scientific cooperation n the military field.96 Mutual visits continued in 
the ensuing years with top military officials’ visits. In this context, Romanian Chief 
of General Staff Constantin Degeratu visited Turkish Chief of General Staff Đsmail 
Hakkı Karadayı in April 1997. The two military officials stressed historical 
cooperation between the two states and they expressed their inclination to take it to 
higher levels.97 Almost two weeks later, President Demirel welcomed his Romanian 
counterpart Emil Constantinescu and said Turkey supported the integration of 
Romania in to the EU and NATO.98  
 The following year, on the occasion of the transfer of Norwegian and 
Russian natural gas to Anatolia, Turkey and Romania came together and reached a 
compromise to work jointly about the matter. However, the other issue of primary 
concern was the production of 1800 6-wheeler military vehicles which were about to 
be completed as well as joint production of helicopters and tanks. It was stated that 
the joint production of eight samples of 6-wheeler military vehicles was about to be 
finished and that they would be handed over to Turkish Armed Forces. It was also 
noted that if the Armed Forces approved, 1800 of such military vehicles would be 
produced, which would cost $500 million in total.99  
 The issue of military cooperation was raised once more during 
Constantinescu’s visit in late July 1998 as the two states asserted their support fro 
                                                 
96
 Mustafa Aksaç, Turkey’s Military Efforts for Peace in the Balkans, p. 116. 
97
 “Basın Birinci Kuvvet”, 15 April 1997, Milliyet. 
98
 “Turkey Supports Romanis’s NATO and EU Bid”, 30 April 1997, Turkish Daily News. 
99
 “Türkiye ve Avrupa Doğalgazı Geliyor”, 18 April 1998, Cumhuriyet. 
  281 
 
the formation of a Balkan multinational peace force, which at the time, was planned 
to take immediate action in case of crisis situations in the region. The issue was also 
raised in the previous meeting in Ankara and Constatinescu expressed support for 
Plovdiv as the deployment location, upon which Demirel asked Constantinescu to 
support Turkey as a Balkan state. At the time, Edirne, Plovdiv and Romanian 
province of Constanza were the strongest contenders.100 
 In a 1998 interview, Romanian Defense Minister Victor Babiuc stated that 
the continuation of friendly relations between Turkey and Romania was very 
important concerning the stability and security of Southeast European states and 
affirmed his content with respect to Turkey’s support for Romania’s NATO bid. 
Babiuc stressed that it would be easier to strengthen military cooperation against 
security risks that may emerge in the Balkans when Romania entered NATO. 
Romanian Defense Minister pointed out the regular official meetings, the PfP 
exercises, Turkey’s military training offerings and Southeast Europe Multinational 
Peace Force, joint projects in defense industry.101 The same were confirmed by 
Chief of General Staff Hüseyin Kıvrıkoğlu during his official visit in Romania in 
October 1999 102 and in November 2000.103  
 Turkey and Romania carry out training activities within the framework of the 
military cooperation agreement. These activities which are carried out in Turkey are 
based on long-term education activities in Turkish military institutions and short-
term courses. Romanian military personnel are offered such courses in the military 
institutions, which cover military staff colleges, language schools, and Commando 
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School. Gülhane Military Medical Academy also provided courses on various war 
surgeries. Romanian military personnel also took courses and seminars at the 
Turkish PfP Center. The training activities in Romania focus on Turkish language 
courses. Turkish Chief of General Staff opened a Turkish language laboratory in 
Romanian Military Staff College in 1997. Turkey appointed a Turkish officer as 
teacher and in 2000, it sent a staff officer to Romanian High Staff College. The two 
countries also participated in various exercises to date, such as the Hezarfen – 97, 
carried out within the framework of PfP which was based on air traffic control 
tactics, the control of airspace and flight training, search and rescue operations as 
well as parachuting. The two states along with Bulgaria, Georgia and Ukraine, took 
part in the Joint Black Sea Corporation in 1999 in the western Black Sea. Within the 
framework of SEEBRIG, they participated in joint military exercises and Romania 
took part in Black Sea Partnership – 2002 carried out under the Turkish Navy 
Command. Romania also participated in Denizyıldızı 2001, Peaceful Star 2001, 
Black Sea Partnership 2001, Mehmetçik 2002, as an observer.104 The two states 
carried out a joint commando military exercise in Kayseri in August 2004.105 In the 
exercise conducted in Karasazlık region in Đncesu district, Turkish and Romanian 
units exercised parachute landing and landed unit and ammunition with CASA and 
C130 planes. The exercise was followed by Romanian Land Forces 2nd Aerial 
Landing Brigadier Ion Chinanescu and Kayseri 1st Commando Brigadier Second 
Commander Đsmet Erdağ. The exercise scenario was to neutralize the terrorists 
hidden in caves.106 
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 The following year, Turkey and Romania conducted a bilateral tactical 
exercise named Blue Eagle which took place in the two states simultaneously 
carried out by Romanian 34th Light Infantry and the Turkish Commando Brigade. 
The goal of this exercise was defined as to train and check the troops’ capability of 
conducting complex operations for the countering of threats to safety and security as 
well as the presentation of the particulars against terrorism.107 In 2006, Turkey held 
a joint naval drill with Romania and Greece named Turkish Minex – 2006 in the 
Aegean Sea. The participants declared by Turkish Naval Forces Command were 
Turkish, Romanian, and Greek warships, Standing NATO Response Force Mine 
Countermeasure Group 2 (SNMCMG) and Turkish Armed Forces aircraft.108  
 In addition to training and military exercises, Turkey and Romania also 
cooperate in the defense industry field including production of military garment, 
standardization, production of armored personnel carrier, and quality guarantee.109 
Romania preserves its supportive attitude concerning Turkey’s future EU 
membership in return for the support Turkey gave Romania for its NATO bid until 
Romania eventually joined the alliance in 2004. Romanian Ambassador in Turkey 
Constantin Grigorie’s remarks pointed to the same in his 2007 interview in Turkish 
daily: “We haven’t forgotten the support we received from Turkey when we wanted 
to join NATO, and now it is our turn to support Turkey to join the EU.”110 
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CHAPTER VII 
 
CONCLUSION 
 
The Balkans have come to be depicted for the region’s political, military, and 
economic significance for Turkey and this dissertation was no exception to this 
depiction. Turkey has been no stranger to the region since the end of the 14th 
century, when the Ottoman domination of the region began and lasted until the 
beginning of the 18th century, putting its imprint on the coming years as well. 
However, the coverage of Balkan issues and Turkey’s relations with the Balkans to 
date gives the impression of the approach that the issue should be devoted more 
scrutiny, yet it seems that this approach has not translated into practice. Relevant 
research on the issue is redundant concerning the pre-1990 period, however there is 
not as much research on the post-1990. The majority of the scholarly pieces in 
Turkish literature seems to focus on the Bosnian war and Turkey’s relations with 
Bosnia – Herzegovina and Kosovo, predominantly from a political point of view. 
As such, this dissertation aimed to bring together diplomatic/political, 
economic, and military relations of Turkey with all the Balkan states namely, Bosnia 
– Herzegovina, Serbia (and Montenegro), Croatia, Macedonia, Albania, Kosovo, 
Romania, Bulgaria, and Greece with special emphasis on the post-Cold War era. The 
main argument of the dissertation was the assumption that the Balkans have been 
underrated in Turkey’s relations and the diplomatic/political field has been treated 
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with the highest concern and this approach has come to downplay the role of the 
economic and the military relations. However, these venues are obviously 
interrelated and have the potential to consolidate one another if explored and 
exploited duly. The existing approach has yet to be replaced with a multidimensional 
one in order to be characterized differently in the future. Furthermore, this study also 
aimed to provide insight for future bilateral and regional relations as well as to make 
policy recommendations. Recent regime transformations in all regional states and 
possible future confrontations have the potential to translate into novel and 
substantial policy discords, and that requires an informed and well devised foreign 
policy towards the region. 
 In this context, the first chapter explored the historical backdrop as to how 
Turkey fits in the Balkans. After being pushed back territorially with World War I, 
Turkey tried to preserve its new frontiers in the Republican era and sought to develop 
peaceful relations with the region to this end. That was why the Balkan states were 
among the first states with which Turkey tried to develop friendly relations. In the 
Cold War years, Turkey became part of the Pax Americana after 1952, yet regional 
states took position on the opposite camp, except Greece. The Cold War proved that 
Turkish foreign policy towards the region hinged on the well-being of the Turkish 
minority as well as their protection. The polarized structure of world politics did not 
allow Turkey to develop a chance to build bilateral and regional relations in a regular 
course. With the exception of Bulgaria, the Communist regional states remained 
mostly marginal for Turkey. With the outbreak of the war in Bosnia in 1992, Turkey 
became preoccupied with the region once again. However, as the crisis subsided, 
Turkey was prompted to engage more with the Middle East than the Balkans by mid-
1990s. The break-up of Communism did not bring a fresh positive start in the region 
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and would bring to pass a new Balkanization, which coincided a time when Turkey 
began to pursue activism in foreign policy making. Turkey assumed a more 
participatory attitude and left aside the policy of non-involvement in regional affairs 
after 1990. This remarkable activism in regional relations gave rise to arguments 
which labeled Turkish foreign policy towards the Balkans as neo-Ottomanist. 
However, Turkey’s Balkan policy was seen a natural expression of the age-old 
geographical, historical, and cultural links in Ankara. In fact, although Turkey was 
concerned with the unfolding events in the Balkans in 1991, the region was not a top 
priority in Turkey in early 1991 as Turkey had to tackle more pressing issues such as 
the PKK terrorism, the Gulf War, and the war between Azerbaijan and Armenia. 
Despite the accusation of neo-Ottomanism, Turkish foreign policy towards the 
Balkans faced feverish national public opinion and expectations, limited means for 
action to create stability in the region, the necessity of acting in harmony with the 
multinational regional structures and of preserving policies in line with the West as a 
staunch ally. Due to the abovementioned more pressing policy issues as well as the 
economic crisis in Turkey in the mid-1990s, the activism in foreign policy making in 
the first half of the 1990s lost momentum. Although Turkey existed in the Balkans in 
political, economic, and military terms, it lacked the organizational network between 
these venues which was required to achieve desired levels in relations.  
 Upon this preparatory ground, the second chapter investigated the historical 
development of Turkey’s relations with the Balkan states from the end of the Great 
War to the end of the Cold War for the purpose of being able to compare Turkish 
foreign policy making towards the region in different time frames throughout the 20th 
century. Turkey’s Balkan policy during the interwar years manifested Atatürk’s 
foreign policy pillars, namely; Realism, tactical expertise, openness in dialogue, 
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knowledge of history, reliability, balanced self-reliance, activism in foreign policy, 
nationalism, humanitarianism, western orientation, and implementation of the “peace 
at home, peace in the world” as a principle. Upon the recent experience of war with 
the regional states, Atatürk’s foreign policy tenets were instrumental in building the 
disrupted relations with the Balkan states. The 1930s gave way to the signing of the 
first regional arrangement; the Balkan Entente in 1934. Turkey assumed a pivotal 
role in the conclusion of this agreement. Similarly, it adhered to this agreement until 
it completed its lifetime and dissolved during World War II. While the war continued 
full scale, Turkey, as well as Britain and the Soviet Union, grew concerned because 
Germany headed towards Romania and Bulgaria in 1940 and 1941. Britain proposed 
a bloc formed by Turkey, Greece, Yugoslavia, and Bulgaria against Germany, which 
yielded no result. After Romania and Bulgaria fell into the hands of Germany in 
early 1940s, Turkey made an appeal in the meeting of Balkan states in Belgrade, 
calling for standing against Germany. Turkey’s attempts failed in 1941 when 
Yugoslavia was invaded by German troops. Turkey considered the rise of 
Communism in the Balkans after World War II a serious issue due to the possibility 
that the Soviet Union could further proceed to dominate the Aegean and perhaps the 
Mediterranean Sea. If Communism took power in Greece, the possibility for Turkey 
to become “an island in the sea of Communism” would be reinforced. The most 
important consequence for Turkey with respect to the efforts towards establishing 
blocs in the Balkans, and Greek Civil War, in line with the Cold War system, was 
that Turkey began to recognize that regional conflicts were those between the U.S.A. 
and the Soviet Union and considered them a matter of aligning its relevant policies 
parallel to those of the U.S.A. By 1953, Turkey, Greece and Yugoslavia signed the 
Friendship and Cooperation Agreement in Ankara and a year later, Balkan alliance 
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was signed. These agreements did not last long, however efforts for cooperation in 
the region continued. After 1955, relations between Turkey and Greece became 
rocky and Turkey did not participate in the Stoica Plan. The previous unsuccessful 
attempts for a cooperative framework and Turkey’s prioritizing the Middle East after 
1955 were two other factors. Between 1945 and 1955, Turkey saw its security 
threatened in the Balkan region and preferred to ensure security through regional 
organizations and inked the Balkan pact and alliance in 1953 and 1954. The views of 
the ruling Democrat Party were based on the consideration that peace in the world 
presented integrity, so the security of a country could not be viewed independent 
from the overall security of the bloc to which that country belonged. That was why 
Turkey did not assume an active independent attitude towards the Balkans unlike 
Greece, and so it acted in line with the Western bloc. In line with the requirements of 
the Cold War system, Turkey did not hold bilateral negotiations, or enter bilateral 
agreements; or cooperate with the Balkan states that were in the opposite camp. In 
the 1960s and 1970s, Turkey conducted multilateralism in foreign policy which also 
included the Balkans. Relations with the Balkan states were attached utmost 
importance, yet this did not include Greece. Relations with the region further 
improved during Ecevit administration. The Balkans posed a relatively stable picture 
in the 1980s excluding the pressure on Turkish minority in Bulgaria, due to which 
relations with this country were strained in 1989. After taking office in 1983, Özal 
government acted cautiously about the minority issue and referred the issue to 
international fora. While Greece entered a rapprochement with Bulgaria on this 
occasion, relations between Yugoslavia and Turkey became closer, although not 
overtly pronounced. 
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 The third chapter showed that relations with the Balkans were shaped in a 
totally different framework with Communism gone. While Turkey handled relations 
with the Balkans during the Cold War within the framework of a bipolar structure, it 
now had to redefine its bilateral and multilateral relations in political, economic, and 
military fields when it found itself surrounded by regional conflicts in the 
Transcaucasus, the Gulf, and the Balkans. Although Turkey took every effort in 
diplomatic, political, and military terms for war to come to an end, it was observed 
that while Turkey’s allies in the West listened to the pleas of Turkish politicians and 
officials with respect, Turkey remained unable to realize its central goals. From the 
beginning until the end, Turkey rejected the idea of a unilateral intervention and tried 
to act as a reliable and responsible mediator. However, Turkey’s efforts of mediation 
never rested on an aloof stance at any point throughout the war. Indeed, the Action 
Plan proposed by Turkey in as early as August 1992 to the ambassadors of the UN 
Security Council Ankara was adopted, if not in its entirety, through the end of the 
war. As regards the domestic repercussions of the war in the parliament, Turkish 
foreign policy did not present a uniform character, the opposition parties were critical 
of the government’s policies mostly by way of alleging that they were ineffective, 
inadequate, and devoid of any power of deterrence. While WP’s criticisms hinged 
more on the common denominator of religion as the departure point, other opposition 
parties, MP and DLP, stressed the lack of an active stance on the part of the 
government and the lack of attempts of call on the international community to end 
the conflict. Their common criticism was that the government did not have a well-
defined Balkan policy. On the other hand, the statements of the government centered 
on the argument that Turkey would in no way engage in a unilateral intervention but 
act in compliance with the international community. Frequent sessions and feverish 
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discussions in the parliament lost momentum with the signing of the Dayton Peace 
Accord. The current state of affairs between Turkey and Bosnia – Herzegovina is 
enough reason to maintain that even if there had been no war in Bosnia in the 1990s, 
relations between Turkey and Bosnia would still preserve its particular nature owing 
to the common history. As for Serbia and Montenegro in former Yugoslavia after the 
conflict erupted, Turkey faced a dilemma because while the relations were strained 
due to the Bosnian War and the anti-Turkish attitude of ultranationalist Serbian 
leaders, the fact that Yugoslavia was the gateway for Turkish trade routes to Europe 
stood as a primary concern in Turkey’s policy formulation. Turkey took efforts to 
avert an Orthodox – Muslim conflict in the region in respect of which it avoided to 
follow a policy not to antagonize Serbia’s main ally Greece when Turkey and Greece 
already had strained relations. As such, Turkey’s foreign policy towards Serbia was 
the subject of severe criticism. It took at least four, or even five years, for the 
bilateral relations to enter normalization stage due to the crisis in Kosovo. As the 
issue of Kosovo still remained at the time of the writing of this dissertation, it can be 
argued that Turkey should duly revisit its Balkan policy in face of the possibility that 
in the absence of Milosevic, there is still a possibility that Serbia’s main opposition 
party and the Socialist Party would not miss the time to elevate Milosevic 
posthumously to a national hero. In fact, to a remarkable portion of Serb population, 
he is so, and that implies a remaining threat to the security of the Balkans with regard 
to Kosovo. The relations between Turkey and Croatia used to be defined as one of 
competing national interests; but the two states now share the common view that the 
EU and NATO are the basis of stability and peace in the Balkans and Europe. 
Turkey’s relations with Croatia are linked, and are likely to remain linked, to 
Croatian – Bosnian relations; the three states have developed a system of 
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trilateralism to further their relations as of 1994 which provided a forum for periodic 
consultations. Turkish foreign policy towards Croatia was conducted with Demirel’s 
personal attempts after 1995, due to mostly which the Croatian attitude towards 
Bosnia displayed a conciliatory nature after Dayton, and equally importantly, averted 
collaboration with the Serbs. As regards the last former Yugoslav republic 
Macedonia, after Turkey recognized Macedonia in February 1992, the diplomatic 
relations began in late August and Turkey was the first state to open an embassy in 
Skopje. Turkey sent aid to Macedonia which proved vital in the winter of 1992 when 
the country had to face the Greek embargo. As in the case of other Balkan states, 
Turkey’s interest towards the region was at its peak between 1992 and 1995. 
However, after the fall of Erbakan government in 1997, relations re-entered a 
normalization path. In face of Macedonia’s willingness towards integration with 
Euro-Atlantic structures, Turkey has repeatedly stated its support for Macedonia’s 
integration into the EU and NATO and is likely to continue to do so in the ensuing 
years. As the most isolated and the weakest communist state in the 1970s, Albania 
found itself in an even weaker and more fragile environment by 1991 and paid 
particular attention to its relations with Turkey and wanted to establish good bilateral 
ties. The absence of any major dispute in bilateral relations was conducive in 
improving relations and Albania was seen as the natural ally of Turkey. Turkey 
stated that it would extend a $ 50 million humanitarian and technical aid to Albania 
in as early as 1992 and such an improvement in bilateral relations made former 
Greek Foreign Minister Andonis Samaras define Albania as part of the alleged 
“Muslim Axis” led by Turkey. The country became closer to Greece after 1997, 
when Greece altered its policy towards Albania into a friendly one. However, 
Albania became closer once again to Turkey when the Kosovo crisis erupted. Turkey 
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supported Kosovar Albanians against the Serbs since the Kosovar Albanians were 
mostly Muslim and Turkish public opinion was favorable towards them; Turkey 
would not afford to assume a pro-Serbian stand or act neutrally after the Bosnian 
experience. Turkey also had close relations with Albania and this was particularly 
important in respect of Albania’s improving relations with Greece. As things stand 
now, Albania and Turkey possess common policies regarding the future of Kosovo 
as well as the stability in Europe. Turkey’s relations with Bulgaria entered a new 
phase after Bulgaria’s accession to the EU on 1 January 2007. Turkey has come to 
voice support for Bulgaria’s EU and NATO – membership and has received due 
reciprocation from its Balkan neighbor. Since the restoration of the memory of the 
assimilation campaign towards the Turkish minority in Bulgaria, Turkish – Bulgarian 
relations have been on the rise in many fields, and particularly in economy, defense, 
tourism, culture, and science. Bulgaria is an important regional state for Turkey for 
being its geographical gateway to Europe. Given that Turkey’s main trading partner 
is the EU with an export of 27 billion Euros from the EU and an import of 22 billion 
Euros to the EU in 2006, Bulgaria is the first stop on Turkey’s trade route to Europe, 
through which Turkey carries out trade activities with its transport fleet which is the 
largest in Europe. Land transport is equally important for human transport, and 
primarily for the Turks in Germany. As such, transportation for trade and humans are 
profitable for Bulgaria for tax revenue. Moreover, as Turkey is on Bulgaria’s trade 
route to the Middle East, preservation of transport facilities are also crucial for 
Bulgaria. Therefore, land transport is a common concern for both Turkey and 
Bulgaria. Furthermore, viewed in respect of the Turks in Bulgaria, preservation of 
stability in mutual relations and in domestic politics of Bulgaria are fundamental to 
ensure that they live in the country with a certain degree of integration and the least 
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possible problems in this regard. Turkey’s military, political, and economic 
initiatives towards Bulgaria have been formulated around such considerations. In 
turn, these initiatives contributed to the normalization, improvement, and 
consequently the exemplary nature of relations. Given that the ruling party in Turkey 
emerged once again as the majority party from the recent elections, it seems most 
likely that there will not be any particular radical change in the course of Turkish – 
Bulgarian relations in the short- and medium-term. With the end of the Cold War and 
the outbreak of new conflicts in the Balkans, Turkey and Greece embarked into a 
political and economic competition as the most powerful two regional states. This 
competition was conducted overtly by Greece and not too straightforwardly by 
Turkey. Greece’s Balkan policy after mid-1990s hinged on seeking ways of 
economic cooperation via confidence, friendship and equal cooperation package and 
transforming that duly into an agreement between Balkan states in establishing and 
maintaining democracy; forming an economic cooperation zone in the region; 
building goodneighborliness relations with Albania and Macedonia, and ensuring the 
expansion of NATO’s peace umbrella in a way to cover the Balkans. However, 
above all, Greece’s most valuable asset was its EU card with which it used the 
political and economic advantages of its membership. Greece had strained relations 
with Albania and Macedonia until 1997; it altered its policies to improve ties with 
these states after 1997 and tried to surpass Turkey’s activism in the region, mostly 
through economic investment. Among formerly communist Balkan states, Romania 
comes to fore as the state with which Turkey improved its relations on a stable basis 
and had almost no problems. Turkey and Romania improved their ties mostly 
through economic activities. The main foreign policy tenets implemented by 
Romania to ensure national security and regional stability are linked to the promotion 
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of partnership relations for entering NATO and European institutions; participating 
in regional and sub-regional projects; establishing bilateral relations; and avoiding 
military adventures. As in the case of other regional states, Turkey backed 
Romania’s integration into EU and NATO. In such a framework, Turkish – 
Romanian relations continued to improve although the two states had been on 
different sides during the Bosnian War and the country now ranks first in terms of 
bilateral export and import, among the regional states with which Turkey has 
commercial ties. 
The fourth chapter explored in what ways the activities in the economic 
activities in the region function as one of the tools that could serve to bolster 
political, cultural, and social relations. Despite Turkey’s continuous efforts, bilateral 
economic relations with the region still remain below desired levels. Yet on the 
whole, Turkish private sector has invested and participated in privatization projects 
considerably in the region since 1990s. Turkey also provided credit to Balkan states 
in pursuit of contributing to the establishment of stability after handicapped relations 
with the region during the Cold War period. Both external and internal factors such 
as inadequate economic infrastructure including incentives, trade and investment 
agreements, the common tendency to invest in Central Asia and Caucasus which are 
rich in natural sources and work power, sluggish and evolving economic systems in 
the regional states, unfavorable tariff agreements, weak banking systems, political 
instability and absence of strategic natural resources prevented economic ties to 
become stronger. Turkey’s share in the region’s $174 million worth overall foreign 
trade was $6,7 million in 2006, which constituted only 4% in the overall figure. 
While Turkey’s trade with regional states is 8%, it was 30 % with close and 
neighboring states in 2006. Turkey’s economic ties are the strongest with Romania as 
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Romania offers a relatively more stable and larger market in the region. Turkish 
entrepreneurs have invested and are investing in Balkan markets. However, this is 
confined to certain limits as Turkey could not develop long-term policies in face of 
domestic and external factors mentioned, which turned out to be haphazard. 
However, there is no ground to argue about a change to the worse as Turkey’s trade 
volume with the regional states are on the increase compared to previous years. 
Long-term trade relations can be reinforced if the region is not underrated by Turkish 
investors.  
 The fifth chapter examined the military relations of Turkey with the regional 
states. Cognizant of the fact that military cooperation inspires confidence also in 
politics and economy, Turkey established bilateral, regional, and international 
military relations with the Balkan states since the end of the Cold War, when the 
states still harbored suspicion towards each other with the fresh memory of the Cold 
War. Turkey took efforts for the normalization of relations by proposing joint 
exercises. Turkish military forces took due initiatives as the significance of enhanced 
military relations also boasts political and diplomatic, as well as economic ties, by 
way of bringing together the once archrival states of the Cold War years into a 
cooperative framework. The existence of Turkish Armed Forces in former trouble 
spots, such as Bosnia – Herzegovina and Kosovo, also proved their competence. 
Training, health, social, and education facilities carried out by the Turkish Armed 
Forces both in Turkey and in the regional states are enough reason to maintain that 
military is the field in which Turkey has asserted itself most strongly and effectively 
in the region. The intensity of cooperation in the field of defense and military would 
definitely be unthinkable two decades ago. However, it can safely be argued that the 
overall improving nature of bilateral relations owes much to the military venue in the 
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form of cooperation in bilateral, regional, and international platforms in the post-
Cold War era.   
 
 Bilateral relations between Turkey and Balkan states entered a new phase 
after the integration process of regional states recently began to materialize with full 
EU membership. Accordingly, it is possible to maintain that Turkey’s relations with 
these states will be brought to pass both in individual bilateral structures and in 
connection with the EU and NATO. Turkey has come to back NATO and EU bids of 
Balkan states both in principle and in practice. Although not at desired levels, 
Turkish – Balkan relations are gradually improving. The Balkans preserves its 
significance for Turkey for being its geographical gateway to Europe. The fact that 
Turkey’s main trading partner was the EU with an export of 27 billion Euros from 
the EU and an import of 22 billion Euros to the EU in 2006 is self-explanatory in this 
regard. Furthermore, viewed in respect of the Turks in the Balkans, preservation of 
stability in mutual relations and in domestic politics of host states are fundamental to 
ensure that the Turks in the Balkans live in their respective host countries with a 
certain degree of integration and the least possible problems in this regard. It remains 
to be seen whether this can be achieved with a revised, long-term, well-worked 
foreign policy towards the region where the government, diplomats, military, and 
businessmen work in close cooperation. 
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APPENDIX A 
 
PACT OF BALKAN AGREEMENT BETWEEN YUGOSLAVIA, GREECE, 
ROMANIA, AND TURKEY 
 
Athens, 9 February 1934 
His Majesty The King of Yugoslavia, the President of the Republic of Greece, His 
Majesty The King of Romania and the President of the Republic of Turkey, in a wish 
to contribute to the consolidation of peace in the Balkans, 
Inspired by the spirit of accommodation and conciliation which was of decisive 
importance in the elaboration of the Briand-Kellogg Pact and the adoption of the 
decisions of the League of Nations relating to it, 
Strongly determined to ensure the respect for the already existing treaty obligations 
and the maintenance of the territorial order now established in the Balkans, 
Have decided to conclude a 
PACT OF BALKAN AGREEMENT  
and, for this purpose, designated as their Plenipotentiaries: 
His Majesty The King of Yugoslavia: 
His Excellency Mr. Bogoljub Jevtić, Minister of Foreign Affairs, 
The President of the Republic of Greece: 
His Excellency Mr. Dimitrios Maximos, Minister of Foreign Affairs, 
His Majesty The King of Romania: 
His Excellency Mr. Nicola Titulescu, Minister of Foreign Affairs, 
The President of the Republic of Turkey: 
His Excellency Mr. Rushdi Bey, Minister of Foreign Affairs, 
Who, after exchanging their Full Powers which were found to be in good and 
prescribed form, agreed on the following provisions: 
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Article 1 
Yugoslavia, Greece, Romania and Turkey shall mutually guarantee the security of 
their Balkan borders. 
Article 2 
The High Contracting Parties undertake to reach agreement on measures which must 
be taken if cases should arise that could affect their interests as defined by the present 
Agreement. They assume the obligation not to take any political action towards any 
other Balkan country which is not a signatory to this Agreement, without a prior 
mutual notification and not to assume any political obligation towards any other 
Balkan country without the consent of the other Contracting Parties. 
Article 3 
The present Agreement shall come into force upon its signing by all the Contracting 
Powers and shall be ratified within the shortest possible time. The Agreement shall 
be open to any Balkan country for accession which shall be taken into favourable 
consideration by the Contracting Parties and shall come into effect as soon as the 
other signatory countries notify their consent. 
In witness whereof of the afore-mentioned Plenipotentiaries have signed this Pact. 
Done in Athens, this ninth February one thousand nine hundred thirty four, in four 
copies, one copy having been handed to each High Contracting Party. 
(L.S.) (signed) B.D. Jevtić  
(L.S.) (signed) D. Maximos 
(L.S) (signed) N. Titulescu 
(L.S) (signed) Dr. Rushdi Bey 
The above Pact of Balkan Agreement was ratified by His Majesty King Alexander I, 
King of Yugoslavia, in Belgrade on 16 June 1934, Conf. No. 13991 - Ministry of 
Foreign Affairs, Belgrade, 23 June 1934. 
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APPENDIX B 
 
TREATY OF FRIENDSHIP AND COLLABORATION BETWEEN THE 
FEDERAL PEOPLE'S REPUBLIC OF YUGOSLAVIA, THE KINGDOM OF 
GREECE AND THE TURKISH REPUBLIC 
SIGNED AT ANKARA, ON 28 FEBRUARY 1953 
The Contracting Parties, 
reaffirming their belief in the principles set forth in the Charter of the United 
Nations, 
determined to live in peace with all the peoples and to contribute to the maintenance 
of international peace, 
desirous to consolidate the friendly relations existing between them, 
resolved to defend the freedom and independence of their peoples, as well as their 
territorial integrity against any force exerted from outside, 
determined to unite their efforts in order to render more effective the organization of 
their defence against any aggression from outside and to act in concert collaborate 
regarding all questions of mutual interest and, particularly, regarding questions 
concerning their defence, 
convinced that the mutual interests of their peoples and all peaceloving peoples 
require that appropriate measures be taken for the safeguarding of peace and security 
in this part of the world, pursuant to Article 51 of the United Nations Charter, 
Have resolved to conclude this treaty and the Heads of their States have appointed as 
their respective Plenipotentiaries: 
The President of the Federal People’s Republic of Yugoslavia: 
His Excellency Monsieur Koca POPOVIC, 
Secretary of State; 
His Majesty the King of the Hellenes: 
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His Excellency Monsieur Stephanos STEPHANOPOULOS, 
Minister of Foreign Affairs; 
The President of the Turkish Republic: 
His Excellency Professor Fuad KÖPRÜLÜ 
Minister of Foreign Affairs,  
Deputy of Istanbul; 
who after exhibiting their full powers and finding them in good and proper form, 
have agreed upon the following provisions: 
Article I 
In order to ensure their collaboration permanently, the Contracting Parties shall 
proceed to consultations concerning all problems of mutual interest. 
The Ministers of Foreign Affairs of the Contracting Parties shall hold a regular 
conference once a year and, if necessary, more often, in order to examine the 
international political situation and make appropriate decisions in accordance with 
the aims of this Treaty. 
Article II 
The Contracting Parties intend to pursue their mutual efforts for the safeguarding of 
peace and security in their region and jointly continue to examine the problems of 
their security, including the concerted measures of defence, which might become 
necessary in case of a non-provoked aggression against them. 
Article III 
The General Staffs of the Contracting Parties shall pursue their collaboration in order 
to submit to their Governments, by common consent, recommendations concerning 
questions of defence, with a view to making co-ordinated decisions. 
Article IV 
The Contracting Parties shall develop their collaboration in the economic, technical 
and cultural spheres; whenever necessary appropriate agreements shall be concluded 
and necessary organizations set up for the purpose of solving economic, technical 
and cultural problems. 
Article V 
The Contracting Parties undertake to settle any dispute which may arise between 
them by peaceful means, in accordance with the provisions of the United Nations 
Charter and in a spirit of understanding and friendship; they also undertake to refrain 
from interfering with the internal affairs of the other Contracting Parties. 
Article VI 
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The Contracting Parties shall refrain from concluding any alliance, or from taking 
part in any action, directed against anyone of them, or in any action which may be 
prejudicial to their interests. 
Article VII 
The Contracting Parties, each for itself, declare that none of the international 
obligations now in force between them and one or several other States is in 
contradiction with the provisions of the present Treaty; on the other hand, they 
engage themselves not to assume in the future any international obligations 
conflicting with the present Treaty. 
Article VIII 
This Treaty does not affect, and cannot be interpreted as affecting in any way, the 
rights and obligations of Greece and Turkey deriving from the North Atlantic treaty 
of April 4, 19491 . 
Article IX 
After the coming of this Treaty into force any other state, whose collaboration for the 
realization of the aims of this Treaty is deemed useful by all the Contracting Parties, 
will be able to accede to the Treaty under the same conditions and with the same 
rights as the three signatory States. 
Each State acceding to this Treaty shall become a Contracting Party of the Treaty by 
deposing an instrument of accession. 
Article X 
The present Treaty, whose French version shall be authentic, shall be ratified by all 
the Contracting Parties and the instruments of ratification shall be deposed with the 
Secretary of State of the Federal People’s Republic of Yugoslavia in Beograd; it shall 
enter into force on the date of deposit of the last instrument of ratification. 
At the expiration of five years after the coming into force of the present treaty, each 
Contracting Party may cease to be a party to the Treaty by notifying the 
Governments of the other Contracting Parties one year in advance. 
IN WITNESS WHEREOF the respective Plenipotentiaries have signed this Treaty. 
DONE in Ankara, this twenty-eight day of February one thousand nine hundred and 
fifty-three, in three copies, one copy being delivered to each Contracting Party. 
Koca POPOVIC, m.p 
Stephanos STEPHANOPOULOS, m.p. 
Fuad KÖPRÜLÜ, m.p. 
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APPENDIX C♦ 
 
 
 
THE CHRONOLOGY OF KEY EVENTS IN THE BALKANS 
 
1989 
 
* 27 February: Yugoslav troops sent to suppress unrest in Kosovo. 
* 8 May: Milosevic becomes President of Serbia 
* 28 June: Milosevic addresses mass rally of Serbs at Kosovo Polje on the six 
hundredth Battle of Kosovo. 
 
1991 
 
* May: Beginning of Croatian – Serb rebellion 
* 25 June: Slovenia and Croatia declare independence 
* 27 June: Yugoslav Army attacks Slovenia 
* 25 September: UN imposes arms embargo on all former Yugoslavia 
* 19 November: Fall of Vukovar to Serb forces 
 
1992 
 
* 2 January: UN mediator Cyrus Vance negotiates ceasefire for Croatia 
*15 January: EC recognizes Croatia and Slovenia 
*21 February:UN sends fourteen thousand peacekeeping troops to Croatia 
*29 February: Bosnia – Herzegovina declares independence. Bosnian Serbs proclaim 
separate state. 
* 5 April: Bosnian Serbs begin siege of Sarajevo 
 
1993 
 
*2 January: Cyrus Vance and Davis Owen unveil at Geneva peace talks to divide 
Bosnia into ten semi-autonomous provinces. 
*22 February: UN set sup war crimes tribunal for former Yugoslavia 
*6 May: UN declares six “safe areas” for Bosnian Muslims: Srebrenica, Zepa, 
Sarajevo, Bihac, Tuzla and Gorazde 
*15-16 May: In a referendum Bosnian Serbs vote for an independent Bosnian Serb 
state 
 
 
 
                                                
♦
 Margaret Thatcher, Statecraft (New York: Harper Collins, 2002), pp. 293 -296. 
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1994   
 
*5 February: Sixty killed and two hundred wounded in mortar attack on Sarajevo 
*18 March: Bosnian government and Bosnian Croats sign US-brokered accord 
*13 May:Five-nation Contact Group announces new plan and eventual partition 
Bosnia 
*20 July: Bosnian Serbs reject peace plan 
*21 November: NATO launched major air strike on Serb airfield. 
*25 November: Serbs detain fifty-five Canadian peacekeepers. 
 
1995 
 
*1 May: Ceasefire expires. Croatia launches offensive to retake Western Slavonia 
*26 May: Serbs take more UN peacekeepers hostage. Eventually 370 seized. 
*28 May: Aircraft carrying Bosnian Foreign Minister Ljubijankic shot down by 
Serbs by Serbs over Bihac.  
*15 June: Serbs step up shelling of Sarajevo and other ‘safe areas’ 
*11 July: Serbs overrun Srebrenica ‘safe area’. 
*12-13 July: Thousands of Muslim men detained (later murdered), while twenty 
thousand Muslim women, children and elderly are expelled to Tuzla 
*25 July: Serbs take Zepa. 
*4 August: Croatia launches assault on rebel Serbs in Knin (Serb ‘Krajina) 
*28 August: Bosnian Serb shell kills thirty-seven in the Sarajevo bazaar. UN secretly 
pulls peacekeepers out of Gorazde 
*30 August: NATO launches major air strikes on Serb guns around Sarajevo. Serbs 
retaliate by shelling Sarajevo 
*1 November: Bosnian peace talks begin in Dayton 
*21 November: Dayton Peace Accord signed. Fifty-one per cent of Bosnian territory 
granted to Bosnian-Croat Federation, 49 per cent to Serbs 
*23 November: UN Karadzic accepts peace plan.  
*30 November: UN votes to end peacekeeping mission by 31 January 1997 
*1 December: NATO authorizes deployment of sixty thousand troops to Bosnia 
*14 December: Serbs, Bosnians and Croats sign peace plan. Bosnian and Serb 
governments agree to formal diplomatic recognition 
*20 December: NATO strikes over command of Bosnia peace mission 
 
1997 
 
*15 June: Tudjman re-elected President of Croatia 
*15 July: Milosevic becomes President of Yugoslavia 
 
1998 
 
*31 March: UN Security Council condemns Yugoslavia’s excessive use of force in 
Kosovo and imposes economic sanctions 
*August: Serbs forces attack Kosovo Albanian villages in Drenica region, forcing 
thousands to flee 
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1999 
 
*January: Evidence comes to light of Serb massacre of Kosovars at Racak 
*6 February: Rambouillet peace talks begin in France. Milosevic refuses to attend 
*18 March: Kosovo Albanian delegates finally sign autonomy plan at Rambouillet. 
Serbs refuse, and begin exercises in Kosovo the following day 
*24 March: Kosovo air war begins 
*27 May:ICTY announces indictment of Milosevic 
*9 June: NATO and Yugoslav authorities agree terms for Serb withdrawal from 
Kosovo 
*10 June: NATO suspends bombing. UN Security Council adopts Resolution 1244, 
permitting deployment of international civil and military personel in Kosovo 
*12 June: Russian troops take control of Pristina airport. NATO forces move into 
Kosovo 
*14 June: Ethnic Albanians begin flooding back into Kosovo. Over six hundred 
thousand return within three weeks 
*20 June: Serb forces complete withdrawal from Kosovo 
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APPENDIX D♦ 
 
SUMMARY OF THE DAYTON PEACE ACCORD ON BOSNIA-
HERZEGOVINA 
 
General Framework Agreement 
• Bosnia and Herzegovina, Croatia and the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia 
agree to fully respect the sovereign equality of one another and to settle 
disputes by peaceful means.  
• The FRY and Bosnia and Herzegovina recognize each other, and agree to 
discuss further aspects of their mutual recognition.  
• The parties agree to fully respect and promote fulfillment of the commitments 
made in the various Annexes, and they obligate themselves to respect human 
rights and the rights of refugees and displaced persons.  
• The parties agree to cooperate fully with all entities, including those 
authorized by the United Nations Security Council, in implementing the 
peace settlement and investigating and prosecuting war crimes and other 
violations of international humanitarian law.  
Annex 1-A: Military Aspects 
• The cease-fire that began with the agreement of October 5, 1995 will 
continue.  
• Foreign combatant forces currently in Bosnia are to be withdrawn within 30 
days.  
• The parties must complete withdrawal of forces behind a zone of separation 
of approximately 4 km within an agreed period. Special provisions relate to 
Sarajevo and Gorazde.  
• As a confidence-building measure, the parties agree to withdraw heavy 
weapons and forces to cantonment/barracks areas within an agreed period and 
to demobilize forces which cannot be accommodated in those areas.  
• The agreement invites into Bosnia and Herzegovina a multinational military 
Implementation Force, the IFOR, under the command of NATO, with a grant 
of authority from the UN.  
• The IFOR will have the right to monitor and help ensure compliance with the 
agreement on military aspects and fulfill certain supporting tasks. The IFOR 
                                                 
♦
 Available on University of Minnesota web site, http://www1.umn.edu/humanits/icty/dayton/dayton 
accord.html as retrieved on 9 April 2006 21:14:52 GMT. 
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will have the right to carry out its mission vigorously, including with the use 
of force as necessary. It will have unimpeded freedom of movement, control 
over airspace, and status of forces protection.  
• A Joint Military Commission is established, to be chaired by the IFOR 
Commander. Persons under indictment by the International War Crimes 
Tribunal cannot participate.  
• Information on mines, military personnel, weaponry and other items must be 
provided to the Joint Military Commission within agreed periods.  
• All combatants and civilians must be released and transferred without delay 
in accordance with a plan to be developed by the International Committee of 
the Red Cross.  
Annex 1-B: Regional Stabilization 
• The Republic of Bosnia and Herzegovina, the Federation and the Bosnian 
Serb Republic must begin negotiations within 7 days, under Organization for 
Security and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE) auspices, with the objective of 
agreeing on confidence-building measures within 45 days. These could 
include, for example, restrictions on military deployments and exercises, 
notification of military activities and exchange of data.  
• These three parties, as well as Croatia and the Federal Republic of 
Yugoslavia, agree not to import arms for 90 days and not to import any heavy 
weapons, heavy weapons ammunition, mines, military aircraft, and 
helicopters for 180 days or until an arms control agreement takes effect.  
• All five parties must begin negotiations within 30 days, under OSCE 
auspices, to agree on numerical limits on holdings of tanks, artillery, armored 
combat vehicles, combat aircraft and attack helicopters.  
• If the parties fail to establish limits on these categories within 180 days, the 
agreement provides for specified limits to come into force for the parties.  
• The OSCE will organize and conduct negotiations to establish a regional 
balance in and around the former Yugoslavia.  
Annex 2: Inter-Entity Boundary 
• An Inter-Entity Boundary Line between the Federation and the Bosnian Serb 
Republic is agreed.  
• Sarajevo will be reunified within the Federation and will be open to all people 
of the country.  
• Gorazde will remain secure and accessible, linked to the Federation by a land 
corridor.  
• The status of Brcko will be determined by arbitration within one year.  
Annex 3: Elections 
• Free and fair, internationally supervised elections will be conducted within 
six to nine months for the Presidency and House of Representatives of Bosnia 
and Herzegovina, for the House of Representatives of the Federation and the 
National Assembly and presidency of the Bosnian Serb Republic, and, if 
feasible, for local offices.  
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• Refugees and persons displaced by the conflict will have the right to vote 
(including by absentee ballot) in their original place of residence if they 
choose to do so.  
• The parties must create conditions in which free and fair elections can be held 
by protecting the right to vote in secret and ensuring freedom of expression 
and the press.  
• The OSCE is requested to supervise the preparation and conduct of these 
elections.  
• All citizens of Bosnia and Herzegovina aged 18 or older listed on the 1991 
Bosnian census are eligible to vote.  
Annex 4: Constitution 
• A new constitution for the Republic of Bosnia and Herzegovina, which will 
be known as "Bosnia and Herzegovina", will be adopted upon signature at 
Paris.  
• Bosnia and Herzegovina will continue as a sovereign state within its present 
internationally-recognized borders. It will consist of two entities: the 
Federation and the Bosnian Serb Republic.  
• The Constitution provides for the protection of human rights and the free 
movement of people, goods, capital and services throughout Bosnia and 
Herzegovina.  
• The central government will have a Presidency, a two chamber legislature, 
and a constitutional court. Direct elections will be held for the Presidency and 
one of the legislative chambers.  
• There will be a central bank and monetary system, and the central 
government will also have responsibilities for foreign policy, law 
enforcement, air traffic control, communications and other areas to be agreed.  
• Military coordination will take place through a committee including members 
of the Presidency.  
• No person who is serving a sentence imposed by the International Tribunal, 
and no person who is under indictment by the Tribunal and who has failed to 
comply with an order to appear before the Tribunal, may stand as a candidate 
or hold any appointive, elective, or other public office in the territory of 
Bosnia and Herzegovina.  
Annex 5: Arbitration 
• The Federation and the Bosnian Serb Republic agree to enter into reciprocal 
commitments to engage in binding arbitration to resolve disputes between 
them, and they agree to design and implement a system of arbitration.  
Annex 6: Human Rights 
• The agreement guarantees internationally recognized human rights and 
fundamental freedoms for all persons within Bosnia and Herzegovina.  
• A Commission on Human Rights, composed of a Human Rights Ombudsman 
and a Human Rights Chamber (court), is established.  
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• The Ombudsman is authorized to investigate human rights violations, issue 
findings, and bring and participate in proceedings before the Human Rights 
Chamber.  
• The Human Rights Chamber is authorized to hear and decide human rights 
claims and to issue binding decisions.  
• The parties agree to grant UN human rights agencies, the OSCE, the 
International Tribunal and other organizations full access to monitor the 
human rights situation.  
Annex 7: Refugees and Displaced Persons 
• The agreement grants refugees and displaced persons the right to safely return 
home and regain lost property, or to obtain just compensation.  
• A Commission for Displaced Persons and Refugees will decide on return of 
real property or compensation, with the authority to issue final decisions.  
• All persons are granted the right to move freely throughout the country, 
without harassment or discrimination.  
• The parties commit to cooperate with the ICRC in finding all missing 
persons.  
Annex 8: Commission to Preserve National Monuments 
• A Commission to Preserve National Monuments is established.  
• The Commission is authorized to receive and act upon petitions to designate 
as National Monuments movable or immovable property of great importance 
to a group of people with common cultural, historic, religious or ethnic 
heritage.  
• When property is designated as a National Monument, the Entities will make 
every effort to take appropriate legal, technical, financial and other measures 
to protect and conserve the National Monument and refrain from taking 
deliberate actions which might damage it.  
Annex 9: Bosnia and Herzegovina Public Corporations 
• A Bosnia and Herzegovina Transportation Corporation is established to 
organize and operate transportation facilities, such as roads, railways and 
ports.  
• A Commission on Public Corporations is created to examine establishing 
other Bosnia and Herzegovina Public Corporations to operate joint public 
facilities, such as utilities and postal service facilities.  
Annex 10: Civilian Implementation 
• The parties request that a High Representative be designated, consistent with 
relevant UN Security Council resolutions, to coordinate and facilitate civilian 
aspects of the peace settlement, such as humanitarian aid, economic 
reconstruction, protection of human rights, and the holding of free elections.  
• The High Representative will chair a Joint Civilian Commission comprised of 
senior political representatives of the parties, the IFOR Commander and 
representatives of civilian organizations.  
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• The High Representative has no authority over the IFOR.  
Annex 11: International Police Task Force 
• The UN is requested to establish a UN International Police Task Force (IPTF) 
to carry out various tasks, including training and advising local law 
enforcement personnel, as well as monitoring and inspecting law enforcement 
activities and facilities.  
• The IPTF will be headed by a Commissioner appointed by the UN Secretary 
General.  
• IPTF personnel must report any credible information on human rights 
violations to the Human Rights Commission, the International Tribunal or 
other appropriate organizations.  
Agreement on Initialing the General Framework Agreement 
• In this agreement, which was signed at Dayton, Bosnia and Herzegovina, 
Croatia and the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia agree that the negotiations 
have been completed. They, and the Entities they represent, commit 
themselves to signature of the General Framework Agreement and its 
Annexes in Paris.  
• They also agree that the initialing of the General Framework Agreement and 
its Annexes in Dayton expresses their consent to be bound by these 
agreements.  
 
 
